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Interaction among autonomous agents in Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) is the key as-
pect for solving complex problems that an individual agent cannot handle alone. In this
context, social approaches, as opposed to the mental approaches, have recently received a
considerable attention in the area of agent communication. They exploit observable social
commitments to develop a veriﬁable formal semantics by which communication protocols
can be speciﬁed. However, existing approaches for deﬁning social commitments tend to
assume an absolute guarantee of correctness so that systems run in a certain manner. That
is, social commitments have always been modeled with the assumption of certainty. More-
over, the widespread use of MASs increases the interest to explore the interactions between
different aspects of the participating agents such as the interaction between agents’ knowl-
edge and social commitments in the presence of uncertainty. This results in having a gap,
in the literature of agent communication, on modeling and verifying social commitments in
probabilistic settings.
In this thesis, we aim to address the above-mentioned problems by presenting a prac-
tical formal framework that is capable of handling the problem of uncertainty in social
commitments. First, we develop an approach for representing, reasoning about, and verify-
ing probabilistic social commitments in MASs. This includes deﬁning a new logic called
the probabilistic logic of commitments (PCTLC), and a reduction-based model checking
procedure for verifying the proposed logic. In the reduction technique, the problem of
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model checking PCTLC is transformed into the problem of model checking PCTL so that
the use of the PRISM (Probabilistic Symbolic Model Checker) is made possible. Formulae
of PCTLC are interpreted over an extended version of the probabilistic interpreted systems
formalism. Second, we extend the work we proposed for probabilistic social commitments
to be able to capture and verify the interactions between knowledge and commitments.
Properties representing the interactions between the two aspects are expressed in a new
developed logic called the probabilistic logic of knowledge and commitment (PCTLkc).
Third, we develop an adequate semantics for the group social commitments, for the ﬁrst
time in the literature, and integrate it into the framework. We then introduce an improved
version of PCTLkc and extend it with operators for the group knowledge and group social
commitments. The new reﬁned logic is called PCTLkc+. In each of the latter stages, we
respectively develop a new version of the probabilistic interpreted systems over which the
presented logic is interpreted, and introduce a new reduction-based veriﬁcation technique
to verify the proposed logic. To evaluate our proposed work, we implement the proposed
veriﬁcation techniques on top of the PRISM model checker and apply them on several case
studies. The results demonstrate the usefulness and effectiveness of our proposed work.
iv
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In this chapter, we introduce the context of our research, which falls in the area of agent
communication within Multi-Agent Systems (MASs). More precisely, it is concerned with
modeling and verifying social commitments –as a means of communication among agents–
in the presence of probabilistic behavior. We also identify the motivations, problem state-
ment, and research questions that we address in this thesis. Then, we list our objectives and
discuss our methodology. Finally, we conclude this chapter by providing the thesis outline.
1.1 Context of Research
1.1.1 Multi-Agent Systems (MASs)
Nowadays, the use of distributed environments to solve complex real world problems using
entities called agents is on rise [16, 86]. Agents are active, social, and adaptable computer
systems situated in some dynamic environment and capable of autonomous actions [122].
Ideally, an agent has to be [123]:
• Reactive: able to respond to changes in its environment.
1
• Pro-active: capable to behave with respect to its goals (goal-directed behavior).
• Social: able to interact and communicate with others.
• Autonomous: able to operate without direct intervention of others.
In addition to being autonomous, agents are possibly heterogeneous; that is, agents
may be independently designed by different programmers and hence it is difﬁcult to make
assumptions about their present or future behavior. A multi-agent system (MAS) consists
of a set of these autonomous entities, which interact with each other and their surrounding
environment to achieve their (joint) objectives [122]. In an open system, autonomous agents
can freely enter and exit different interactions at any time [44]. In principle, open MASs
provide no guarantees about the behavior of their agents. This means that when agents are
working together, such as carrying out a business protocol, an agent’s misbehavior may
potentially create an exception for another agent and obstruct its proper working. However,
one can look at multi-agent systems from different perspectives. From the computing per-
spective, a MAS is a computational paradigm and an advance in computer science. From
the software engineering perspective, multi-agent technology is a new software engineering
paradigm providing new abstractions for different phases of software development process.
MASs approaches can be seen as very efﬁcient and modular ways of modeling and im-
plementing systems as they are capable of designing and programming autonomous agents
with different abilities, behaviors, and intentions. From the artiﬁcial intelligence perspec-
tive, MASs provide better understanding and modeling of social intelligence and emergent
behaviors.
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1.1.2 Agent Communication Languages (ACLs)
Communication is a fundamental aspect for autonomous agents in MASs to coordinate with
one another to solve complex problems that are difﬁcult for an individual agent to tackle.
Therefore, communication among agents is a key element to build effective MASs. In
many realistic settings, agents need to interact to realize their goals. The type of interaction
among the agents varies according to the goals of these interacting parties and the context of
the transactions they are performing. An agent may cooperate with other agents to perform
a certain task, compete with others to achieve a shared goal, or do a combination of both in
order to perform individual or group tasks.
The importance of deﬁning a standard framework for agent communication has been
widely recognized. However, there have been many attempts in the literature to agree on
standards for agent communication. Semantics of ACLs are deﬁned either internally (pri-
vately) in terms of agents’ beliefs and goals, or externally (publicly) in terms of agents’
social commitments. Approaches deﬁned using the former type of semantics are called
mental approaches because they focus on the minds of interacting agents, while those de-
ﬁned using the latter one are called social approaches because they consider the social con-
text of the interacting parties. In contrast to mental approaches such as those that are built
using FIPA-ACL1 and KQML (Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language) [42], social
commitments proved to be a powerful representation for agent interactions [12, 80, 127].
They provide a social semantics that abstracts away from the agents internal states and of-
fers social and observable meaning to the messages being exchanged among agents. In the
context of this thesis, we focus on the kind of communication in which the semantics of
messages is deﬁned publicly, i.e., in terms of social commitments.




Our review of the social commitments literature has revealed a gap in handling probabilistic
social commitments in MASs. We have noticed that though social commitments have been
the subject of a vast research activity for more than a decade, current proposals to represent
and verify social commitments, for instance [9, 11, 13, 23, 24, 32, 34, 98, 113], assume
typical settings in which agents behave in an ideal manner, and consequently commitments
among interacting agents are treated under the assumption of certainty. However, in the
formulation of agent-based systems, the role of uncertainty is crucial for an efﬁcient and
coherent resolution of complex problems. Simply put, agents in MASs overcome com-
plex problems thanks to their individual capabilities to be autonomous and to adapt their
behavior with the changing of the environment in which they live and interact. Practically
speaking, agents cannot always observe all the changes in the environment, but instead each
agent can only have a partial view of other agents’ behavior [48]. Indeed, the presence of
imperfect information about the environment leads autonomous agents to make estimations
about the observable world as part of their autonomous decision making processes [114].
This means that agents inevitably meet uncertainty during their work, or in many cases,
for the high complexity of the problem, the information they handle is (or needs to be)
approximate.
This unpredictable behavior of MASs raises different important questions. The inter-
esting issue that we are mainly focusing on is how social commitments can be tackled in
such systems. In reality, due to agents’ autonomy, a request to create a social commitment
is not always followed by the creation of that commitment. The same principle applies to
fulﬁlling an established commitment. That is, in some situations, even if there is some state
of affairs (i.e., content of a commitment) that an agent wants to bring about, its actions
might not reliably drive the state of affairs into the desired state [125]. Consequently, the
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problem of specifying and verifying social commitments is made more complicated by the
presence of uncertainty.
The interaction between social commitments and agents’ knowledge is also not re-
ceiving sufﬁcient attention from the researchers in MASs community. For instance, the ad-
dition of epistemic reasoning to social commitments has not been widely considered yet. In
fact, the ability to perform knowledge reasoning over commitments is one of the major ad-
vantages of addressing the relationship between the two concepts which ultimately helps en-
sure agents’ awareness about their commitments and the fulﬁllments of these commitments.
The vast majority of existing proposals have been carried out to address each of knowledge
and commitments independently (see for example [5, 9, 26, 34, 51, 55, 62, 77, 90, 116]).
However, it has been demonstrated that these two concepts (i.e., knowledge and commit-
ments) are closely inﬂuencing each other in various practical settings such as e-commerce
applications [1]. Therefore, their interaction needs to be speciﬁed and veriﬁed in a system-
atic way. The only two existing approaches, to the best of our knowledge, to model such
interactions between knowledge and commitments either neglect the probabilistic features
of MASs by assuming an absolute degree of correctness so that systems under consideration
behave in an ideal manner [1], or adopt a different kind of commitments called “internal
commitment” rather than the “social commitments” that we consider in this thesis [95]. The
notion of “internal commitment” refers to a commitment of an agent to itself [99].
Another issue that has attracted our attention while reviewing the literature is the
limitation of the current approaches to handle group social commitments. Although the
notion of “group” has been, in one way or another, attached to commitments in several
proposals [31, 94, 124, 128], the semantics of “group social commitments” has never been
materialized in the past. The need to formalize “group social commitments” stems from the
importance of the concept of “group” in real settings as we will see later in Chapter 5.
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To address the above shortcomings, a major challenge in our research is to accurately
represent and verify social commitments in the presence of uncertainty. Another ambitious
challenge is to formally capture and verify the interaction between social commitments
and agents’ knowledge in probabilistic MASs. Yet another challenge is to deﬁne an ap-
propriate semantics for social commitments under the scope of a group (i.e., one-to-many
commitment schemes) and then study the relationship between individual and group social
commitments and knowledge in probabilistic settings.
1.3 Problem and Research Questions
The main problem we are addressing in this thesis is the problem of handling probabilistic
social commitments in MASs. To ensure having effective commitment-based interactions
in open and heterogeneous systems, these commitments need to be represented and veriﬁed
while keeping uncertainty in mind.
Current research initiatives focus mainly on extending conventional temporal logics
such as LTL [91] and CTL [38], and CTL∗ [39] to express social commitments [5, 9, 34,
51, 90, 113]. The downside of the current extended logics resides in their expressiveness.
In fact, existing commitment logics can neither express probabilistic social commitments
nor capture the interaction between commitments and knowledge in probabilistic MASs.
Besides, these logics lack the ability to deal with group-commitment scenarios and instead
they are limited to the common one-to-one commitment scheme.
To circumvent this downside, we need to come up with a probabilistic logic equipped
with a social operator –for commitments and their fulﬁlments– that is expressive enough to
represent and reason about social commitments in the presence of uncertainty.
In order to do so, some questions arise. We name these research questions: R1, R2,
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R3, . . . etc. The ﬁrst question is: how can we deﬁne a logic that is capable of specify-
ing social commitments employed in uncertain settings? [R1]. In the literature, there
is no such work that considers dealing with social commitments in the presence of proba-
bilistic behavior. Thus, our thinking was directed towards existing conventional logics to
investigate the possibility of exploiting them to help deﬁne the new logic. However, which
temporal logic to choose is the second question to be answered [R2]. Existing probabilis-
tic temporal logics such as PCTL [57] and PCTL∗ [3] consider neither commitments nor
agent communication. We propose to extend PCTL with modal operators for commitments
and their fulﬁllments. This process is achieved by combining two existing logics together.
However, any logic needs to be associated with a computational model over which formu-
lae of the logic are interpreted. So, our third question is: which computational model
to use in order to model the target MASs? [R3]. The underlying computational model
considered throughout this thesis is the one of interpreted system formalism [40], suitably
extended whenever necessary. Furthermore, to verify the proposed logic, we need to an-
swer the following question: which formal veriﬁcation technique to use? [R4]. In fact,
there are three main veriﬁcation techniques to verify systems against given requirements
in the literature, namely testing, theorem proving, and model checking. Model checking
has some advantages over others since it is fully automated and systematically checks all
system states. On the other hand, in testing, it is hard to generate exhaustive test cases, and
theorem proving requires expertise and is only semi-automatic. So, we use model checking
as a means of formal veriﬁcation. However, which model checking technique to adopt
[R5] should be answered as many techniques are already in use. Current proposals use only
qualitative model checking to ensure the correctness of commitment-based interactions in
MASs. However, since our approach is built on PCTL, we propose a reduction-based prob-
abilistic model checking technique in which the problem of model checking our logic is
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reduced to the one of PCTL. Finally, to check the effectiveness of our approach, we need
to implement the proposed model checking technique. Hence, we need to answer the ques-
tion: which model checker to use in order to verify the proposed logic? [R6]. In our
work, we adopt the PRISM model checker2 as it already allows for analyzing and verifying
probabilistic systems, and it also performs symbolic model checking of PCTL in which it
manipulates sets of states rather than single states. Such sets are efﬁciently represented and
transformed by means of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [81], which help alleviate the
state space problem associated with model checking.
1.4 Objectives
The main objectives of this research are:
1. Proposing a new meaningful, declarative, and veriﬁable logic with an expressive
power that allows for representing and reasoning about commitments and their ful-
ﬁllments in the presence of uncertainty.
2. Developing a new version of interpreted systems that can effectively model systems
under consideration.
3. Investigating the relationship between the probabilistic social commitments and prob-
abilistic knowledge in agent-based systems.
4. Deﬁning a proper semantics for the group social commitments.
5. Introducing a new model checking technique for verifying social commitments ex-




As an improvement over existing solutions, the research presented in this dissertation tar-
gets social commitments employed in systems exhibiting probabilistic behavior. We ad-
dress the problem of specifying probabilistic social commitment in MASs by developing
a novel logic called the probabilistic logic of commitments (PCTLC) that can represent
and reason about social commitments in the face of uncertainty. The introduction of the
new logic is motivated by the fact that the needed modal operators for reasoning about
probabilistic social commitments and their fulﬁllments cannot be expressed using existing
temporal logics. To build PCTLC, we advocate the technique of combining two existing
logics in a new logic. Particulary, we adopt the independent join technique [8, 46, 47].
The reason why we use this technique is because it ensures the preservation of important
properties of the logics being combined [69]. In this perspective, we combine a logic of
commitment called CTLC [9, 34] and a probabilistic logic called PCTL [57]. This process
can be seen as adding a probabilistic operator to the ingredients of the logic of commitment
(CTLC), or vise versa (i.e., adding a commitment operator to the ingredients of the proba-
bilistic logic PTLC). We model target systems using the formalism of interpreted systems.
However, the original version of interpreted systems introduced by Fagin et. al in [40] does
not capture the probabilistic behavior of MASs and also does not account for the commu-
nication between interacting agents. Therefore, we combine two extended versions of the
original formalism introduced respectively by Halpern [55] and Wan et al. [116] to capture
the stochastic behavior of the system, and Bentahar et al. [9] and El-Menshawy et al. [34]
to model the communication between interacting parties.
Furthermore, our approach evaluates social commitments at the design level as to
help reduce the cost of the development process and increase robustness of target systems.
This is achieved by formally verifying some given PCTLC-based properties using a model
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checking technique. Model checking was chosen due to the reasons stated earlier in Section
1.4. However, model checking can be generally performed by one of the following methods.
1) Direct method in which new dedicated model checking algorithms are developed in order
to verify social commitments, or 2) Indirect method which is also called reduction-based
method or translation-based method. Indirect model checking techniques involve devising
some reduction rules to reduce the problem of model checking the logic at hand to that
of an existing logic in order to use current model checkers [77]. Certainly, each method
has its own beneﬁts with respect to the logic being veriﬁed. In this thesis we follow the
latter method because it is easy to use and allows the re-use of existing model checkers
[34]. Later in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, we show how the indirect method can effectively and
efﬁciently verify probabilistic social commitments.
Our proposed model checking procedure for PCTLC includes instantiating a set of
reduction rules that transform the problem of model checking PCTLC to the problem of
model checking an existing probabilistic logic called PCTL. By so doing, we gain the priv-
ilege of re-using the available PRISM model checker.
The proposed logic of social commitment (PCTLC) is then extended by an epistemic
operator to be able to express and reason about the interaction between knowledge and so-
cial commitments in the presence of uncertainty. The idea is that, we have various logics for
each of knowledge and social commitments independently in the literature, so we combine
a probabilistic logic of knowledge and a probabilistic logic of commitments in a single logic
that we call the probabilistic logic of knowledge and commitment PCTLkc. On that basis,
we again construct a set of transformation rules to reduce the problem of model checking
the proposed logic PCTLkc to that of PCTC so that formulae expressing properties written














































































































Figure 1.1: The Proposed Framework
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To be able to handle social commitments when the scope of interacting agents is
extended from the common one-to-one scheme to one-to-many scheme, we develop a se-
mantics for the group social commitment operator and integrate it to the framework. We
also add a group knowledge operator in order for the new logic to be more expressive and
effective. The improved and reﬁned logic is called the new logic of knowledge and com-
mitments (PCTLkc+). Moreover, we generalise the model checking technique proposed for
PCTLkc to verify the new logic (PCTLkc+) with the group operators.
Finally, each proposed reduction technique is implemented independently on top of
the PRISM tool and applied to a concrete case study. Figure 1.1 depicts the structure of
the proposed work, links contributions to each other, and maps them to thesis chapters.
Moreover, this ﬁgure shows where we answer each of the research questions presented in
Section 1.3.
1.6 Contributions
We have developed a set of methods to pursue our objectives and to ﬁll the research gap
identiﬁed above. The majority of the work presented in this thesis has been published in
the proceedings of various international conferences and refereed international journals. In
summary, the main contributions are:
1. A new logic called the probabilistic logic of commitments (PCTLC) that can repre-
sent and reason about social commitments in the presence of uncertainty [107].
2. A new logic called the probabilistic logic of knowledge and commitment (PCTLkc)
whose expressive power helps capture the interaction between knowledge and social
commitments in probabilistic MASs [106]
3. A Semantics for group social commitment [104].
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4. An improved version of the logic of knowledge and commitments enriched with epis-
temic and social group operators (PCTLkc+). The distinguished feature of the new
logic lies in its ability of not only expressing the interaction between individual (ba-
sic) social commitments and knowledge, but also expressing the interaction between
group social commitments and knowledge in the presence of uncertainty [104].
5. Three reduction-based model checking techniques for PCTLC [103], PCTLkc [106],
and PCTLkc+ [105] respectively.
6. Implementation of the three proposed model checking techniques on top of the PRISM
model checker using concrete case studies.
1.7 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the background
needed for our research. Chapter 3, presents a formal approach for handling probabilistic
social commitments in MASs. In Chapter 4, we introduce a probabilistic approach for cap-
turing and verifying the interaction between knowledge and social commitments. Chapter
5 presents an improved version of the approach presented in Chapter 4 and then extends it
to accommodate group knowledge and group commitments. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis




This chapter reviews the background needed for our thesis. We explain all concepts, tech-
niques, and tools that are used throughout this thesis. In Section 2.1, the concept of so-
cial commitments as a means of communication between interacting agents is discussed.
Section 2.2 is devoted to brieﬂy review reasoning about knowledge in MASs. In Section
2.3 some modeling formalisms including Interpreted Systems, we use in this thesis, are re-
viewed. Temporal logics for systems speciﬁcation are also presented in this section. Section
2.5, describes the concept of model checking. Also, a review of some prominent existing
model checkers is given in this section. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 2.6.
2.1 Social Commitments
The interoperability requirement in MASs has led to the introduction of various standard-
ized agent communication languages (ACLs). The early proposals for deﬁning the seman-
tics of ACLs like KQML [42] and FIPA ACL1 are developed using agent’s mental states like
beliefs, desires and intentions. These are now called mentalistic approaches because their
1See FIPA-ACL speciﬁcations (1997,1999,2001,2002), http://www.ﬁpa.org/repository/aclspecs.php3
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focus are on the minds of the individuals participating in the interaction. A major weakness
of these approaches is that they assume that agents can read each other minds [96]. Actu-
ally, in open environments where heterogeneous agents are made by different vendors and
possibility using different technologies, it seems impossible to trust other agents completely
or to make strong assumptions about their internal structure. This raises a serious veriﬁca-
tion problem for such approaches [99, 122]. To overcome this drawback, some researchers
took the initiative to think about other ways for deﬁning ACLs [96]. As a result, social com-
mitments have come to emergence. Social commitments are basically modeled as public
information conveyed by an agent to another one. More speciﬁcally, a social commitment
is an agreement between an agent, namely debtor, to another agent, creditor, in which the
debtor engages towards the creditor to bring about a certain property [18, 101]. In addition
to being social, commitments are also public, and objective [23]. These properties of so-
cial commitments help heterogeneous agents attribute the same meaning to the messages
being exchanged so that the meaning is expressed using concepts that do not depend on an
individual agent’s internal structure. Importantly, a commitment between two agents is not
just a static entity, but rather a dynamic one whose state changes over time as events occurs
[54, 111]. This dynamicity feature supports commitments’ ﬂexibility and can be captured
through the manipulation of commitments via some operations such as creation, fulﬁllment,
cancellation, release, assignment, and delegation [97]. In particular, a debtor may create a
commitment, thus activating it, or fulﬁll a commitment, thus discharging it. However, for
different reasons, a debtor might fail to fulﬁll its commitment; thus, it becomes violated.
Given a commitment, its creditor can freely assign it to another creditor, and its debtor may
delegate it to a another debtor. Furthermore, a debtor may cancel a commitment; whereas,
a creditor can release the debtor from the commitment at any time.
Commitment-based approaches to ACLs have been around for about twenty years.
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Deﬁning semantics of ACLs using the notion of social commitments has its roots back to
the work of Singh [98] in which he was the ﬁrst to formalize a commitment-based ACL
in temporal logic. Since then, social commitments have gained more and more popularity
as a communication approach that makes no assumptions on the agents’ internal states.
To develop such approaches, various commitment logics that extend CTL (Computation
Tree Logic), LTL (Lineal Temporal Logic), and CTL∗ (superset of CTL and LTL) have
been introduced. Examples of efforts on this line can be found in [13, 51, 90, 98, 113].
These logics have been successful in speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of systems from different
areas such as commitment-based protocols [5, 32, 45, 127], modeling business processes
[28, 108] and agent-based web services [10]. However, the common limitation of theses
proposals is that they neglect the uncertainty aspects of MASs and tend to assume typical
behavior instead. In broad terms, uncertainty is a crucial aspect in MASs and has an impact
not only on the behavior of the participating agents but also on the communication process
that occur among these agents.
In this thesis, we consider the notion of “social commitments” that is meant for com-
munication. That is, the notion of commitments as a foundation for understanding inter-
actions among agents. Therefore, we use communicative social commitments, also called
illocutionary social commitments, as deﬁned in [9, 34]. Those commitments are formally
denoted by Ci→ jϕ , meaning that agent i, the debtor, commits to agent j, the creditor, to
bring about ϕ , where ϕ is the content of the commitment. Different notations with the
same meaning can be found in [28, 44, 98]. This notion of “social commitments” should
not be confused with some related notions such as “Internal Commitments”, “Norms”, and
“Obligations”. In traditional Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI), a commitment was understood as
the commitment of a single agent to some belief or to some course of action [76]. In this
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direction, “internal commitment” [18, 99] which refers to a commitment of an agent to it-
self has been widely used in the domain of AI. Norms, which are formal speciﬁcations of
deontic statements that aim at regulating the interactions among agents, have also received
a considerable attention in AI and MASs domains [7, 100, 110]. Obligations, on the other
hand, have long been used as explicit mechanisms for inﬂuencing the behavior of inter-
acting parties and providing some stability and reliability in their interactions [29]. Some
researchers consider that commitments are somewhat like direct obligations [30, 99].
In contrast, the interesting feature that differentiates social commitments from the
aforementioned notions is that a social commitment is directed from one party (the debtor)
to another one (the creditor) which reﬂects the intuition that the debtor is committed to
doing something for the creditor. These commitments are illocutionary in the sense that
they are used as means of conveying information among interacting agents. Moreover,
communicative commitments are equipped with a grounded semantics because the social
accessibility relation has an intuitive and computational interpretation that makes its model
checking possible.
2.2 Reasoning about Knowledge
knowledge logics (also known as epistemic logics) are focused on reasoning about the
knowledge that agents may have about themselves, the world, or other agents [40]. These
logics have been shown to be a useful framework for the analysis of distributed algorithms
and security protocols. Generally, an epistemic logic captures the essence of knowledge
through modal operators. In this line, the contribution of Jaakko Hintikka in [58] is recog-
nized as the ﬁrst attempt to investigate the logic of knowledge as a modal logic. Since then,
researchers in AI and MASs have carried out numerous proposals to represent the evolu-
tion of knowledge [26, 40, 55, 62, 77, 78, 83, 116]. Formally, agent i knows something
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is denoted by Ki ϕ . From a veriﬁcation perspective, model checking the logic of knowl-
edge was ﬁrst mooted by Halpern and Vardi [56]. Since that time theoretical aspects of
model checking the logic of knowledge and its combinations with temporal logic have been
studied.
In addition to reasoning about what one agent knows, it is often useful to be able to
reason about the common knowledge: the things that everyone knows, and that everyone
knows that everyone knows, etc. Everyone knows can be deﬁned as an abbreviation:
EGϕ ≡ K1ϕ ∧ . . .Knϕ , where G is a group of agents, and n is the number of agents in G.
The common knowledge operator CG is deﬁned in terms of EG as follows:
CG ≡ EGϕ ∧E2Gϕ ∧·· ·∧EkG∧ . . . , where EkG is read: “everyone in G knows ϕ to degree k”.
2.3 Modeling Techniques
Transition Systems (TSs) are typically used as models to describe the behavior of systems
[22]. They are the underlying models for all various non-real time models. TSs are modeled
as directed graphs where nodes reﬂect the states, and edges represent the transitions. A state
describes some information about the systems at a given moment of its behavior. Whereas,
a transition describes how the systems can evolve from one state to another. A TS is a tuple
T = (S,Act,→, I,AP,L), where S is a set of states, Act is a set of actions, →⊆ S×Act×S
is the transition relation, I ⊆ S is a set of initial states, AP is a set of atomic propositions,
and L : S→ 2AP is a labeling function [4]. In order to model random phenomena, transition
systems are enriched with probabilities. This can be done in different ways. In the rest of
this section, we review some probabilistic models that are used throughout our thesis.
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2.3.1 Interpreted Systems
The formalism of interpreted systems introduced by Fagin el al. [40] provides a useful
framework to locally model autonomous and heterogeneous agents who interoperate within
a global system via sending and receiving messages. This thesis builds on this formalism
for various reasons:
• It is a suitable formalism for modelling agent-based systems as it provides a good
level of abstraction that allows focusing more on modeling the key characteristics of
the interacting agents along the evolution of their social commitments [37].
• It has been successfully used to reason about various aspects of MASs such as time,
knowledge, commitments, and correct behavior.
• Interpreted systems are computationally grounded [120], meaning that the semantics
of interpreted systems maps directly to the paths of the system, and vice-versa.
• Interpreted systems can be easily extended. The original version introduced by Fagin
et al. [40] has been extended in various ways as we will see below. This property of
being readily extensible is important for us as we always need to extend it as required.
Suppose a set Agt = {1, . . . ,n} of n agents. At all times, each agent in the system
is assumed to be in some local state, which intuitively records the complete information
that the agent can access at that time. Speciﬁcally, each agent i ∈ Agt is characterized
by countable sets Li and Acti of local states and actions respectively in which the set Acti is
mainly used to account for the temporal evolution of the system. Also, local actions for each
i ∈ Agt are performed in compliance with a local protocol Pi : Li → 2Acti , which assign a
set of enabled local actions to a local state. Intuitively, this set corresponds to the actions
that are enabled in a given local state. Furthermore, the environment in which agents live
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may be modeled by means of a special agent e. Associated with e are a set of local states
Le, a set of actions Acte, and a protocolPe. A tuple g= (l1, . . . , ln, le)∈ (L1× . . .×Ln×Le)
where li ∈ Li for each i ∈ Agt and le ∈ Le, is called a “global state” and represents the
instantaneous conﬁguration of all agents in the system at a given time (i.e., a snapshot of
the global system at a speciﬁc time).
The local evolution function τi that determines the transitions for an individual agent
i between its local states is deﬁned as follows:
τi : Li×Le×Acti → Li (2.1)
Similarly, the global evolution function of the system is deﬁned as follows:
τ : G×ACT → G (2.2)
where ACT = Act1 × . . .×Actn and each component a ∈ ACT is called a “joint action”,
which is a tuple of actions (one for each agent), and G= L1× . . .×Ln×Le denotes a set of
global states. The notation li(g) is used to represent the local state of agent i in the global
state g. In addition, I ∈ G is an initial global state for the system.
Bentahar et al. [9] and El-Menshawy et al. [34] extended Fagin et al.’s formalism
of interpreted systems with shared and unshared variables in order to account for commu-
nication that occurs during the execution of MASs and to provide an intuitive semantics
for social commitments that are established through communication between interacting
agents. They speciﬁcally associated with each agent i ∈ Agt a countable set Vari of local
variables. Then, they used those variables to represent communication channels through
which messages are sent and received. Technically, they denoted the value of a variable x
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in the set Vari at local state li(g) by lxi (g). Thus,
if li(g) = li(g′), then lxi (g) = l
x
i (g
′) for all x ∈Vari (2.3)
The idea is that, for two agents i and j to communicate, they should share a communication
channel, which is represented by shared variables between i and j. In this perspective,
a communication channel between i and j does exist iff Vari ∩Var j = /0. For a variable
x ∈ Vari ∩Var j, lxi (g) = lxj(g′) means the values of x in li(g) for agent i and in l j(g′) for
agent j are the same. This intuitively represents the existence of a communication channel
between i (in g) and j (in g′) through which the variable x has been sent by one of the two
agents to the other, and as a consequence of this communication, i and j will have the same
value for this variable. The key point is that shared variables are only used to motivate
the existence of communication channels, not the establishment of communication. Figure
2.1 depicts the idea of using shared and unshared variables for establishing communication
channels between interacting agents. The three conditions upon which a communication
channel between i and j exists are listed below:
For each pair (i, j) ∈ Agt2, ∼i→ j⊆ S×S is a social accessibility relation. s∼i→ j s′ is
deﬁned by the following conditions:
1. li(s) = li(s′).
2. Vari∩Var j = /0 such that ∀x ∈Vari∩Var j we have lxi (s)= lxj(s′).
3. ∀y ∈Var j−Vari we have lyj(s)= lyj(s′).
Recently, Al-Saqqar et al. [1] have modiﬁed the deﬁnition of social accessibility
relations given in [9, 34] in such a way that the new deﬁnition does no longer depend


















Figure 2.1: Social accessibility relations as deﬁned in [9, 34]
interacting agents as shown in Figure 2.2. The new condition upon which a communication
channel is established is stated below:
s≈i→ j s′ iffVari∩Var j = /0 such that ∀x∈Vari∩Var j we have lxi (s) = lxi (s′) = lxj(s′),
where ≈i→ j⊆ S×S is the new social accessibility relation [1].
The original version of interpreted systems formalism was also extended by Halpern
et al. [55] and further by Wan et al. [116] to model the stochastic behavior of MASs.
Accordingly, the local evolution function is deﬁned as follows:
τi : Li×Acti×Li → [0,1] (2.4)
such that for all li ∈ Li, we have ∑l′i∈Li τi(li,ali→l
′
i , l′i) = 1 wherein ali→l
′
i is the local action
labeling a transition between local states li and l′i of agent i.
Moreover, the global evolution function is deﬁned as follows:
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Figure 2.2: The modiﬁed version of social accessibility relations as in [1]
The sum of the probabilities over all possible transitions from a given state g must be 1: for
all g∈G, ∑g′∈G τ(g,ag→g
′
,g′) = 1 where ag→g′ is the action labeling the transition between
the two global states g and g′ of the system.
Such a modiﬁed version of the interpreted systems formalism is called probabilistic
interpreted systems [55]. In the formalism of probabilistic interpreted systems, the transi-







2.3.2 Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs)
DTMCs are commonly used as models for probabilistic systems. A DTMC is a transition
system that deﬁnes the probability of moving from one state to another.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (DTMC). Given a set of atomic propositions AP, a DTMC can be deﬁned as
a 4-tuple D = (S,s,P,L) where:
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• S is a nonempty and ﬁnite set of states;
• s is the initial state;
• P : S× S → [0,1] is the transition probability matrix, such that for every state s ∈ S,
we have ∑s′∈SP(s,s′) = 1;
• L : S → 2AP is a labelling function which assigns to each state s ∈ S the set L(s) of
atomic propositions that are valid in the state.
DTMCs are stochastic models of systems that change their states at discrete-times
(n = 0,1,2, . . .) and have the following property: if the system enters state s at time n, it
stays there for exactly one unit of time and then jumps to state s′ at time n+ 1 with prob-
ability P(s,s′), regardless of its history up to and including time n−1 [71]. The deﬁnition
shows that states are labelled with atomic propositions which indicate the status of the sys-
tem (e. g., waiting, sending). The system can change its states according to a probability
distribution given by the transition probability matrix P. Each element P(s,s′) of the tran-
sition probability matrix gives the probability of making a transition from state s to state s′.
A transition from state s to s′ can only take place if P(s,s′) > 0. However, if P(s,s′) = 0,
no such transition is possible. Again, the probabilities from a given state must sum up to 1,
i.e. ∑s′∈SP(s,s′) = 1.
2.3.3 Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)
MDPs can be seen as transition systems in which in any state a nondeterministic choice
between probability distributions exists.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (MDP). Given a set of atomic propositions AP, an MDP model M can be
deﬁned as a 5-tuple, M = (S,AC,Pt , Ii,L), where:
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• S is a nonempty and ﬁnite set of states.
• Pt : S×AC×S→ [0,1] is the transition probability function, such that for every state
s ∈ S and action θ ∈ AC, we have ∑s′∈SPt(s,θ ,s′) ∈ {0,1}.
• AC is a set of actions. At state s ∈ S, the action θ is enabled iff ∑s′∈SPt(s,θ ,s′) = 1.
• Ii is an initial state.
• L : S→ 2AP is a state labeling function.
MDPs possess the Markov property, which requires that any information necessary
to predict the effects of all events is captured in the state. In other words, the effects of an
event in a state depend only on that state and not on the prior history. However, the major
difference between MDPs and DTMCs is the choice of actions. While a DTMC describes
the state transitions of a stochastic system, it does not capture the fact that the agent can
choose an appropriate course of action in order to change the system’s state. However, for
an MDP, at every state one or more actions are available, and each action is associated with
a probability distribution over the successor states. That is, MDPs are not augmented with
a unique probability measure. Reasoning about probabilities of sets of paths of an MDP
relies on the resolution of the nondeterminism. In order to deﬁne the semantics of such an
MDP, the notion of adversary is used. An adversary (also referred to as scheduler, policy,
or strategy [4, 112]) is an entity that resolves the nondeterministic choices in MDPs. Being
in a state of the system, an adversary determines the next step to be taken. Informally, at
each step, the adversary picks an action, and then the next state is picked according to the
probability distribution associated with the action. In our work, we focus on a special class
of adversaries called Memoryless Adversary [43] where the choice of action depends only
on the state and independent of what has happened in the history. An adversary is said to
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be memoryless if it always selects the same action in a given state. The induced adversaries
are basically DTMC models.
A partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) is a variant of MDPs. Ac-
tually, a POMDP is an MDP in which the agent is unable to observe the current state.
Instead, the agent must maintain a probability distribution over the set of possible states,
based on a set of observations and observation probabilities, and the underlying MDP. A
POMDP model [65] can be described as a tuple (S,A,T,R,Ω,O), where:
• S, A, T, and R describe an MDP;
• Ω is a ﬁnite set of observations that the agent can experience of its world; and
• O : S×A → ∏(Ω) is the observation function, which gives, for each action and
resulting state, a probability distribution over possible observations.
2.4 System Speciﬁcation
In this section, we describe some logics for specifying requirements of transition-based
systems. The discussed logics use atomic propositions and connective operators to describe
systems properties in states.
2.4.1 Temporal Logics
Temporal logic is a modal logic with modal operators to describe the temporal order of
occurrence of events. The two commonly used temporal logics are Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) [91] and Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [38]. They differ from each other based on
the way the notion of time is handled. LTL describes temporal relations on one execution
path; whereas, in CTL it is possible to quantify over the paths with respect to a given state.
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Below, we review the two logics and then review a probabilistic extension of CTL called
PCTL [57].
a. LTL (Linear Temporal Logic)
In LTL, time is considered to be a linear sequence. Each moment in time has a unique
possible future. Thus, temporal operators are provided for describing events along a single
time line. The syntax of LTL is deﬁned by the following BNF grammar [4]:
ϕ ::= true | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | ©ϕ | ϕ U ϕ |
where: p ∈ AP is an atomic proposition. © and U stand for “next time” and “until” respec-
tively. The formula ©ϕ holds at the current state if ϕ holds in the next state. The formula
ϕUψ holds at the current state, if there is some future moment for which ψ holds and ϕ
holds at all moments until that future moment. ♦ϕ , which stands for eventually ϕ holds,
can be derived using the U operator as follows: ♦ϕ ≡ true U ϕ . Also, theϕ , which stands
for “always ϕ , or globally ϕ”, can be derived as follows: ϕ ≡ ¬♦ ¬ϕ . The Boolean
connectives ¬ and ∨ are deﬁned in the usual way.
Semantics of LTL. Formulae of LTL stand for properties of paths. Therefore, a path can
either satisfy an LTL-formula or not. Let T = (S,Act,→, I,AP,L) be a transition system
where S is a nonempty set of states, Act is a set of actions, →⊆ S×Act×S is the transition
relation, I ⊆ S is a set of initial states, AP is a set of atomic propositions, and L : S→ 2AP is
a labeling function. Given s,s′ ∈ S, (s,s′) ∈→ means that s′ is an immediate successor of s.
A path π in T is an inﬁnite sequence of states π = (s0,s1, . . .) such that (si,si+1) ∈→ for all
i ≥ 0. π(i) is the (i+1)-th state in π , and πi = π(i),π(i+1), . . . is the sufﬁx of π starting
at π(i). The satisfaction of an LTL-formula ϕ with respect to the path π in the transition
system T is denoted by (T,π) |= ϕ , which is inductively deﬁned as follows:
− (T,π) |= p iff p ∈ L(π(0)),
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− (T,π) |= ¬ϕ iff (T,π)  ϕ,
− (T,π) |= ϕ1∧ϕ2 iff (T,π) |= ϕ1 and (T,π) |= ϕ2,
− (T,π) |=©ϕ iff (T,π(1)) |= ϕ,
− (T,π) |= (ϕ1 U ϕ2) iff ∃ k≥ 0 such that (T,π(k)) |= ϕ2 and ∀ 0≤ i< k,(T,π(i)) |= ϕ1.
An LTL-formula ϕ holds at state s in the model T, written (T,s) |= ϕ , iff all paths starting
from s satisfy ϕ . Moreover, the model T satisﬁes ϕ iff ϕ holds in all paths emanating
from an initial state. We say that ϕ is valid in T, written |= ϕ when for all s ∈ S, we have
(T,s) |= ϕ .
b. CTL (Computation Tree Logic)
In contrast to LTL, CTL advocates a tree-like structure time, allowing some instants
to have more than a single successor. Thus, it distinguishes between state formulae and
path formulae. The syntax of CTL is given by the following BNF grammar [4]:
ϕ ::= true | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Eψ | Aψ
ψ ::=©ϕ | ϕ U ϕ |
Intuitively, state formulae express a property of a state, while a path formulae express a
property of a computation path where a computation path is an inﬁnite sequence of states.
© and U are deﬁned as in LTL. Notice that, in CTL, a path quantiﬁer (either A which stands
for all paths, or E which stands for some path) is immediately followed by a single one of
the usual linear temporal operators , ♦, ©, or U in order to construct a well formed state
formula.
Semantics of CTL. The semantics of CTL is given via the satisfaction relation “|=”. Given
a transition system T = (S,Act,→, I,AP,L), where S is a nonempty set of states, Act is a
set of actions, →⊆ S×Act× S is the transition relation, I ⊆ S is a set of initial states, AP
is a set of atomic propositions, and L : S → 2AP is a labeling function. A path π in T is
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also an inﬁnite sequence of states π = (s0,s1, . . .) such that (si,si+1) ∈→ for all i≥ 0. π(i)
is the (i+ 1)-th state in π , and πi = π(i),π(i+ 1), . . . is the sufﬁx of π starting at π(i).
The set of paths starting at state s is denoted by Π(s). The satisfaction relation (T,s) |= ϕ ,
which means that the formula ϕ holds at the state s in the model T, is deﬁned inductively
as follows:
− (T,s) |= p iff p ∈ L(s),
− (T,s) |= ¬ϕ iff (T,s)  ϕ,
− (T,s) |= ϕ1∧ϕ2 iff (T,s) |= ϕ1 and (T,s) |= ϕ2,
− (T,s) |= ∃ψ iff (T,π) |= ψ for some π ∈Π(s),
− (T,s) |= ∀ψ iff (T,π) |= ψ for all π ∈Π(s).
Like LTL, the satisfaction relation |= for path formulae is deﬁned by:
− (T,π) |=©ϕ iff (T,π(1)) |= ϕ,
− (T,π) |= (ϕ1 U ϕ2) iff ∃ k≥ 0 such that (T,π(k)) |= ϕ2 and ∀ 0≤ i< k,(T,π(i)) |= ϕ1.
State formula ∃ψ is valid in state s if and only if there exists some path starting in s that
satisﬁes ψ . In contrast, state formula ∀ψ is valid in state s if and only if all paths starting in
s satisfy ψ .
c. PCTL (Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic)
PCTL [57] is an extension of CTL with a probability operator. It is used to express
properties of probabilistic systems. The syntax of PCTL is deﬁned by the following BNF
grammar [4]:
ϕ ::= true | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Pk(ψ)
ψ ::=©ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ U≤m ϕ
where: p ∈ AP is an atomic proposition and Pk is a probabilistic operator. ∈ {<,≤,>
,≥}. k ∈ [0,1] is a probability bound or threshold. m ∈ N+ is a positive integer number
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reﬂecting the maximum number of transitions needed to reach a certain state. ϕ and ψ
are state and path formulae respectively. ©,U and U≤m stand for “next time”, “until” and
“bounded until” path modal connectives respectively.
Semantics of PCTL.Given a probabilistic model such as a Markov chainM=(S,P, I,AP,L)
where S is a ﬁnite set of states, P is the transition probability matrix, I ⊆ S is a set of initial
states, AP is a set of atomic propositions, and L : S→ 2AP is a labeling function. Let ϕ and
ψ be PCTL state and path formulae respectively. The satisfaction relation |= is deﬁned for
a PCTL state formula ϕ inductively as follows:
− (M,s) |= p iff p ∈ L(s),
− (M,s) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,s)  ϕ,
− (M,s) |= ϕ1∧ϕ2 iff (M,s) |= ϕ1 and (M,s) |= ϕ2,
− (M,s |= Pk(ψ) iff Probs(ψ)  k,where: Probs(ψ) = Probs{π ∈Π(s) | π |= ψ}.
For a path π ∈M, the satisfaction relation is deﬁned as follows:
− (M,π) |=©ϕ iff (M,π(1)) |= ϕ,
− (M,π) |= ϕ1 U≤m ϕ2 iff ∃ k ≤ m s.t. π(k) |= ϕ2 and ∀i< k,(M,π(i)) |= ϕ1,
− (M,π) |= ϕ1 U ϕ2 iff ∃ m≥ 0 s.t. (M,π) |= ϕ1 U≤m ϕ2.
Combining Logics
Logic combination is emerging as a relevant research topic in many disciplines.
Multi-modal logics can be constructed by combining existing logics in several ways [47].
In this thesis, we advocate the independent join (or fusion) technique [46]. The problem of
combining logics based on the independent join technique is as follows. Given two logics
A and B, how do we combine them into one logic which extends the expressive power of
each one?
The combination of two logics using this technique is denoted by A⊕B. Given two
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logics A and B, their languages LA and LB, and their corresponding axiomatic systems
HA and HB, the logic A⊕B is the smallest logic with the following properties:
• The language of the combined logic is the union of LA and LB.
• The resultant logic from the combination is axiomatised by the set of axioms HA∪
HB which means that no “interaction” axiom is needed, i.e., axioms involving mixed
operators are not necessarily required.
If LA and LB are interpreted in Kripke frames F1 = (W,R11, . . . ,R1n) and F2 =
(W,R21, . . . ,R2m) , the semantics of the combined logic A⊕B can be interpreted over the
Kripke frame F= (W,R11, . . . ,R1n,R21, . . . ,R2m) obtained by the “fusion” of the two frames
F1 and F2. Using this technique ensures the preservation of important properties (such as
soundness, completeness, and decidability, etc.) of the logics being combined as they are
deﬁned in the literature [69].
2.5 Model Checking
Veriﬁcation is one of the important aspects of ACLs. Generally, for ACL standards to gain
acceptance, it must be possible to determine whether or not any agent-based system that
claims to conform to an ACL standard actually does so. An ACL is said to be veriﬁable if it
enjoys this property [119, 121]. In this section, we review a veriﬁcation technique, namely
model checking, that is utilized in this research to verify our proposed logics.
Model checking is a formal, automatic technique to verify whether or not system
design models satisfy given requirements [17, 22]. In other words, it is the problem of
establishing whether or not a given formula ϕ is true in a given model M. Its value lies in
its ability to verify various aspects (such as time, knowledge, commitments, etc) of target
systems [69]. Typically, a model checking process involves three phases:
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1. Modeling: To convert a design into a formalism so that mathematical computation
and logical deduction can be performed.
2. Speciﬁcation: To specify the properties that the model must satisfy.
3. Veriﬁcation: To verify whether the model holds the speciﬁcation.
Despite its success in verifying hardware and software systems from different do-
mains, model checking is generally a resource-intensive process that requires a large amount
of memory and processing time. This is essentially due to the fact that the systems’ state
space may grow exponentially with the number of variables combined with the presence
of concurrent behaviors, which may hinder the veriﬁcation process. This phenomenon is
known as the state explosion problem. To alleviate this problem, several techniques have
been explored in the literature [4]. Binary Decision Diagrams BDD, Partial Ordered Reduc-
tion, Compositional Reasoning, Symmetry and Induction are some well-known approaches.
However, one of the most promising solutions aim at optimizing model checking algorithms
by introducing symbolic data structures based on binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [22, 81].
Moreover, an ordered BDD (OBDD) is one which has an ordering for some list of variables.
Model checking using BDDs is called symbolic model checking. It emphasizes that sets of
states are represented symbolically. It is more efﬁcient than using merely individual states.
The idea is to represent states and set of states as Boolean Formulae which, in turn, can
be readily encoded as BDDs. To elaborate, let Sat(ϕ) = {s ∈ S | M,s |= ϕ) be a set of
states satisfying ϕ . Given a CTL formula ϕ and a CTL model M = (S,Rt ,V, I), the idea
is to compute the set Sat(ϕ) of states satisfying ϕ in M, which is represented in BDDs,
and then compare it against the set of initial states I in M that is also represented in BDD.
If I ⊆ Sat(ϕ), then the model M satisﬁes the formula ϕ; otherwise, a counter-example is



















Figure 2.3: Qualitative model checking overview
model checking when the result is given as “Yes” or “No” (i. e. whether or not the property
is satisﬁed) is called qualitative or non-probabilistic model checking. An overview of this
type of model checking is given in Figure 2.3.
2.5.1 Probabilistic Model Checking
In addition to qualitative model checking, quantitative (or probabilistic) model checking
techniques based on probabilistic model checkers have recently gained popularity [4]. Prob-
abilistic model checking is an automatic formal veriﬁcation technique for the analysis of
systems exhibiting stochastic behavior [59]. It offers the capability for interpreting the sat-
isﬁability of a given property in terms of quantitative results. In fact, the probabilistic model
checking technique is similar to conventional model checking as discussed earlier. The ma-
jor difference is that a probabilistic model contains additional information on the likelihood
of transitions between states, or to be more speciﬁc, it can model probabilistic behavior. An


































Figure 2.4: Probabilistic model checking overview
a probabilistic model checker takes as input a property and a model and delivers the result
“Yes” or “No”, or some probability.
2.5.2 Model Checking Tools
There have been various model checking tools (also known as Model Checkers) in the
literature. In this section, we review some of the most widely used model checkers.
• MCMAS
MCMAS (Model Checker for Multi-Agent Systems) [79] is an OBDD-based sym-
bolic model checker developed for the purpose of verifying epistemic properties of
multi-agent systems. It supports branching-time temporal logic CTL. It also supports
interpreted systems as an underling formalism for modeling target systems. The ded-
icated programming language used for describing a MAS in MCMAS is called ISPL
(Interpreted Systems Programming Language). MCMAS was originally designed to
handle the logic of knowledge CTLK and the branching-time temporal logic CTL.
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Recently, it has been extended by implementing some new algorithms that allow it
to accept commitment formulae and hence to verify social commitments. The new
extended version is called MCMASC (MCMAS for commitments). [37].
• NuSMV
NuSMV [21], an extension version of SMV [81], is a well-known and widely trusted
model checker. It is written in ANSI C language. As an input language, NuSMV
accepts ﬁles written in SMV language. While the SMV tool was originally devel-
oped to implement the OBDD-based symbolic model checking for CTL, NuSMV
implements also bounded model checking techniques for LTL – in addition to the
symbolic model checking techniques for CTL. This feature distinguishes it the most
from SMV. Nevertheless, both SMV and NuSMV allow for a compact description of
systems under consideration using modules, which may be composed to describe the
evolution of states.
• SPIN
The SPIN [60] model checker is one of the most used tools for tracing software
defects in concurrent system designs. It was introduced in the 1980s at Bell Labs.
Later, it has been made available to the public. The original version of SPIN has been
continually under development and improvement. SPIN’s programming language is
called PROMELA. [61] details the theoretical foundations of SPIN and presents the
user manual. The main characteristics of SPIN are:
 It is designed for the temporal logic LTL.
 It is an automata-based model checker.
 It implements various optimization strategies, including on-the-ﬂy model checking
and partial order reduction.
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• PRISM
PRISM [73] stands for Probabilistic Symbolic Model Checker. It is the leading tool in
the area of probabilistic model checking. The tool is widely used for checking proba-
bilistic speciﬁcations over probabilistic models. The speciﬁcations can be expressed
either in PCTL or in Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [4, 43]. Systems models can
be described using the PRISM language as Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMCs),
Continuous-Time Markov Chains (CTMCs), or Markov Decision Processes (MDPs).
PRISM has been successfully used to analyse systems with a wide range of applica-
tion domains, including communication and multimedia protocols, randomised dis-
tributed algorithms, security protocols, and many others. PRISM is the most appro-
priate tool for our work thanks to its capability of verifying probabilistic properties,
and accepting formulae written in PCTL. Using PRISM, it is possible to either deter-
mine if a probability satisﬁes a given bound or obtain the actual value.
• MCK
MCK (stands for Model Checking Knowledge) is a model checker for the logic of
knowledge, developed at the School of Computer Science and Engineering at the
University of New South Wales [48]. It is implemented using OBDD-based sym-
bolic algorithms. In the epistemic dimension, agents may use their observations in
a variety of ways to determine what they know: observation alone, observation and
clock, and perfect recall of all observations. The former way (observation alone) is to
evaluate an agent’s knowledge based merely on its current observation. The second
way (observation and clock) is to compute an agent’s knowledge based both on its
current observation and the current clock value. The latter way (perfect recall of all
observations) is to compute an agent’s knowledge based on the complete record of all
its observations.
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In the temporal dimension, speciﬁcation formulae may use either linear time tempo-
ral logic (LTL), or the branching-time logic (CTL). Recently, MCK was extended by
Huang et al. [62] to permit the veriﬁcation of knowledge in the presence of proba-
bilistic behavior.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the background and concepts needed for the rest of my thesis.
As social commitments are the main focus of this research, it is important, again, to empha-
sis that the notion of “social commitments” we consider in this thesis is the communicative
social commitments that are public and observable. In the next chapter, we propose a new




In this chapter1, we establish a formal approach that allows us to precisely address prob-
abilistic social commitments in MASs. The proposed approach is based on a new logic
called the Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic of Commitments (PCTLC), or simply the
Probabilistic Logic of Commitments. This logic is intended to be used for specifying, rea-
soning about, and verifying social commitments in the presence of uncertainty. PCTLC
extends PCTL [57] with a commitment modality. We model MASs using a new version of
interpreted systems that merges two extended versions of the original formalism namely,
the probabilistic interpreted systems [55, 116], and the communicative interpreted systems
[9, 34]. Finally, we propose a model checking technique for verifying PCTLC.
3.1 Introduction
In order to represent and reason about social commitments in MASs, commitment logics
that extend CTL (Computation Tree Logic), LTL (Linear Temporal Logic), and CTL∗ (su-
perset of CTL and LTL), have been proposed, see for example [13, 51, 90, 98, 113].
1The results of this chapter have been published in the journal of Applied Soft Computing [103], and in
SoMet_13 [107].
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However, current logics are merely related to specifying and verifying social com-
mitments under the assumption of reliable behavior. That is, they assume an absolute,
non-probabilistic running of systems under consideration. Unfortunately, this is not always
the case. Heterogeneous and autonomous intelligent components in agent societies make
it challenging to precisely analyze random or unreliable agent behaviors. This is because
agents’ actions are based on observing the environment changes and in many situations
agents cannot observe all changes in the environment. Instead, each agent can only have a
partial view of other agents’ behaviors [75]. In such cases, agents make estimations about
the observable world as part of their autonomous decision making processes. Moreover,
when the system being modeled is an open system, i.e., interacts with an environment,
then uncertainty in transitions may arise due to imperfect information about the environ-
ment [114]. Consequently, the problem of representing and verifying social commitments
is made more complicated by the presence of transition uncertainty which makes agents un-
certain about the effects of their actions on their peers and not fully aware of the situations
other agents are encountering. Moreover, from the communication perspective, commit-
ments themselves are likely to be subject to probabilistic events. Xuan and Lesser [125]
have highlighted some sources of uncertainty that make a commitment between two agents
probabilistic:
1. The ﬁrst source of uncertainty is related to the debtor’s action(s). That is, debtor’s
action(s) might not always lead to the fulﬁlment of the commitment.
2. The second source comes from the agent decision processes. Debtors beliefs and
desires might change such that continuing to pursue fulﬁlling the commitment for
others becomes irrational. Debtors’ beliefs about the commitment context include,
for example, the degree that the agent to whom the commitment was made is still
relying on its fulﬁllment. To the creditor, this can cause problems because its action(s)
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may depend on the honoring of the commitment by the debtor.
3. The third form of uncertainty comes from the incomplete knowledge of the debtor
about the creditor or about the environment within which the agent interacts.
Consequently, one cannot assume that all autonomous agents will behave as expected,
and thus commitments among communicating parties cannot be treated under the assump-
tion of certainty. Modeling uncertainty can be achieved using different tools including fuzzy
logic as in [25, 66], and probabilities as in [41, 67, 89]. On the one hand, fuzzy logic is
speciﬁcally designed to deal with imprecision of facts (or the membership in vaguely de-
ﬁned sets). Its use in MASs has been investigated by some researchers. In [49], the authors
exploited fuzzy logic in designing intelligent agents that communicate with each other us-
ing a mental approach that uses KQML [42] as the underlying communication language.
However, mental approaches suffer from the semantics veriﬁcation problem [121]. That is,
they cannot verify whether an agent is acting according to a given semantics or not [122].
In our work, we adopt social approaches that are based on observable social commitments.
On the other hand, probability is an important component in the design and analysis
of complex systems across a broad spectrum of application domains, including commu-
nication and multimedia protocols, randomised distributed algorithms, security protocols,
and dynamic power management. It is commonly used to model unreliable or unpredictable
behavior. Probability deals with the chance of happening for an event or a condition (i.e.,
likelihood of some event or condition). Although probability has proven to be a powerful
technique in handling different aspects of MASs [70, 116], its value in addressing social
commitments for agent communication is yet to be investigated. In our research, we use
probabilities to model the uncertainty because we are concerned with the likelihood of the
fulﬁlment of the commitment. That is, when a social commitment between two agents takes
place, we are interested to know about the chance of fulﬁlling that commitment at a certain
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state in the system. Additionally, using probabilities to handle the uncertainty of social
commitments provides us with the privilege of exploiting existing probabilistic logics and
model checkers. However, it is worth mentioning that probability assignments are not the
focus of this research. Probability values can be obtained from historical data using some
techniques such as the algorithm proposed in [84] which allows us to compute the ﬁxed
probabilities between two states based on some other probabilities.
To motivate our study of modeling and verifying social commitments in the face of
uncertainty, we use two situational examples that arise in practical settings such as web-
based systems and mobile applications.
Example 1. Let us consider the Online Shopping System [52] which aims at providing
services for purchasing online items. In the web-based Online Shopping System, customers
can request to purchase one or more items from the supplier. Having selected an item, the
customer commits towards the supplier to pay in order for the request to take place. Once
the order is paid, the supplier conﬁrms the order, and commits to deliver the requested
item and enters a planned shipping date. Finally, when the order is shipped, the customer
is notiﬁed. Because of the uncertainty associated to the underlying infrastructures of both
commitments (i.e., the internet through which the payment is made and the transport system
used for the delivery of purchased goods), there is no guarantee that these commitments will
be fulﬁlled. Therefore, reasoning about and verifying the commitments to pay and to deliver
have to be tackled with probability in mind so that the degree of fulﬁlling each commitment
can be measured.
Example 2. In the ﬁeld of mobile applications which are complex in nature, address-
ing social commitments should be paired with the consideration of uncertainty of transitions
and commitments. Let us consider a simple scenario where a receiver agent and a sender
agent have an agreement, in which the receiver agrees to pay the sender in return of the
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delivery of a requested service. This can be represented as a social commitment, in which
the receiver will be committed to the sender to pay upon obtaining the requested service. In
such a scenario, because of the presence of stochastic behavior in mobile applications, the
commitment to pay is not going to be surely satisﬁed.
The scenarios described above cannot be represented by existing conventional com-
mitment logics because of the uncertainty aspect in both systems. Consequently, they can-
not be veriﬁed. To cope with the situation, we need a probabilistic commitment logic that
accounts for uncertainty, and a probabilistic model checking procedure to verify properties
expressed in the new logic.
The ultimate objective of this chapter is to introduce a logical approach that is capable
of addressing probabilistic social commitments in MASs. This is done as follows. First, we
present a new probabilistic logic called PCTLC to express and reason about social commit-
ments when uncertainty is a key factor. The introduction of PCTLC logic was driven by the
fact that current probabilistic temporal logics such as PCTL [57] and PCTL∗ [3] consider
neither commitments nor agent communication. PCTLC extends PCTL with modalities for
commitments and their fulﬁllments. We model probabilistic MASs by a formalism resulted
from extending the interpreted systems introduced by Fagin et al. [40]. This extension con-
siders agents uncertainty and their communication abilities. Properties to be veriﬁed (i.e.,
social commitments) are speciﬁed using the probabilistic logic of commitment PCTLC.
Second, we introduce a formal and automatic, probabilistic model checking technique for
probabilistic commitment-based agent interactions. Our proposed veriﬁcation method is
a reduction-based model checking technique and consists of transforming the problem of
model checking PCTLC into the problem of model checking PCTL [57] so that the use of
PRISM is made possible. This reduction encompasses two main steps. In the ﬁrst step, we





























Figure 3.1: A schematic view of the probabilistic social commitment approach
reduce the MDP into DTMC to be as an input to the PRISM model checker. In the latter
step, we transform PCTLC formulae into PCTL formulae based on some rules developed
speciﬁcally for this purpose. As argued in [34], the main advantage of the reduction tech-
niques compared to the direct ones is that they are easy to implement and allow the re-use of
the existing model checkers. Third, we implement the proposed model checking approach
on top of the PRISM model checker and then apply it on a concrete case study, namely
Oblivious Transfer Protocol [92] from cryptography domain. Figure 3.1 gives an overview
of the proposed approach.
3.2 The Probabilistic Logic of Commitments (PCTLC)
In this section, we present a new modal logic called the probabilistic logic of commitments
(PCTLC) to address probabilistic social commitments in MASs. The logic we introduce
extends the probabilistic branching-time logic PCTL [57] with a commitment modality. To
do so, we merge two existing logic namely PCTL [57] and CTLC [9, 34] using the inde-
pendent join technique [46]. The independent join combines logics as they are deﬁned in
the literature. Thus, it ensures the preservation of each logic’s properties in the new logic.
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Hereafter, we ﬁrst present the syntax of our new logic, and then we deﬁne its semantics. Be-
fore going further, we deﬁne a new version of interpreted systems formalism with abilities
to account for the uncertainty aspect in target MASs and to model the social interactions
between communicating parties.
The PCTLC model is generated based on two extensions of the interpreted systems
formalism [40] introduced in [9, 34], and [55, 116] as discussed in Chapter 2.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Models). Given a set of atomic propositions AP = (p,q,r, . . .), the model
M1 = (S, I,P,{∼i→ j}(i, j)∈Agt2 ,ν) is a tuple where:
• S ⊆ L1 × . . .×Ln is a countable set of all reachable global states for the system. A
state s is reachable iff there exists a sequence of transitions from an initial state to s
in which the probability of each transition is greater than 0.
• I ∈ S is an initial global state for the system.
• P : S×S→ [0,1] is a total transition probability function deﬁned as P(s,s′)= τ(s,as→s′ ,s′)
iff there exists a joint action a= (a1, . . . ,an) ∈ ACT such that
∑i∈Agt τi(li(s),ali(s)→li(s
′), li(s′))> 0 and ∑s′∈S P(s,s′) = 1 for all s ∈ S.
• For each pair (i, j) ∈ Agt2, ∼i→ j⊆ S×S is a social accessibility relation. s∼i→ j s′ is
deﬁned by the following conditions:
1. li(s) = li(s′).
2. Vari∩Var j = /0 such that ∀x ∈Vari∩Var j, we have lxi (s)= lxj(s′).
3. ∀y ∈Var j−Vari, we have lyj(s)= lyj(s′).
• ν : S→ 2AP is a function valuating states with atomic propositions.
Our model M1 can be thought of as a labeled state-transition system in which each transi-
tion from s to s′ is annotated with a probability value in the matrix P indicating the likelihood
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of its occurrence wherein the transition is assumed to take a discrete time-step. This means
that there is no notion of real time, while reasoning about discrete time is possible through
state variables keeping track of time and counting transition steps. It is also important to
mention that every state in M1 has at least one outgoing transition to avoid deadlocks.
Moreover, all terminating/ﬁnal states are modeled with a self-loop.
Computation paths. We can unfold the model M1 into a set of paths. A path through the
model M1 is a non-empty (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequence π = s0 s1 . . . of global states such
that P(sr,sr+1)> 0 for all r ≥ 0. Also, π(r) denotes the (r+1)th state of π , i.e., π(r) = sr
for all r ≥ 0.
Probability Space. Let Ω be a sample set (or the set of possible outcomes of an ex-
periment). A pair (Ω,F) is said to be a sample space if F is a σ -algebra of measurable
subsets of Ω, which are closed under countable union and complement and often built from
basic events called cylinders (the elements of F are called events). A triple (Ω,F,μ) is a
probability space if μ is a probability measure over F, i.e., 0≤ μ(A)≤ 1 for all A ∈ F such
that:
• μ( /0) = 0,
• μ(Ω) = 1, and
• μ(⋃∞k=1Ak) = Σ∞k=1μ(Ak) for disjoint Ak.
The probability matrix P induces a probability space on the set of inﬁnite paths Π(s),
which start in the state s, using the cylinder construction [4] as follows. An observation of
a ﬁnite path determines a basic event (cylinder). Suppose s = s0; for π = s0 s1 . . . sn, we
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1 if π consists of a single state
∏n−1r=0 P(sr,sr+1) otherwise.
(3.1)
This extends to a unique measure Probs on the set of inﬁnite paths Π(s) w.r.t countable
union and complement [74].
3.2.1 Syntax of PCTLC
Deﬁnition 3.2 (PCTLC syntax). Given a set of atomic propositions AP, the PCTLC formu-
lae are deﬁned by the following BNF grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | C | Pk(ψ) | Pk(C )
ψ ::=©ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ U≤m ϕ
C ::=Ci→ jϕ | Fu(Ci→ jϕ)
where: p ∈ AP is an atomic proposition and Pk is a probabilistic operator where ∈ {<
,≤,>,≥} and k ∈ [0,1] is a probability bound or threshold. m ∈ N+ is a positive integer
number reﬂecting the maximum number of transitions needed to reach a certain state. ϕ
and ψ are state and path formulae interpreted over the states and paths of M1 respectively.
The Boolean connectives ¬ and ∨ are deﬁned in the usual way. Formulae C , called social
formulae, are special state formulae in PCTLC that can express social properties using
the modal connectives Ci→ j and Fu(Ci→ j) standing for “commitment” and “fulﬁllment of
commitment” respectively. ©,U and U≤m stand for “next time”, “until” and “bounded
until” path modal connectives respectively.
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The intuitive meanings of the temporal and probabilistic operators are straightforward from
PCTL [63]. Ci→ jϕ is read as “agent i commits towards agent j that ϕ”. Fu(Ci→ jϕ) is
read as “the commitment Ci→ jϕ is fulﬁlled”. The probabilistic operator Pk(C ) on social
formulae C states the degree of the commitment and the fulﬁllment of the commitment:
how much the agent is conﬁdent about its commitment and fulﬁlling its commitment re-
spectively.
PCTLC logic allows us to express properties likeCi→ jϕ ⊃ (P≥0.95(U≤13Fu(Ci→ jϕ)))
which means when a commitment about ϕ is held, then the probability that the commitment
is fulﬁlled within 13 discrete-time steps is at least 0.95, where ⊃ stands for the logical im-
plication.
3.2.2 Semantics of PCTLC
The semantics of our PCTLC is interpreted over the probabilistic model M1 which was
introduced above. Given a model M1 = (S,P, I,{∼i→ j}(i, j)∈Agt2 ,ν), then (M1,s) |= ϕ
states that “a state s in the model M1 satisﬁes the state formula ϕ , (M1,π) |= ψ means
that “a path π in the model M1 satisﬁes the path formula ψ , and (M1,s) |= Pk(ψ) means
that “a state s in the model M1 satisﬁes Pk(ψ) if the probability of taking a path from
s that satisﬁes ψ is in the interval speciﬁed by  k”. When the model M1 is clear from
the context, we simply write the satisfaction relation |= as follows: s |= ϕ and π |= ψ .
Furthermore, for a given pair (i, j) ∈ Agt2 of agents, we denote the number of accessible
states s′ from a given state s such that s∼i→ j s′ by |s∼i→ j s′|. The sample space of such pair
of agents at s is the set of possible accessible states of (i, j) at s and is equal to |s∼i→ j s′|.




1, if s |= ϕ
0, otherwise.
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Deﬁnition 3.3 (Satisfaction). Satisfaction of a PCTLC formula in the model M1 is con-
ductively deﬁned as follows:
• For a non-probabilistic state formula:
s |= p iff p ∈ ν(s);
s |= ϕ1∨ϕ2 iff s |= ϕ1 or s |= ϕ2;
s |= ¬ϕ iff s  ϕ;
s |=Ci→ jϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S s.t. s∼i→ j s′,we have s′ |= ϕ;
s |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff ∃s′ ∈ S s.t. s′ ∼i→ j s and s′ |=Ci→ jϕ;
• For a path formula:
π |=©ϕ iff π(1) |= ϕ;
π |= ϕ1 U≤m ϕ2 iff ∃ k ≤ m s.t. π(k) |= ϕ2 and ∀i< k,π(i) |= ϕ1;
π |= ϕ1 U ϕ2 iff ∃ m≥ 0 s.t. π |= ϕ1 U≤m ϕ2;
• For a probabilistic operator working over a path formula:
s |= Pk(ψ) iff Probs(ψ)  k where: Probs(ψ) = Probs{π ∈Π(s) | π |= ψ};
• For a probabilistic operator working over a social formula, where the set of events F is
the set of states satisfying a formula, and assuming that the probabilities of accessible
states from state s are equally distributed:
s |= Pk(Ci→ jϕ) iff Prob(s |=Ci→ jϕ) k, where:
Prob(s |=Ci→ jϕ) =
∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |= ϕ|
|s∼i→ j s′| ;
s |= Pk(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff Prob(s |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ))  k, where:
Prob(s |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) = Probs{π ∈Π(s′) | s′ ∼i→ j s and π = s′ . . .s and s′ |=Ci→ jϕ}
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Note that, the probabilistic commitment is computed based on the number of accessi-
ble states that satisfy the content over the whole number of accessible states, which reﬂects
the uncertainty of the agent over the accessible states, so that over the commitment. On the
other hand, probabilistic fulﬁllment is computed using the probabilistic transitions of the
path linking the commitment state to the fulﬁllment state.
The following proposition is straightforward from the semantics:
Proposition 3.1.
If (M1,s) |= P≤0(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) and (M1,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ), then the state s is not reachable
from the commitment state.
Theorem 3.1 (Probabilistic and Conventional Commitments Equivalences).
1. (M1,s) |= P≥1(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M1,s) |=Ci→ jϕ
2. (M1,s) |= P≤0(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M1,s) |=Ci→ j¬ϕ
3. (M1,s) |= P]0,1[(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M1,s) |= ¬Ci→ j¬ϕ ∧¬Ci→ jϕ
Proof.
• First equivalence.
“=⇒ ”. Assume s |=P≥1(Ci→ jϕ). By the PCTLC semantics, it follows that Prob(s |=
Ci→ jϕ)≥ 1. Thus,
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| ≥ 1. This means that for all s′ ∈ S such that s∼i→ j s′,
we have s′ |= ϕ , and hence s |=Ci→ jϕ .
“ ⇐= ”. Assume s |= Ci→ jϕ . By the PCTLC semantics, it follows that for all s′ ∈
S such that s ∼i→ j s′, we have s′ |= ϕ (i.e. all accessible states from s satisfy ϕ).
Consequently, ∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |= ϕ|= |s∼i→ j s′|. Therefore,
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| ≥ 1 and hence,
s |= P≥1(Ci→ jϕ).
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• Second equivalence.
“=⇒ ”. Assume s |=P≤0(Ci→ jϕ). By the PCTLC semantics, it follows that Prob(s |=
Ci→ jϕ) ≤ 0. Thus,
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| ≤ 0. Since the set of the accessible states from s is
not empty, then ∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |= ϕ| must be 0 (i.e. ϕ is not true in any of the accessible
states). Consequently, for all s′ ∈ S such that s∼i→ j s′, we have s′  ϕ , which means
s′  ¬ϕ . Hence, s |=Ci→ j¬ϕ .
“⇐= ”. Assume s |=Ci→ j¬ϕ . By the PCTLC semantics, it follows that for all s′ ∈ S




|s∼i→ js′| ≤ 0. Hence, s |= P≤0(Ci→ jϕ).
• Third equivalence.
“ =⇒ ”. Assume s |= P]0,1[(Ci→ jϕ). By the PCTLC semantics, it follows that 0 <
Prob(s |=Ci→ jϕ)< 1. Thus, 0<
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| < 1. This means that it would never be
the case that ∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |= ϕ| = |s ∼i→ j s′| nor ∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |= ϕ| = 0. Consequently,
there exist some s′,s′′ ∈ S such that s∼i→ j s′ and s∼i→ j s′′ and s′ |= ϕ and s′′ |= ¬ϕ .
Hence, it is impossible to have s |= ¬ϕ or s |= ϕ for all s ∈ S such that s ∼i→ j s.
Consequently, s Ci→ j¬ϕ and s Ci→ jϕ . Hence s |= ¬Ci→ j¬ϕ and s |= ¬Ci→ jϕ .
“ ⇐= ”. Assume s |= ¬Ci→ jϕ . By the PCTLC semantics, it follows that there exists
s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i→ j s′ and s′ |= ¬ϕ . Consequently, it would never be the case
that s′ |= ϕ for all s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i→ j s′. Therefore, 1 >
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| . Now
assume s |= ¬Ci→ j¬ϕ . Therefore, ∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |= ϕ| = 0 would never be he case as
some accessible states should satisfy ϕ . Consequently,
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| > 0. Thus, 0 <
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| < 1. Hence, s |= P]0,1[(Ci→ jϕ).
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Theorem 3.2 (Probabilistic and Conventional Fulﬁllment Equivalences).
1. (M1,s) |= P>0(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff (M1,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) and s is reachable from the
commitment state.
2. (M1,s) |= P≤0(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff (M1,s) |=¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ) or s is not reachable from the
commitment state.
Proof.
The proofs of these equivalences are direct from Proposition 3.1 and the above semantics.
3.3 Model Checking PCTLC using Reduction
When designing communicating agent-based systems that are complex, and stochastic in
nature, formal veriﬁcation is generally recognized as one of the best design support tech-
nologies, and a valuable tool towards having efﬁcient systems in terms of ensuring the
compliance of system design models against the given requirements.
Given a multi-agent system represented as a probabilistic interpreted system M1 and
a speciﬁcation ϕ in PCTLC describing a desirable property, the problem of probabilistic
model checking PCTLC can be deﬁned as: 1) establishing whether or not (M1, I) |= ϕ , i.e.,
if I ∈ Sat(ϕ)where Sat(ϕ)={s∈ S | M1,s |=ϕ} is the set of states satisfying ϕ , 2) compar-
ing the probability of satisfying ϕ with a probability threshold  k, where Sat(Pk(ϕ)) =
{s ∈ S | Probs(ϕ)  k}, or 3) computing the probability of ϕ , (M1,s) |= P=? (ϕ). Note
that answers to the second and third queries can be: (1) truth values, when the speciﬁcation
simply asks for a comparison to a probability threshold, or (2) quantitative, returning the
actual probability.
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Figure 3.2: The proposed reduction technique of model checking PCTLC
Figure 3.2 depicts the workﬂow of our reduction technique. As mentioned before,
the idea is to reduce the problem of probabilistic model checking PCTLC to the problem of
probabilistic model checking PCTL in order to be able to use the PRISM model checker.
Concretely, the proposed reduction technique consists of two processes (see Figure 3.2).
In the former process, we transform our model M1 into an MDP model. MDPs are the
standard models for describing systems with probabilistic and nondeterministic behavior
[93]. At every state of an MDP, one or more actions are available, and each action is
associated with a probability distribution over the successor states. That is, MDPs are not
augmented with a unique probability measure. Reasoning about probabilities of sets of
paths of an MDP relies on the resolution of the nondeterminism. In order to deﬁne the
semantics of such an MDP, as in [43], we use the notion of adversary to factor out the
nondeterminism and consider the probability of some behavior of the MDP (i.e., allowing
us to place a well-deﬁned probability on the set of paths for each adversary). Informally,
at each step, the adversary picks an action, and then the next state is picked according to
the probability distribution associated with the action. In this work, we focus on a special
class of adversaries called Memoryless Adversary where the choice of action depends only
on the state and independent of what has happened in the history (i.e., which path led to the
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current state). An adversary is said to be memoryless if it always selects the same action
in a given state. The resulting adversaries are basically DTMC models for which we can
deﬁne a probability measure over paths. The obtained DTMC models will be the input of
the PRISM model checker. In the latter process of the reduction technique, we transform
PCTLC formulae into PCTL formulae (see Section 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Transforming the Model M1
Given M1 = (S,P, I,{∼i→ j}(i, j)∈Agt2 ,ν), and a PCTLC formula ϕ , we deﬁne an MDP
model M′1 = H (M1) and PCTL formula H (ϕ) using the transformation function H
such that M1 |= ϕ iff H (M1) |= H (ϕ). Recall that the model M′1 is an MDP model
= (S,AC,Pt , Ii,L). Now, the model M′1 can be deﬁned using the function H as follows:
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Figure 3.3: Translating relations in M1 model into actions in the MDP model
• S=S; Ii=I; L=ν .
• The set of atomic action propositions AT is deﬁned as follows:
AT = {ε} ∪ {α1→1,α1→2, . . . ,αn→n} ∪ {β1→1,β1→2, . . . ,βn→n}. Consequently, the
set of actions AC = {γ} ∪ {α11,α12, . . . ,αnn} ∪ {β 11,β 12, . . . ,β nn} where n is the
number of agents, 1≤ i≤ n, and 1≤ j≤ n. Actions γ,α i j, and β i j denote transitions
53
deﬁned, respectively, from the probabilistic transition relation P, the accessibility re-
lation ∼i→ j, and the transition added when there exists a transition labeled with α i j
and needed to deﬁne the transformation of the formula Fu(Ci→ j). Note that, ε is
the atomic action forming γ , αi→ j is the atomic action forming α i j, and βi→ j is the
atomic action forming β i j.
• Pt combines the probabilistic transition relations of P and the probabilistic relations
obtained from translating accessibility relations ∼i→ j to transitions labeled with α i j
and probabilistic transitions labeled with β i j. The probability of each transition la-
beled with α i j is equal to the probability of each other transition labeled with α i j
emanating from the same state which is calculated by dividing one over the number
of transitions labeled with α i j (i.e., equal distribution). The probabilities of transi-
tions labeled with β i j are calculated in the same way. For states s,s′ ∈ S and action




P(s,s′), if θ = γ
1
|s∼i→ js′| , if θ = α
i j
1
|s′∼i→ js| , if θ = β
i j.
Now, we deﬁne three different adversaries as follows: σt to be used for interpreting
temporal formulae, σc to be used for interpreting commitment formulae, and σ f u to be
used for interpreting fulﬁllment formulae. It is worth to mention that when deﬁning σc and
σ f u, some rules need to be set. To deﬁne σc at a state, action α i j has to be among the
enabled actions at that state. Then, the memoryless adversary σc picks the action α i j at this
state, and γ at all other states. Meaning that, deﬁning adversary σc at a state rather than a
commitment state (the state whereCi→ jϕ holds) would not be possible. The same principle
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applies to σ f u. However, σt always picks action γ at every state in M′1. The induced model
of applying the adversary σ over M′1 is a DTMC model.
Hereafter, we introduce our reduction rules that translate PCTLC formulae to PCTL
formulae w.r.t a given adversary.
3.3.2 Reducing PCTLC Formulae into PCTL Formulae
Given the adversary σt , the PCTLC formulae are transformed inductively into PCTL as
follows:
H (p) = p, if p is an atomic proposition,
H (¬ϕ) = ¬H (ϕ),
H (Pk(ϕ ∨ψ)) = Pk(H (ϕ)∨H (ψ)),
H (Pk©ϕ) = Pk©H (ϕ),
H (Pk(ϕ U ψ)) = Pk(H (ϕ)UH (ψ)),
H (Pk(ϕ U≤m ψ)) = Pk(H (ϕ)U≤mH (ψ)),
It is important to note that, the social formulae (Ci→ j,Fu) are not transformed into
PCTL by making use of σt because σt does not capture the social accessibility relation and
instead it captures only the temporal transitions at every state in the model M′1.
Given the adversary σc, the PCTLC commitment formulae are transformed induc-
tively into PCTL as follows:
H (Ci→ jϕ) = P≥1(©H (ϕ)),
H (PkCi→ jϕ) = Pk(©H (ϕ)),
The reason behind translating a commitment formula Ci→ jϕ to next operator © fol-
lowed by H (ϕ) is that by having transformed the social accessibility relation ∼i→ j into a
transition labeled with action α i j, it is obvious that all next states of the commitment state
through the transition labeled with α i j satisfy H (ϕ) (see Figure 3.3). Hence, with respect
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to σc, which is a DTMC model that ignores all transitions at the commitment state except
those labeled with α i j, we clearly see that the commitment state is converted into a state
whose all successor states satisfy H (ϕ).
Given the adversary σ f u, the PCTLC fulﬁllment formulae are transformed inductively
into PCTL as follows:
H (Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) = P>0(©H (Ci→ jϕ)) = P>0(©P≥1(©H (ϕ))),
H (PkFu(Ci→ jϕ)) = Pk(©H (Ci→ jϕ)) = Pk(©P≥1(©H (ϕ))).
Fu(Ci→ jϕ) is transformed to next operator © followed by H (Ci→ jϕ) because w.r.t
σ f u, there exists a state next to the fulﬁllment state in which H (Ci→ jϕ) holds. Notice that
the added transitions, labeled with β i j, always go from the fulﬁllment state to a state where
H (Ci→ jϕ) is satisﬁed (they go either to the commitment state or to the fulﬁlment state
itself where in both states the formulaH (Ci→ jϕ) holds). This can be easily seen in Figure
3.3. Indeed, this intuitively complies with the fact that for a commitment to be fulﬁlled, the
commitment itself has to be created before and still alive at the moment of fulﬁlling it (i.e.,
at the fulﬁllment state).
Theorem 3.3 (Satisfaction Equivalence).
Let σt , σc, and σ f u be the DTMC models corresponding to the adversaries that cap-
ture respectively temporal formulae, commitment formulae, and fulﬁllment formulae. The
following equivalences hold:
(M1,s) |= p iff (σt ,s) |= p
(M1,s) |= ¬ϕ iff (σt ,s) |= ¬H (ϕ)
(M1,s) |= Pk(ϕ ∨ψ) iff (σt ,s) |= PkH (ϕ)∨PkH (ψ)
(M1,s) |= Pk©ϕ iff (σt ,s) |= Pk©H (ϕ)
(M1,s) |= Pk(ϕ U ψ) iff (σt ,s) |= Pk(H (ϕ)U H (ψ))
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(M1,s) |= Pk(ϕ U≤m ψ) iff (σt ,s) |= Pk(H (ϕ)U≤m H (ψ))
(M1,s) |=Ci→ jϕ iff (σc,s) |= P≥1(©H (ϕ))
(M1,s) |= PkCi→ jϕ iff (σc,s) |= Pk(©H (ϕ))
(M1,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff (σ f u,s) |= P>0(©P≥1(©H (ϕ)))
(M1,s) |= PkFu(Ci→ jϕ) iff (σ f u,s) |= Pk(©P≥1(©H (ϕ))
This theorem emphasizes that each formula has to be associated with an adversary
(i.e., a DTMC model) over which the formula can be interpreted. The proof of the theo-
rem with regard to PCTL formulae is straightforward as PCTL formulae are also PCTLC
formulae. For commitment formulae, the proof is given in Theorem 3.4 that discusses the
soundness of the transformation rules.
Theorem 3.4 (Soundness and Completeness of H ). Let M1 and Φ be respectively a
PCTLC model and formula and let H (M1) and H (Φ) be the corresponding model and
formula in PCTL. We have M1 |=Φ iffH (M1) |=H (Φ).
Proof. Our aim here is to prove that the proposed reduction technique is sound (i.e., the nec-
essary condition) and complete (i.e., the sufﬁcient condition). We prove this by induction on
the structure of the formulaΦ. The case of PCTLC formulae that are also PCTL formulae is
straightforward. In what follows, we analyze two cases: Φ=Ci→ jϕ and Φ= Fu(Ci→ jϕ).
• Φ = Ci→ jϕ . We have (M1,s) |= Ci→ jϕ iff (M1,s′) |= ϕ for every s′ ∈ S such that
s ∼i→ j s′. Consequently, (M1,s) |= Ci→ jϕ iff (M′1,s′) |= H (ϕ) for every s′ ∈ S
such that (s,α i j,s′) ∈ Pt . Now, w.r.t the adversary σc that is deﬁned to interpret
commitment formulae overM′1, every inﬁnite path π ∈Πσc(s) satisﬁes that π(1) = s′
and (M′1
σc ,π(1)) |=H (ϕ). Then, (M′1σc ,s) |=©H (ϕ) for all π ∈Πσc(s). As the
path quantiﬁer A is not deﬁned in PCTL, and we have P≥1 (weaker than A) instead,
so we obtain (M′1
σc ,s) |= P≥1(©H (ϕ)).
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• Φ = Fu(Ci→ jϕ). We have (M1,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff there exists s′ ∈ S such that
s′ ∼i→ j s and (M1,s′) |=Ci→ jϕ . Consequently, (M1,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff there exists
s′ ∈ S such that (s,β i j,s′) ∈ Pt and (M′1,s′) |=H (Ci→ jϕ). Now, w.r.t the adversary
σ f u which is deﬁned to interpret fulﬁllment formulae over M′1, we obtain at least one
inﬁnite path π ∈ Πσ f u(s) that satisﬁes π(1) = s′ and (M′1σ f u ,π(1)) |=H (Ci→ jϕ).
Since E is equivalent to P>0 and H (Ci→ jϕ) is equivalent to P≥1(©H (ϕ)), so we
obtain (M′1
σ f u ,s) |= P>0(©P≥1(©H (ϕ))).
3.4 Implementation
In this section, we apply our model checking approach on Oblivious Transfer Protocol
[92]. For the purpose of providing experimental results demonstrating the effectiveness
and efﬁciency of our reduction technique, we verify some properties of oblivious transfer
protocol, expressed originally in PCTLC logic.
3.4.1 Oblivious Transfer Protocol
Oblivious transfer protocol was introduced in cryptography to allow a sender to send some
information to a receiver in such a way that the sender remains oblivious to what is received.
We study the oblivious transfer protocol due to Rivest [92] in which the sender (Alice)
has two secret values m0 and m1. The receiver (Bob) would like to know one of the two
values without telling Alice which value he learned. This protocol has been the subject of
analysis for some probabilistic properties [62]. Rivest’s solution uses a trusted initializer
(Ted) who participates only in the initial setup to help both agents by providing them with
some random material. The random material includes two random strings (r0 and r1) —
with the same length as Alice’s messages— to be sent to Alice in the setup phase. Then, Ted
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ﬂips a bit (d) and sends it to Bob along with a random string rd. Now, for Bob to request
mc (c= 0 or 1), he sends Alice the bit e= c⊕d (⊕ is the exclusive OR logical gate: it takes
as input two bits and its output is 0 if the two bits are equal, and 1 otherwise). Then, Alice
responds with the values f0 = m0⊕ re and f1 = m1⊕ r1−e. Upon receiving f0 and f1, Bob
can compute mc = fc⊕ rd. Having done so, Alice will have no idea as to which message
Bob chose, and Bob will have learned nothing about m1−c (Alice’s other message).
In order to use the PRISM model checker to verify and analyze Oblivious Transfer
Protocol, the latter has to be encoded into the PRISM input language. Simply, we treat the
Sender (Alice) and Receiver (Bob) in the protocol as agents. Then, each agent is translated
into a module in the PRISM language. Moreover, each agent is comprised of variables that
determine its local states. For example, Bob’s variables are: bool S_req: send request, bool
R_ack: receive acknowledgement, bit d: 0 or 1, bit c: 0 or 1, bit e: 0 or 1, bool S_e: send
bit e, string rd: random variable obtained form Ted in the initial setup, R_ f : receive f0 and
f1. The global model is obtained by the synchronization between all modules (agents).
3.4.2 Oblivious Transfer Protocol Properties
One of the main motivations of this chapter is to verify properties expressed as PCTLC
formulae. Gurin and Pitt [53] expressed that verifying protocol properties can be performed
at design time. This kind of veriﬁcation aims to prove that some property will hold for all
the interactions that correctly follow the protocol. Our proposed model checking technique
mainly accommodates compliance by design-time veriﬁcation of interaction properties. In
fact, there have been various catalogs of properties proposed in the literature [11, 19, 27]. In
our work, we check safety, Liveness, and reachability properties in the Oblivious Transfer
Protocol as they are popular examples of protocol properties. These properties reﬂect some
requirements of the oblivious transfer protocol that have to be met.
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• Property 1: Safety “Something bad will never occur".
This property can be generally expressed in CTL by the formula A¬p which is
equivalent to P≥1(¬p) in PCTLC where p represents a bad situation. Such bad
situations include, for example, when Alice fulﬁlls her commitment of using the bit e
(received from Bob) along with the random variables r0,r1 (obtained from Ted in the
initial setup) for calculating f0 and f1, but Bob does not use the random variable rd
to compute his requested value mc. This bad situation can be avoided using PCTLC
as follows:
ϕ1 = P≥1¬[P>0♦Fu(CA→B(use− e))∧P≥1¬(use− rd)]
• Property 2: Liveness “Something good will eventually happen".
This property expresses that some good situation will eventually occur. For example,
in all computation paths it is always the case that if Alice fulﬁlls her commitment of
using the bit e and the random strings r0,r1 for calculating and delivering f0 and f1,
then in all paths in the future Bob can use f0 and f1 to compute his requested value
mc. This can be expressed as follows:
ϕ2 = P≥1[P>0♦Fu(CA→B(use− e))⊃ P≥1♦(comp−mc)]
• Property 3: Reachability “Some particular situation can be reached".
This property comes in the form E♦p which is equivalent to P>0♦p in PCTLC where
p is the situation that needs to be reached. For example, once Alice commits towards
Bob to use the bit e in calculating f0 and f1, there should be a possibility from the
initial state for Alice to eventually reach the fulﬁllment state where she can fulﬁll her
commitment towards Bob. This property can be expressed as follows:
ϕ3 = P>0♦Fu(CA→B(use− e))
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Table 3.1: Veriﬁcation results of the oblivious transfer protocol
Exp.# #Agents #States #Transitions Const. Time (s)
Exp.1 2 25 75 0.016
Exp.2 4 625 3125 0.047
Exp.3 6 1.6∗104 1.1∗105 0.079
Exp.4 8 3.9∗105 3.5∗106 0.188
Exp.5 10 9.7∗106 1.1∗108 0.344
Exp.6 12 2.4∗108 3.1∗109 0.547
Exp.7 14 6.1∗109 9.2∗1010 0.859
Exp.8 16 1.5∗1011 2.6∗1012 1.11
Exp.9 18 3.8∗1012 7.2∗1013 1.5
Exp.10 20 9.5∗1013 2∗1015 2.531
Exp.11 22 2.3∗1015 5.5∗1016 3.531
Exp.12 24 6∗1016 1.5∗1018 5.609
3.4.3 Experimental Results
We have carried out 12 experiments. Our experiments were performed on a Dell laptop
equipped with 32-bit Windows XP with 4 GB of RAM and Genuine Intel(R) CPU at 2.4
GHz. Table 3.1 reports the results of the performed experiments wherein (Exp.#) denotes
the experiment number, (#Agent) denotes the number of agents, (#States) denotes the num-
ber of reachable states, (#Transitions) denotes the number of transitions, and (Construction
Time) denotes the time needed for building the simulated model in seconds. We started our
experiments with only two agents; Alice (sender) and Bob (Receiver). In this interaction,
Bob requests a value (information) from Alice and then Alice responses to Bob and sends
him the requested value in such a way that both agents respect the rules of the protocol for
encrypting and decrypting the information.
In the second experiment, we added two more agents (receivers) who also request
some values from Alice. For the rest of the experiments, each time we add two more agents

















Figure 3.4: Model construction time for oblivious transfer protocol
successfully build the model.
In every experiment, we monitor the changes occurring in (#States), (#Transitions),
and (Construction Time) respectively. From Table 3.1, we notice that the state space (rep-
resented in terms of reachable states) increases exponentially as the number of agents in-
creases (cf. Figure 3.4). Likewise, the number of transitions also increases exponentially as
more agents are added. However, the time (in seconds) needed for building the model in-
creases polynomially, which shows the effectiveness of our model checking approach when
the system scales up (about 6∗1016 states). The cause of this time increase in building the
model when more agents are added is that the number of reachable states and the size of the
model are increased. Moreover, the more we become closer to the state explosion point as
in experiments 20, 22, and 24, the higher time is need for building the model. This reﬂects
the fact that the model size in these experiments turns out to be much bigger.
It is worth noticing that starting from experiment #2 we re-write the desirable prop-
erties ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ3 in a parameterized form, as follows (n is the number of agents in the
experiment):
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However, for the purpose of model checking using our reduction technique, every de-
ﬁned formula needs to be transformed according to the reduction rules presented in Section
3.3.2. Below we show the transformed forms of ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ3 respectively in the case of
two agents (i.e., experiment #1).
H (ϕ1) = P≥1¬[P>0♦H (Fu(CA→B(use− e)))∧P≥1¬H (use− rd)].
= P≥1¬[P>0♦(P>0(©P≥1(©H (use− e))))∧P≥1¬H (use− rd)].
= P≥1¬[P>0♦(P>0(©P≥1(©(use− e))))∧P≥1¬(use− rd)].
H (ϕ2) = P≥1[P>0♦H (Fu(CA→B(use− e)))⊃ P≥1♦H (comp−mc)].
= P≥1[P>0♦(P>0(©P≥1(©H (use− e))))⊃ P≥1♦H (comp−mc)].
= P≥1[P>0♦(P>0(©P≥1(©(use− e))))⊃ P≥1♦(comp−mc)].
H (ϕ3) = P>0♦H (Fu(CA→B(use− e))).
= P>0♦[P>0(©P≥1(©H (use− e)))].
= P>0♦[P>0(©P≥1(©(use− e)))].
Table 3.2 shows the results in terms of veriﬁcation time (in seconds) of model checking
the above deﬁned properties when the number of agents varies from a simple interaction
scenario of two agents to more complicated scenarios of 24 agents. The total execution time
can be easily obtained by summing up the construction time to build the simulated model
reported in Table 3.1 and the veriﬁcation time of the considered formulae. For instance,
in Exp. 12 with 24 agents, the total execution time of verifying ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ3 is 5.609+
2.609+2.453+2.118 = 12.789 s.
Notice that the three properties hold in all conducted experiments, meaning that our
approach is successful in expressing and verifying system properties using PCTLC. Clearly,
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Table 3.2: Results of model checking some properties for Oblivious Transfer Protocol
Exp.# #Agents Time for MC ϕ1 Time for MC ϕ2 Time for MC ϕ3
1 2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
2 4 0.015 0.016 0.015
3 6 0.032 0.031 0.032
4 8 0.046 0.047 0.062
5 10 0.078 0.093 0.078
6 12 0.11 0.141 0.172
7 14 0.203 0.188 0.219
8 16 0.359 0.328 0.343
9 18 0.453 0.403 0.5
10 20 1.062 0.797 0.719
11 22 1.813 1.125 1.106
12 24 2.609 2.453 2.118
as depicted in Figure 3.5, the time for model checking the three properties is similar which
increases polynomially till we reach the case of 20 agents then it grows up dramatically.
However, these results demonstrate the scalability of our reduction-based model checking
technique to verify commitments and their fulﬁlments in uncertain setting for agent com-
munication.
3.5 Related Work
The work of this chapter is related to a number of other proposals in the literature. In this
section, we give a brief overview of the most relevant ones.
3.5.1 Adding Commitment Operators to Existing Logics
Singh in [98] extends CTL logic by adding operators for social commitments, beliefs, and
intentions in order to formally model the interactions between interacting parties in a MAS.
By doing so, he was able to develop a speciﬁcation language for commitment-based pro-
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Figure 3.5: Time for model checking some properties for oblivious transfer protocol
meaning of the new modalities. With respect to the commitment, the author claims that a
commitment is satisﬁed at a certain state if and only if the content of the commitment is
true along all accessible paths deﬁned using an accessibility relation and emanating from the
commitment state (the state where the commitment holds). Though the author claims that
the proposed semantics is veriﬁable, no concrete approach for verifying or model checking
the semantics is presented.
Bentahar and his colleagues in [13, 14] present an approach that extends CTL∗ with
an operator for commitments and their actions, and two operators for argument and dynamic
logic respectively. To deﬁne a semantics for the commitment modality, they present a new
deﬁnition for the accessibility relations. Moreover, their semantics is deﬁned in terms of
the computations (paths) along which the commitment is satisﬁed.
Cheng in [19] introduce a model checking method using the SPIN model checker
(Simple Promela Interpreter [60]) to verify commitment-based business protocols and their
compositions based on LTL logic. In this method, commitments are not expressed directly
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in the logic as we propose in our work. Instead, they are simply abstracted as variables.
Consequently, the intrinsic meaning of commitments is not captured.
In [27], Desai and his group highlight some protocol properties and classify them
into general properties and protocol-speciﬁc properties in order to verify the correctness
of commitment protocols. The presented properties are deﬁned in terms of Propositional
Linear Temporal logic (LTL). Then, they outline a technique for verifying commitment
protocols and their compositions against these properties. The proposed approach involves
using the SPIN model checker as a tool for the formal veriﬁcation. Among the general
properties that they are successfully able to verify are the deadlocks (which may result
from the contradictory between the axioms used in protocol composition) and livelocks
properties. As in [19], commitments are simply abstracted using variables.
El-Menshawy and his colleagues in [32] tried to overcome the limitations raised in
[13, 14]. They propose a new logical language called CTL∗sc to develop a speciﬁcation
language for commitment-based protocols. Their new logic extends CTL∗ with commit-
ments and their associated actions. Furthermore, they extend the temporal modalities of
CTL∗ with past-directed temporal modalities. The semantics of actions is not deﬁned in
a recursive way as in [13, 14], i.e., the semantics of each action does not depend on other
actions. Based on their new logic, the authors develop a Social Negotiation Protocol (SNP)
that merges a set of dialogue games, commitment actions and dialogue actions. Then,
they present an automatic veriﬁcation technique to verify the SNP using symbolic model
checking in which they veriﬁed some given properties such as Reachability, Safety, and
Liveness. They implemented their proposed veriﬁcation technique using the NuSMV[21]
and MCMAS[79] symbolic model checkers. Their experimental results show the ability of
the proposed approach to handle large state spaces of 1016. However, the work does not
consider the uncertainty issue associated with the protocol.
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In a later work, El-Menshawy et al. [36] deﬁned a new temporal logic called CTLC
by extending CTL with operators for social commitments and their fulﬁlments and viola-
tions. In terms of deﬁning CTLC, their main contribution is the deﬁnition of a new social
accessibility relation. They deﬁne a new accessibility relation in which they assume the
existence of an intermediate state between the commitment state and the fulﬁllment state.
The debtor, in their accessibility deﬁnition, is uncertain about the current state so he looks
for the intermediate state (different from the current state) in which it does not matter for
him being in the commitment state, the intermediate state, or the fulﬁllment state (i.e., the
local states of the debtor in the three global states are indistinguishable). However, for the
creditor it does not matter being in the intermediate state or in the fulﬁllment state as being
in one of them is the same for him. Introducing the intermediate state makes the compu-
tation of the accessible states very complex. The authors veriﬁed the proposed logic using
a symbolic model checking algorithm they developed for this purpose. They also extended
the MCMAS model checker to be capable of interpreting the new modalities. By so doing,
they were able to show that the problem of model checking CTLC is polynomial-time re-
ducible to the problem of model checking CTLK (Computation Tree Logic of Knowledge
[88]). However, the stochastic aspect of the system being veriﬁed has not been addressed.
CTLC logic [36] has also been the focus of El-Menshawy et al. [33, 34] and Benta-
har et al. [9] to verify and model check commitment-based protocols. In [33], the authors
investigate the use of symbolic model checkers to verify the compliance of commitment
protocols against some given properties such as liveness and safety. To do so, they reduce
the problem of model checking CTLC to the problem of model checking either CTLK or
ARCTL (an extension of CTL with action formulae [87]) where both are extensions of
CTL. This allowed them to use MCMAS (suitable for CTLK), and NuSMV (suitable for
ARCTL). On the other hand, Bentahar et al. [9] reﬁned CTLC by introducing a set of
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shared and unshared variables so that their extended version of interpreted systems can ac-
count for the communication among the interacting agents. Technically, they associate with
each agent a countable set of local variables. Then, they use those variables to represent
communication channels through which messages are sent and received. Furthermore, they
analyzed the time complexity of CTLC model checking in explicit models such as Kripke-
like structures, and its space complexity for concurrent programs. Their proposed model
checking algorithms are implemented on top of the MCMAS model checker. El-Menshawy
et al. [34] also modiﬁed CTLC into CTLC+ that allows reasoning about communicating
commitments and their fulﬁlments. In their work, they introduce a formal reduction tech-
nique to reduce the problem of model checking CTLC+ to the problem of model checking
ARCTL and the problem of model checking GCTL∗. This allows them to take a beneﬁt of
existing model checkers such as the extended NuSMV symbolic model checker (suitable for
ARCTL) and the CWB-NC automata-based model checker (suitable for GCTL∗). More-
over, they analyzed the complexity of model checking CTLC+ for concurrent programs
with respect to the size of such programs and the length of the formulae and proved it to
be PSPASE-complete. Our work extends those proposals by considering the probabilistic
aspect of social commitments.
Focusing on business models, Telang and Singh [109] propose an expressive and
declarative approach capable of specifying business models at a high level of abstraction
using the notion of social commitments. In particular, they specify business models us-
ing CTL logic, and model check operational interactions (a set of business interactions)
speciﬁed as UML sequence diagrams. They map each model business to a temporal logic
speciﬁcation based on the progression of the states of the relevant commitments. Con-
cretely, they capture the business model as an aggregation of business patterns. Then, they
map each pattern to a CTL-based speciﬁcation. To verify agent interactions, the authors
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use the NuSMV model checker to compute whether operational models correctly support a
business model. In this work, commitments are translated into NuSMV variables instead of
introducing a new commitment modality as we do in our proposal.
In [35], the authors propose a new logical-based language to specify commitment-
based protocols. The presented language is deﬁned in terms of ACTL∗c logic which in turn
extends CTL∗ with operators for social commitments and their actions. Like in [34], the
authors also present a formal reduction-based veriﬁcation technique to transfer the problem
of model checking ACTL∗c to the problem of model checking GCTL∗. They implement
their automatic reduction-based model checking approach on top of the CWB-NC model
checker. Like in their proposal in [34], agents are assumed to be certain about their com-
mitments.
In [50], Gerard and Singh introduce an approach that specify commitment protocols
and their reﬁnements using guarded messages. The meaning of each message is deﬁned
as a set of actions. They use CTL as the underlying logic in which the speciﬁcation is
deﬁned. The authors propose a model checking technique to seek whether a protocol reﬁnes
another protocol correctly under certain conditions or not. The proposed tool “Proton” was
implemented on top of the MCMAS model checker. The commitments, which supposed
to be certain, are modeled as objects which are mapped into domain variables in ISPL (the
input language of MCMAS).
3.5.2 Probabilistic Commitments
Uncertainty in commitments has to date received little attention by researches of MASs
community. Herein, we review some existing proposals that treat commitments in the pres-
ence of uncertainty.
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In [117], Witwicki and Durfee presented a commitment-based methodology for ap-
proximating the optimal joint policy in agent coordination. They proposed a technique to
decompose large mathematical programs that encodes the decision problems of all agents
into 1) a search for optimal commitments regarding each agent’s outgoing inﬂuences; and
2) a search for optimal local policies that respect the commitments decided upon. For a
given set of commitments, they add constraints to the traditional linear program formula-
tion of MDPs to guarantee that a feasible policy respects the commitments. Each agent can
then solve its linear program separately.
In another work, Witwicki and Durfee [118] investigated the use of probabilistic com-
mitments in service orientation. They proposed a commitment-based negotiation mecha-
nism based on uncertain durations by which service providers agree to provide a service
within a given time and certain probability. The commitment between service providers
and service requesters use temporal and probabilistic parameters to summarize expectations
over future agent activities. Agents (providers and requesters) then beneﬁt from these com-
mitments to build policies about how to achieve (for providers) or utilize (for requesters)
these anticipated service outcomes. MDPs were adopted as the underling models for mod-
eling their agent-based systems. While the semantics of the commitments was not formally
described (i.e., in term of logic), they have given a deﬁnition for the probabilistic commit-
ment as follows. “A probabilistic temporal service commitment Ci j(s) = 〈t,ρ〉 is a guar-
antee that agent i will perform (for agent j) the actions necessary to deliver service s by
time t with probability no less than ρ" [118]. By making use of these probabilistic commit-
ments, agents can make promises to each other even if they cannot fully guarantee service
provision.
Unlike the proposals in [117, 118], we precisely use social commitments as a means
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Table 3.3: Comparison between our approach for the probabilistic commitments and the
related work
Approach Formal Uncertainty Verification
[13, 14, 98]
√






Table 3.4: Comparison between PCTLC and existing logics in terms of the adopted logic
Approach LTL CTL CTL∗ ARCTL PCTL None
[19, 27]
√










of communication between the interacting agents. In addition, these proposals do not con-
sider the veriﬁcation aspect of commitments. However, we address the commitments be-
tween communicating parties from a formal perspective. That is, we integrate a commit-
ment modality to probabilistic logic so that the veriﬁcation of such commitments becomes
achievable by means of model checking.
3.5.3 Comparison
We compare our work to the existing approaches by taking into consideration the follow-
ing criteria: Formalization, Uncertainty, and Veriﬁcation. Formalization reﬂects the use of
formal logics such as LTL, CTL, CTL∗, ARCTL or PCTL to represent and specify the com-
mitments. Uncertainty property indicates whether the probabilistic behavior is considered
or not. Finally, Veriﬁcation conﬁrms the presentation of a formal veriﬁcation technique to
verify the proposed approach. Table 3.3 shows a summary about the comparison between
our work and the existing approaches based on the criteria described above.
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Table 3.5: Comparison between PCTLC and existing approaches in terms of the used veri-
ﬁcation tool
Approach SPIN MCMAS NuSMV CWB-NC PRISM None
[19, 27]
√
[9, 32, 33, 36, 50]
√








In terms of formalization, our approach shares with most of the surveyed proposals
the idea of extending existing temporal logics with new modalities for the commitments
and their fulﬁlments. However, the main feature that distinguishes it from others lies in
the logic being extended to handle social commitments. While others adopt conventional,
non-probabilistic logics such as LTL, CTL, and CTL∗, ours is the only work that builds on
a probabilistic logic, namely PCTL. Table 3.4 compares between our approach and other
proposals with respect to the underlying logic that has been extended to specify social
commitments.
From the veriﬁcation perspective, like proposals in [33, 34, 35], we adopt a formal re-
duction technique as the underlying basis for our model checking to translate the problem of
model checking our logic to the problem of model checking an existing logic. However, to
the best of our knowledge, non of the existing approaches has veriﬁed social commitments
in the presence of uncertainty. Therefore, our approach outperforms the related approaches
as it is the ﬁrst attempt to tackle the veriﬁcation problem of the probabilistic social com-
mitments. Table 3.5 displays a comparison between our approach and the existing ones in
terms of the used model checkers.
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3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a new model checking technique for social commitments
among agents interacting in uncertain settings. We speciﬁed properties for such systems
using Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic of Commitments (PCTLC). The PCTLC logic
extends PCTL with a social operator for commitments and their fulﬁllments. Target sys-
tems are modeled using a new version of interpreted systems which incorporates and ex-
tends two different versions of interpreted systems formalism to capture the probabilistic
behavior of MASs, and account for the communication between interacting entities. The
proposed model checking technique consists of a set of reduction rules to formally reduce
the problem of model checking PCTLC to the problem of model checking PCTL so that the
use of the PRISM model checker is made possible. The proposed veriﬁcation approach was
evaluated through implementing the reduction tool on top of the PRISM model checker and
then applying it on a real case study from the cryptography domain namely the oblivious
transfer protocol. The obtained results show the effectiveness of the proposed technique.
In particular, we were successfully able to verify some desirable properties expressed orig-
inally in PCTLC. We also showed that the proposed reduction technique is scalable as we
were able to perform the model checking for models made of up to 1.56 ∗ 1018 states and
transitions.
In the next chapter, we investigate how our approach for probabilistic social commit-




The Interaction between Probabilistic
Commitments and Knowledge
In this chapter1, we put forward a method for capturing and verifying the interactions be-
tween the concepts of knowledge and social commitments in probabilistic MASs. The
proposed method allows us to ﬁgure out the impact of knowledge and social commitments
on each other in the presence of uncertainty. To express the two concepts simultaneously
in systems exhibiting probabilistic behavior, we deﬁne a new modal logic called the Prob-
abilistic Computation Tree Logic of Knowledge and Commitments (PCTLkc), or simply
the Probabilistic Logic of Knowledge and Commitments, which combines the probabilistic
logic of commitments (PCTLC) that has been introduced in Chapter 3 and the existing prob-
abilistic logic of knowledge (PCTLK) [115, 116] in a single tool. In the current chapter,
MASs are modeled using a new version of interpreted systems that captures the probabilis-
tic behavior and accounts for the communication between interacting components. Based
on the proposed logic, we introduce a new model checking procedure to check the compli-
ance of target systems against some desirable properties.
1The results of this chapter have been published in the journal of Expert Systems with Applications [106].
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4.1 Introduction
The rapid increase of using software agents and MASs nowadays has led to the increasing
demand of ﬁnding principled techniques for modeling and verifying such systems. Gen-
erally, to build effective open MASs, several aspects which have direct inﬂuence on the
efﬁciency and effectiveness of the entire system must be taken into account [69]. Among
other aspects, knowledge and social commitments are of a great interest in MASs. Social
commitments have been a vital approach in agent societies to capture the communication
between interacting agents for more than a decade. On the other hand, knowledge has been
addressed in distributed systems since 1960s [116]. Recently, Al-Saqqar et al. [1] have
demonstrated that these two concepts are closely interacting with each other in various real
life scenarios.
Despite the large amount of work that has been done to model and represent vari-
ous aspect of probabilistic MAS, none of the existing approaches addresses the concepts of
knowledge and social commitments simultaneously. In fact, the problem of reasoning about
and verifying the interaction between knowledge and social commitments in the presence of
uncertainty has not been investigated yet. Interpreted systems formalism [40] and Partially
Observable Markov Decision Processes POMDPs (a variant of MDP) are the most promi-
nent traditions in the area of modeling and representing stochastic MASs. These models are
used to traditionally interpret some logics deﬁned to specify and reason about some given
properties of MASs. On the one hand, interpreted systems formalism provides a natural
and yet efﬁcient way for modeling MASs at different levels of abstractions (i.e., local and
global). It has been extended in [55] and further in [115, 116] to capture the probabilistic
behavior of epistemic MASs. Recently, it has been extended in [9] and [34] to account for
the communication that occur between interacting parties in conventional MASs. The dis-
tinct point of the extended versions of this formalism is that knowledge and commitments
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can be captured through the use of what is called accessibility relations. The accessibility
relation for knowledge denotes the existence of equivalent states for a given agent. That is,
states where the agent cannot distinguish between being in which one of them. For commit-
ments, accessibility relations capture the existence of communication channel between the
communicating agents and the transferring of information from the sender to the receiver.
On the other hand, POMDPs have been widely used to model the uncertainty of knowledge
and behavior for stochastic agents [62]. An important point of POMDPs is that there is no
distinction drawn between actions taken to change the state of the world and actions taken
to gain information [64]. This is important because, in general, every action has both types
of effect. However, solving these models comes at a very high computational cost [82]. In
this chapter, we aim to examine the use of interpreted systems formalism to capture not only
knowledge and commitments independently, but also the interactions (combinations) of the
two aspects in stochastic systems. We also intent to verify these interactions by means of
model checking.
In terms of computational logics, most current proposals address each of knowledge
and commitments in MASs independently (see for example [5, 9, 26, 34, 51, 55, 62, 77,
90, 116]). However, in so many real world settings, these two concepts need to interact
with each other in order to ensure rich modeling at local (agent) and global (MAS) levels.
Nevertheless, it is a challenge to guarantee the correctness of the system’s behavior due to
the complex nature of the autonomous and heterogenous agents, especially when they have
probabilistic characteristics [102].
Applying model checking techniques that were originally introduced for standard
logics, such as LTL [91], CTL [38], or PCTL [57], to the veriﬁcation of the interaction be-
tween knowledge and social commitments in presence of uncertainty is not straightforward
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as non of these logics can capture and express the relationship between knowledge and so-
cial commitments in probabilistic settings. In this chapter, we introduce a model checking
technique to address this open issue.
The motivation for the incorporation of knowledge and commitments in a probabilis-
tic logic is provided by the fact that these two concepts not only have an impact on each
other, but also their interaction is crucial in various real scenarios. For instance, in the ﬁeld
of mobile applications, which are complex in nature, there exist situations when account-
ing for the interaction between knowledge and commitments improves the output of such
applications. Let us consider a simple scenario where receiver and sender agents share an
agreement, in which the receiver agrees to pay the sender in return of the delivery of a
service he has requested. This can be represented as a commitment, in which the receiver
will be committed to the sender to pay once the service is made available for him. Now,
if everything goes well and the receiver successfully makes his payment, the sender has to
know that the payment is made so that he does not ask the receiver to pay again. Moreover,
the receiver (who made the payment) has to know that he has fulﬁlled his commitment to
avoid making multiple payments, and so on. However, those interactions are stochastic.
For instance, the commitment to pay is not going to be surely satisﬁed.
To effectively specify such properties in the face of uncertainty, the need for a logical
tool that can express probabilistic knowledge and commitments simultaneously is indeed
conﬁrmed. Rather than building a logic from scratch to address the underlying aspects,
we combine logics dealing with these two individual units in a single logic. We advocate
the approach of combining existing logics because it ensures the preservation of important
properties of the logics being combined [69]. In particular, we use the independent join (or
fusion) technique [46]. Given two logics A and B, we combine them in a new logic A⊕B
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which extends the expressive power of each one. In our case, suppose A addresses proba-
bilistic epistemic properties of agents and B addresses the social aspects (i.e., probabilistic
commitments and their fulﬁlments) between interacting agents. Their combination should
be able to not only express epistemic and social properties, but also express the interaction
between the two concepts (i.e., express them in a single formula). Once the new combined
logic is deﬁned, we use the PRISM tool [73] as the formal veriﬁcation tool to verify it after
its reduction to PCTL, the probabilistic branching-time logic [57].
The contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, we present a new probabilis-
tic version of interpreted systems to model MASs using the dimensions of knowledge and
social commitments. The developed version merges two extended versions of the origi-
nal formalism of interpreted systems introduced by Fagin and his colleagues [40]. Those
versions are introduced respectively by 1) Halpern [55] and extended later by Wan et al.
[115, 116] to capture the stochastic behavior of the system; and 2) by Bentahar et al. [9]
and El-Menshawy et al. [34] to model the communication between interacting parties. Sec-
ond, we introduce a new logic called Probabilistic Logic of Knowledge and Commitment
(PCTLkc) to be able to capture and reason about the interaction between knowledge and so-
cial commitments. The logic we deﬁne combines the Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic
of Knowledge PCTLK [115, 116] and the Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic of Com-
mitments PCTLC [107]. PCTLK and PCTLC are, in turn, extensions of the Probabilistic
Computation Tree Logic PCTL [57] with an epistemic modality for the knowledge and a
social modality for the commitments and their fulﬁlments respectively. Third, we introduce
a new model checking technique to verify the proposed logic (PCTLkc). The introduced
technique is a reduction-based in which the problem of model checking PCTLkc is trans-
formed into the problem of model checking an existing logic called PCTL. To achieve this
reduction, new rules have been laid down to transform the models of PCTLkc to MDPs to
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be suitable for the PRISM model checker. We also devise some other rules to reduce each
PCTLkc formula into PCTL formula. By so doing, we can build on the existing PRISM
model checker by automating our translation to verify some given properties written origi-
nally in our new logic PCTLkc. Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the proposed approach.
Figure 4.1: An approach for the interaction between knowledge and commitments
The work presented in this chapter represents a new trend in the direction of capturing
interactions between various aspects in MASs. It can be seen as a ﬁrst attempt to combine
the notions of probability, knowledge, and commitments in a single tool giving a new ex-
pressive power —in terms of expressing the individual aspects as well as their combinations
in the presence of uncertainty—, and is therefore subject to new intuitions.
4.2 The Probabilistic Logic of Knowledge and Commit-
ment (PCTLkc)
In this section, we introduce our new probabilistic logic of knowledge and commitment
(PCTLkc). The modal logic we introduce can express knowledge and social commitments
simultaneously in the presence of uncertainty. It combines two existing probabilistic logics
namely, the probabilistic logic of knowledge PCTLK [115, 116] and the probabilistic logic
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of commitments PCTLC [103, 107]. We ﬁrst present the syntax of our new logic, and
then we deﬁne its semantics. We also deﬁne a new version of the probabilistic interpreted
systems formalism over which the semantics of PCTLkc can be interpreted.
As we said earlier, the new logic PCTLkc contains a knowledge modality that doesn’t
exist in the logic deﬁned previously in Chapter 3. Therefore, we need ﬁrst to deﬁne the
model of PCTLkc. In fact, the PCTLkc model is generated from an extended version of
probabilistic interpreted systems [55, 116] enriched by the social accessibility relations
introduced in [9, 34] as discussed in Chapter 2.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Models). Given a set of atomic propositions Φp = (p,q,r, . . .) and a set of
agents Agt= {1, . . . ,n}, the model M2 = (S,P, I,∼1, . . . ,∼n,{∼i→ j}(i, j)∈Agt2 ,ν) is a tuple
where:
• S ⊆ L1 × . . .×Ln is a countable set of all reachable global states for the system. A
state s is reachable iff there exists a sequence of transitions from an initial state to s
in which the probability of each transition is greater than 0.
• I ∈ S is an initial global state for the system.
• P : S×S→ [0,1] is a total transition probability function deﬁned as P(s,s′)= τ(s,as→s′ ,s′)
iff there exists a joint action a= (a1, . . . ,an) ∈ ACT such that
∑i∈Agt τi(li(s),ali(s)→li(s
′), li(s′))> 0 and ∑s′∈SP(s,s′) = 1 for all s ∈ S.
• ∼i⊆ S× S is the epistemic accessibility relation for the agent i, such that for two
global states s and s′, we have: s∼i s′ iff li(s) = li(s′).
• For each pair (i, j)∈ Agt2,∼i→ j⊆ S×S is a serial social accessibility relation. s∼i→ j
s′ is deﬁned by the following conditions:
1. li(s) = li(s′).
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2. Vari∩Var j = /0 such that ∀x ∈Vari∩Var j we have lxi (s)= lxj(s′).
3. ∀y ∈Var j−Vari we have lyj(s)= lyj(s′).
• ν : S→ 2Φp is a function valuating states with atomic propositions.
The difference between our new modelM2 and the modelM1 that has been proposed
in Chapter 3 is that M2 has the ability to model agents’ knowledge in the system –in addi-
tion to modeling the commitment-based communication among interacting parties– thanks
to the epistemic accessibility relations that are integrated in the model. Technically, M2
in an extended version of M1 with epistemic accessibility relations. Computation paths of
M2 and probability space are deﬁned as in Chapter 3.
4.2.1 Syntax of PCTLkc
The logic we introduce in this section can be seen as an extension to the logic presented
in Chapter 3 by adding an epistemic operator to PCTLC [103, 107]. The resulting logic,
i.e., PCTLkc, will have the power to not only express the individual aspects of knowledge
and social commitments in independent formulae, but also express combinations of the two
concepts in the same formulae.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Syntax). Given a set of atomic propositions Φp. Let Agt= {1, . . . ,n} be a
set of agents. The PCTLkc formulae are deﬁned by the following BNF grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ |K | C | Pk(ψ) | Pk(K )| Pk(C )
ψ ::=©ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ U≤m ϕ
K ::= Kiϕ
C ::=Ci→ jϕ | Fu(Ci→ jϕ)
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where p ∈ Φp is an atomic proposition and Pk is a probabilistic operator where ∈ {<
,≤,>,≥} and k ∈ [0,1] is a probability bound or threshold. m ∈ N+ is a positive integer
number reﬂecting the maximum number of transitions needed to reach a certain state. ϕ
and ψ are state and path formulae interpreted over the states and paths of M2 respectively.
The Boolean connectives ¬ and ∨ are deﬁned in the usual way. Formulae K are state for-
mulae called knowledge (epistemic) formulae and used to express the epistemic properties
through the Ki operator which stands for agent i knows. Formulae C , called social formu-
lae, are special state formulae in PCTLkc that can express social properties using the modal
connectives Ci→ j and Fu(Ci→ j) standing for “commitment” and “fulﬁllment of commit-
ment” respectively. ©,U and U≤m stand for “next time”, “until” and “bounded until” path
modal connectives respectively.
4.2.2 Semantics of PCTLkc
Given a model M2 = (S,P, I,∼1, . . . ,∼n,{∼i→ j}(i, j)∈Agt2 ,ν), then (M2,s) |= ϕ states that
“a state s in the model M2 satisﬁes a state formula ϕ , (M2,π) |= ψ means that “a path
π in the model M2 satisﬁes a path formula ψ , and (M2,s) |= Pk(ψ) means that “a state
s in M2 satisﬁes Pk(ψ) if the probability of taking a path from s that satisﬁes ψ is in
the interval speciﬁed by  k”. When the model M2 is clear from the context, we simply
write the satisfaction relation |= as follows: s |= ϕ and π |= ψ . Furthermore, for a given
pair (i, j) ∈ Agt2 of agents, we denote the number of socially accessible states s′ from a
given state s such that s∼i→ j s′ by |s∼i→ j s′|. We also denote the number of epistemically
accessible states s′ from a given state s such that s∼i s′ by |s∼i s′|.




1, if s |= ϕ
0, otherwise.
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Deﬁnition 4.3 (Satisfaction). Satisfaction of a PCTLkc formula in the model M2 is recur-
sively deﬁned as follows:
s |= p iff p ∈ ν(s);
s |= ϕ1∨ϕ2 iff s |= ϕ1 or s |= ϕ2;
s |= ¬ϕ iff s  ϕ;
s |= Kiϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S s.t. s∼i s′ we have s′ |= ϕ;
s |=Ci→ jϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S s.t. s∼i→ j s′,we have s′ |= ϕ;
s |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff ∃s′ ∈ S s.t. s′ ∼i→ j s and s′ |=Ci→ jϕ;
π |=©ϕ iff π(1) |= ϕ;
π |= ϕ1 U≤m ϕ2 iff ∃k ≤ m s.t. π(k) |= ϕ2 and ∀i< k,π(i) |= ϕ1;
π |= ϕ1 U ϕ2 iff ∃m≥ 0 s.t. π |= ϕ1 U≤m ϕ2;
s |= Pk(ψ) iff Probs(ψ)  k where: Probs(ψ) = Probs{π ∈Π(s) | π |= ψ};
For a probabilistic operator working on an epistemic formula, where the set of all accessible
states from s is our sample space and the set of events F is the set of states accessible from
s and satisfy the formula:
s |= Pk(Kiϕ) iff Prob(s |= Kiϕ)  k where: Prob(s |= Kiϕ) = ∑s∼is′
|s′|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| ;
For a probabilistic operator working over a commitment formula, where the set of all acces-
sible states from s is our sample space and the set of events F is the set of states satisfying
the formula:




For a probabilistic operator working over a fulﬁlment formula, assuming that accessible
states are also reachable:
s |= Pk(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff Prob(s |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ))  k; where:
Prob(s |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) = Probs{π ∈Π(s′) | s′ ∼i→ j s and π = s′ . . .s and s′ |=Ci→ jϕ}
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The probabilistic knowledge is computed in such a way to reﬂect the indistinguisha-
bility property of the epistemic accessibility relations. Therefore, the probability is com-
puted based on the number of accessible states satisfying the content of the knowledge over
the number of equivalent states, as all the states are equally accessible. Probabilistic com-
mitment is also computed based on the number of accessible states that satisfy the content
over the whole number of accessible states, which demonstrates the uncertainty of the agent
over the accessible states, so that over the commitment. Probabilistic fulﬁllment, however,
is computed using the probabilistic transitions of the path linking the commitment state to
the fulﬁllment state. The following proposition is straightforward from the semantics:
Proposition 4.1.
If (M2,s) |= P≤0(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) and (M2,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ), then s is not reachable from the
commitment state.
Theorem 4.1. Epistemic Equivalences
1. (M2,s) |= P≥1(Kiφ) iff (M2,s) |= Kiφ
2. (M2,s) |= P≤0(Kiφ) iff (M2,s) |= Ki¬φ
3. (M2,s) |= P]0,1[(Ki φ) iff (M2,s) |= ¬Ki¬φ ∧¬Kiφ
Proof.
• First equivalence.
“⇒ ”. Assume s |= P≥1(Kiϕ). By the semantics of PCTLkc, it follows that Prob(s |=
Kiϕ) ≥ 1. Therefore, ∑s∼is′
|s′|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| ≥ 1. This means ∀s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i s′, we have
s′ |= ϕ (as ∼i is reﬂexive, so s′ could be s itself). Thus, s |= Kiϕ .
“ ⇐ ”. Assume s |= Kiϕ . By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that for all s′ ∈ S such
that s∼i s′, we have s′ |= ϕ (i.e. all accessible states from s satisfy ϕ). Consequently,
∑s∼is′ |s′ |= ϕ |= |s∼i s′|. Therefore,
∑s∼is′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| ≥ 1 and hence s |= P≥1(Kiϕ).
84
• Second equivalence.
“ ⇒ ”. Assume s |= P≤0(Kiϕ). By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that Prob(s |=
Kiϕ) ≤ 0. Thus, ∑s∼is′
|s′|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| ≤ 0. Since ∼i is reﬂexive, so the set of the accessible
states from s is not empty, therefore ∑s∼is′ |s′ |= ϕ| must be 0 (i.e. ϕ is not true in any
of the accessible states). Consequently, for all s′ ∈ S such that s∼i s′, we have s′  ϕ ,
which means s′  ¬ϕ . Hence, s |= Ki¬ϕ .
“⇐ ”. Assume s |= Ki¬ϕ . By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that ∀s′ ∈ S such that
s∼i s′, we have s′  ϕ . Since the set of the accessible states from s is not empty, then
∑s∼is′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| ≤ 0. Hence, s |= P≤0(Kiϕ).
• Third equivalence.
“ ⇒ ”. Assume s |= P]0,1[Kiϕ). By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that 0 <
Prob(s |= Kiϕ) < 1. Thus, 0 < ∑s∼is′
|s′|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| < 1. This means that it would never
be the case that ∑s∼is′ |s′ |= ϕ|= |s∼i s′| nor ∑s∼is′ |s′ |= ϕ|= 0. Consequently, there
exist some s′,s′′ ∈ S such that s ∼i s′ and s ∼i s′′ and s′ |= ϕ and s′′ |= ¬ϕ . Hence, it
is impossible to have s |= ¬ϕ or s |= ϕ for all s ∈ S such that s ∼i s. Consequently,
s  Ki¬ϕ and s  Kiϕ . Hence s |= ¬Ki¬ϕ and s |= ¬Kiϕ .
“ ⇐ ”. Assume s |= ¬Kiϕ . By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that there exists
s′ ∈ S such that s∼i s′ and s′ |= ¬ϕ . Consequently, it would never be the case that for
all s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i s′ we have s′ |= ϕ . Therefore, 1 > ∑s∼is′
|s′|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| . Now assume
s |= ¬Ki¬ϕ . Therefore, ∑s∼is′ |s′ |= ϕ|= 0 would never be the case as some accessi-
ble states should satisfy ϕ . Consequently,
∑s∼is′ |s
′|=ϕ|




Hence, s |= P]0,1[(Kiϕ).
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Theorem 4.2. Commitment Equivalences
1. (M2,s) |= P≥1(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M2,s) |=Ci→ jϕ
2. (M2,s) |= P≤0(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M2,s) |=Ci→ j¬ϕ
3. (M2,s) |= P]0,1[(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M2,s) |= ¬Ci→ j¬ϕ ∧¬Ci→ jϕ
Proof.
• First equivalence.
“⇒ ”. Assume s |= P≥1(Ci→ jϕ). By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that Prob(s |=
Ci→ jϕ)≥ 1. Thus,
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| ≥ 1. This means that for all s′ ∈ S such that s∼i→ j s′,
we have s′ |= ϕ , and hence s |=Ci→ jϕ .
“ ⇐ ”. Assume s |= Ci→ jϕ . By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that for all s′ ∈
S such that s ∼i→ j s′, we have s′ |= ϕ (i.e. all accessible states from s satisfy ϕ).
Consequently, ∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |= ϕ|= |s∼i→ j s′|. Therefore,
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| ≥ 1 and hence,
s |= P≥1(Ci→ jϕ).
• Second equivalence.
“⇒ ”. Assume s |= P≤0(Ci→ jϕ). By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that Prob(s |=
Ci→ jϕ) ≤ 0. Thus,
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| ≤ 0. Since the set of the accessible states from s is
not empty, then ∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |= ϕ| must be 0 (i.e. ϕ is not true in any of the accessible
states). Consequently, for all s′ ∈ S such that s∼i→ j s′, we have s′  ϕ , which means
s′  ¬ϕ . Hence, s |=Ci→ j¬ϕ .
“ ⇐ ”. Assume s |=Ci→ j¬ϕ . By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that for all s′ ∈ S




|s∼i→ js′| ≤ 0. Hence, s |= P≤0(Ci→ jϕ).
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• Third equivalence.
“ ⇒ ”. Assume s |= P]0,1[(Ci→ jϕ). By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that 0 <
Prob(s |=Ci→ jϕ) < 1. Thus, 0 <
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| < 1. This means that it would never
be the case that∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |=ϕ|= |s∼i→ j s′| nor∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |=ϕ|= 0. Consequently,
there exist some s′,s′′ ∈ S such that s∼i→ j s′ and s∼i→ j s′′ and s′ |= ϕ and s′′ |= ¬ϕ .
Hence, it is impossible to have s |= ¬ϕ or s |= ϕ for all s ∈ S such that s ∼i→ j s.
Consequently, s Ci→ j¬ϕ and s Ci→ jϕ . Hence s |= ¬Ci→ j¬ϕ and s |= ¬Ci→ jϕ .
“ ⇐ ”. Assume s |= ¬Ci→ jϕ . By the PCTLkc semantics, it follows that there exists
s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i→ j s′ and s′ |= ¬ϕ . Consequently, it would never be the case
that s′ |= ϕ for all s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i→ j s′. Therefore, 1 >
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| . Now
assume s |= ¬Ci→ j¬ϕ . Therefore, ∑s∼i→ js′ |s′ |= ϕ| = 0 would never be he case as
some accessible states should satisfy ϕ . Consequently,
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| > 0. Thus, 0 <
∑s∼i→ js′ |s
′|=ϕ|
|s∼i→ js′| < 1. Thus, s |= P]0,1[(Ci→ jϕ).
Theorem 4.3. Fulﬁllment Equivalences
1. (M2,s) |= P>0(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff (M2,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) and s is reachable from the
commitment state.
2. (M2,s) |= P≤0(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff (M2,s) |=¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ) or s is not reachable from the
commitment state.
Proof.
The proofs of these equivalences are direct from Proposition 4.1 and the above semantics.
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4.3 Model Checking PCTLkc Using Reduction
In this section, we present our reduction technique to model checking PCTLkc. Given
a MAS represented as a probabilistic interpreted system M2 and a desirable property ϕ
written in PCTLkc, the problem of probabilistic model checking PCTLkc can be deﬁned as:
1) establishing whether (M2, I) |= ϕ , i.e., if I ∈ Sat(ϕ) where Sat(ϕ)={s ∈ S | M2,s |=
ϕ} is the set of states satisfying ϕ; 2) comparing the probability of satisfying ϕ with a
probability threshold  k, where Sat(Pk(ϕ)) = {s ∈ S | Probs(ϕ)  k} ; or 3) computing
the probability of ϕ , (M2,s) |= P=? (ϕ). Note that answers to the second and third queries
can be: (1) truth values, when the speciﬁcation simply asks for a comparison to a probability
threshold; or (2) quantitative, returning the actual probability.
Figure 4.2 depicts the structure of our proposed reduction technique. The idea is to
reduce the problem of probabilistic model checking PCTLkc to the problem of probabilistic
model checking PCTL in order to use the PRISM model checker. Concretely, the proposed
reduction technique consists of two processes. In the former one, we transform our model
M2 into an MDP model. MDPs are the standard models for describing systems with proba-
bilistic and nondeterministic behavior [93]. Then, we use the notion of adversary as in [72]
to resolve the nondeterminism of the MDP. The resulting adversaries are basically DTMC
models for which we can deﬁne a unique probability measure over paths. The obtained
DTMC models will be the input of the PRISM model checker. In the latter process of the
reduction technique, we transform PCTLkc formulae into PCTL formulae. This is basically
achieved by constructing a set of rules that formally transforms the PCTLkc formulae into
corresponding ones in PCTL.
In a nutshell, the proposed model checking procedure is as follows. Given M2 =
(S,P, I,∼1, . . . ,∼n,{∼i→ j}(i, j)∈Agt2 ,ν), and PCTLkc formula ϕ , we have to deﬁne an MDP



















Figure 4.2: The proposed reduction technique of model checking PCTLkc
that M2 |= ϕ iff F (M2) |=F (ϕ).
4.3.1 Transforming the Model M2
In order to transform our modelM2 = (S,P, I,∼1, . . . ,∼n,{∼i→ j}(i, j)∈Agt2 ,ν) into an MDP
model M′2 = (S,Act,Pt , Ii,L), we need to deﬁne the set of actions Act. Therefore, one of
the main steps that we perform in this transformation is to deﬁne the set Act. The idea
is that, we translate different relations in M2 into labeled transitions in M′2. Labels (also
called actions) are used to distinguish between different types of relations. Consequently,
the three relations in M2, namely transition relation, epistemic accessibility relation, and
social accessibility relation are translated into labeled transitions in M′2. Moreover, when-
ever we have a labeled transition representing a social accessibility relation we add the
symmetric closure of it to interpret the fulﬁlment of the commitment. As depicted in Figure
4.3 (assuming that n is the number of agents, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and 1 ≤ j ≤ n), actions δ ,α i,β i j,
and γ i j denote transitions deﬁned, respectively, from the probabilistic transition relation P,
the epistemic accessibility relation ∼i (to capture the semantics of knowledge), the social
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Figure 4.3: Translating relations in M2 into labeled transitions in the MDP model
accessibility relation ∼i→ j (to capture the semantics of commitment), and the symmetric
closure of the social accessibility relation (to capture the semantics of fulﬁlment).
The MDP model M′2 = (S,Act,Pt , Ii,L) can now be deﬁned as follows:
• S=S; Ii=I; L=ν .
• Act = {δ} ∪ {α1,α2, . . . ,αn} ∪ {β 11,β 12, . . . ,β nn} ∪ {γ11,γ12, . . . ,γnn} where n is
the number of agents.
• We deﬁne Pt as the union of the transitions labeled with δ (i.e., the probabilistic tran-
sitions of P) with the probabilistic transitions labeled with α i, probabilistic transitions
labeled with β i j, and probabilistic transitions labeled with γ i j. The probabilities of
transitions labeled with δ are not manipulated but rather inherited from the proba-
bilistic transition function P. However, for transitions labeled with α i and emanating
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from the same state are given equal probabilities (i.e., equal distribution) which re-
ﬂect the uncertainty of the agent over the accessible states, so that over the content
of the knowledge. Meaning that, the probability of each transition annotated by α i is
equal to the probability of each other transition labeled with α i emanating from the
same state which is calculated by dividing one over the number of transitions labeled
with α i. The probabilities of transitions labeled with β i j and γ i j are calculated in





P(s,s′), if θ = δ
1
|s∼is′| , if θ = α
i
1
|s∼i→ js′| , if θ = β
i j
1
|s′∼i→ js| , if θ = γ
i j.
The induced model of applying the adversary σ over M′2 is a DTMC model. Specif-
ically, four adversaries are deﬁned; σt over which temporal formulae are interpreted, σe to
capture epistemic formulae, σc to capture commitment formulae, and σ f to capture fulﬁll-
ment formulae. These adversaries are deﬁned based on the following rules. To deﬁne σt ,
action δ is selected at every state in M′2. For σe, action α i has to be among the enabled
actions at the knowledge state. Then, the adversary picks up α i at that knowledge state and
δ at every other state. Adversaries σc, and σ f are deﬁned in the same way.
4.3.2 Reducing PCTLkc Formulae into PCTL Formulae
In this section, we introduce our reduction rules that translate PCTLkc formulae to PCTL
formulae w.r.t given adversary σ . Given the adversary σt , the PCTLkc formulae are trans-
formed inductively into PCTL as follows:
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F (p) = p, if p is an atomic proposition,
F (¬ϕ) = ¬F (ϕ),
F (Pk(ϕ ∨ψ)) = Pk(F (ϕ)∨F (ψ)),
F (Pk©ϕ) = Pk©F (ϕ),
F (Pk(ϕ U ψ)) = Pk(F (ϕ)UF (ψ)),
F (Pk(ϕ U≤m ψ)) = Pk(F (ϕ)U≤mF (ψ)),
Note that σt is a DTMC model that is used to interpret only PCTL formulas. It cannot
be used to capture the transformed formulas of knowledge and commitment as it ignores all
relations except those labeled by δ (i.e., transition relations of P).
Given the adversary σe, the PCTLkc epistemic formula is transformed inductively into
PCTL as follows:
F (Kiϕ) = P≥1(©F (ϕ)),
F (PkKiϕ) = Pk(©F (ϕ)),
As mentioned earlier, the adversary σe is a DTMC model that captures only action
α i at the knowledge state and δ at all other states. Intuitively, transitions labeled with
α i represent epistemic accessibility relations and, in fact, epistemically accessible states
from the knowledge state must satisfy ϕ . Back to Figure 4.3 (b), it is readily seen that
all next states to the knowledge state through transitions labeled with α i satisfy F (ϕ).
This explains why knowledge formula Ki ϕ is transformed to next operator followed by the
transformation of the content of the knowledge (i.e.,©F (ϕ)) in all paths emanating from
the knowledge state.
Given the adversary σc, the PCTLkc commitment formula is transformed inductively
into PCTL as follows:
F (Ci→ jϕ) = P≥1(©F (ϕ)),
F (PkCi→ jϕ) = Pk(©F (ϕ)),
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Similar to the case of knowledge formula, Figure 4.3 (c) illustrates the intuitions
behind transforming the commitment formulaCi→ jϕ to©F (ϕ) in all baths emerging from
the commitment state.
Given the adversary σ f , the PCTLkc fulﬁllment formula is transformed inductively
into PCTL as follows:
F (Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) = P≥1(©F (Ci→ jϕ)) = P≥1(©P≥1(©F (ϕ))),
F (PkFu(Ci→ jϕ)) = Pk(©F (Ci→ jϕ)) = Pk(©P≥1(©F (ϕ))).
Though the semantics of the fulﬁllment operator in PCTLkc requires the existence of a
path containing the fulﬁlment state which must be socially accessible from the commitment
state, in this transformation we notice that all next states to the fulﬁlment state through
transitions labeled with γ i j should satisfy the commitment formula (Ci→ jϕ). The reason
of that is because in our transformation process, the transitions labeled with γ i j came as a
result of adding the symmetric closure of transitions labeled with β i j in order to capture the
semantics of the fulﬁlment. Therefore, all added transitions should satisfy the commitment
formula (Ci→ jϕ) (see Figure 4.3 (c)).
Theorem 4.4 (Equivalences Satisfaction).
Let σt , σe, σc, and σ f be the DTMC models corresponding to the adversaries that
capture respectively, temporal formulae, epistemic formulae, commitment formulae, and
fulﬁlment formulae in the model M′2. The following equivalences hold:
(M2,s) |= p iff (σt ,s) |= p
(M′2,s) |= ¬ϕ iff (σt ,s) |= ¬F (ϕ)
(M2,s) |= Pk(ϕ ∨ψ) iff (σt ,s) |= PkF (ϕ)∨PkF (ψ)
(M2,s) |= Pk©ϕ iff (σt ,s) |= Pk©F (ϕ)
(M2,s) |= Pk(ϕ U ψ) iff (σt ,s) |= Pk(F (ϕ)U F (ψ))
(M2,s) |= Pk(ϕ U≤m ψ) iff (σt ,s) |= Pk(F (ϕ)U≤m F (ψ))
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(M2,s) |= Kiϕ iff (σe,s) |= P≥1(©F (ϕ))
(M2,s) |= PkKiϕ iff (σe,s) |= Pk(©F (ϕ))
(M2,s) |=Ci→ jϕ iff (σc,s) |= P≥1(©F (ϕ))
(M2,s) |= PkCi→ jϕ iff (σc,s) |= Pk(©F (ϕ))
(M2,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff (σ f ,s) |= P≥1(©P≥1(©F (ϕ)))
(M2,s) |= PkFu(Ci→ jϕ) iff (σ f ,s) |= Pk(©P≥1(©F (ϕ)))
Notice that each formula has to be interpreted over a DTMC model (adversary) that
is used to solve the nondeterminism in M′2 based on the type of the formula (i.e., temporal,
epistemic, or social). The proof of the theorem with regard to PCTL formulae is straight-
forward as PCTL formulae are also PCTLkc formulae. However, for epistemic and social
formulae, the proof is given in Theorem 4.5.
Theorem 4.5 (Soundness and Completeness ofF ). LetM2 andΦ be respectively a PCTLkc
model and formula and letF (M2) andF (Φ) be the corresponding model and formula in
PCTL. We have M2 |=Φ iffF (M2) |=F (Φ).
Proof.
To prove the soundness of the proposed reduction technique, we have to prove that the
following three cases are sound: Φ= Kiϕ , Φ=Ci→ jϕ and Φ= Fu(Ci→ jϕ). We prove this
by induction on the structure of the formula Φ. The case of PCTLkc formulae that are also
PCTL formulae is straightforward.
• Φ = Ki ϕ . We have (M2,s) |= Ki ϕ iff (M2,s′) |= ϕ for every s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i
s′. Therefore, (M2,s) |= Ki ϕ iff (F (M2),s) |= F (Ki ϕ). Recall that F (M2) =
M′2. Now, (M′2,s) |=F (Ki ϕ) iff for every s′ ∈ S such that (s,α i,s′) ∈ Pt , we have
(M′2,s′) |=F (ϕ). However, w.r.t the semantics of σe which is an adversary deﬁned
to interpret commitment formulae over M′2, it follows that every inﬁnite path π ∈
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Πσe(s) satisﬁes that π(1) = s′ and (σe,π(1)) |=F (ϕ). Thus, (σe,s) |=©F (ϕ) for
all π ∈ Πσe(s). As the path quantiﬁer A is not deﬁned in PCTL, and we have P≥1
instead, so we obtain (σe,s) |= P≥1(©F (ϕ)).
• Φ=Ci→ jϕ . We have (M2,s) |=Ci→ jϕ iff (M2,s′) |=ϕ for every s′ ∈ S such that s∼i→ j
s′. Consequently, (M2,s) |=Ci→ jϕ iff (M′2,s) |=F (Ci→ jϕ). It follows that, (M′2,s) |=
F (Ci→ jϕ) iff for every s′ ∈ S such that (s,β i j,s′) ∈ Pt , we have (M′2,s′) |=F (ϕ).
Now, based on the adversary σc which is deﬁned to interpret commitment formu-
lae over M′2, every inﬁnite path π ∈ Πσc(s) satisﬁes that π(1) = s′ and (σc,π(1)) |=
F (ϕ). Thus, (σc,s) |=©F (ϕ) for all π ∈ Πσc(s). As the path quantiﬁer A is not
deﬁned in PCTL, and we have P≥1 instead, so we obtain (σc,s) |= P≥1(©F (ϕ)).
• Φ = Fu(Ci→ jϕ). We have (M2,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff there exists s′ ∈ S such that
s′ ∼i→ j s and (M2,s′) |=Ci→ jϕ . Consequently, (M′2,s) |=F (Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff there
exists s′ ∈ S such that (s,γ i j,s′) ∈ Pt and (M′2,s′) |= F (Ci→ jϕ). Now, w.r.t the
adversary σ f which is deﬁned to interpret fulﬁllment formulae over M′2, we obtain at
least one inﬁnite path π ∈Πσ f (s) that satisﬁes π(1)= s′ and (σ f ,π(1)) |=F (Ci→ jϕ).
Since E is equivalent to P>0 and F (Ci→ jϕ) is equivalent to P≥1(©F (ϕ)), so we
obtain (σ f ,s) |= P>0(©P≥1(©F (ϕ))).
4.4 Implementation
In this section, a case study is implemented using PRISM [73] to verify knowledge, com-
mitments, and interactions between the two concepts in probabilistic MASs. We apply the
approach using the NetBill protocol as in [34, 80, 126]. NetBill protocol is developed for
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buying and selling encrypted software through the internet. We add probability to the orig-
inal protocol so that the protocol will be closer to the real world situation. There are many
interactions and communications between a buyer and a seller with NetBill protocol, and
they are subject to several stochastic events, such as a buyer’s request for a quote could be
successfully received by the seller in only 95% of the cases. Another example is the buyer
will satisfy his delivery commitment with 98% of probability. As we said before, those
probabilities could be generally obtained after observing the system behavior for long time.
We will introduce this modiﬁed probabilistic NetBill protocol next.
4.4.1 NetBill Protocol
The basic NetBill protocol involves one customer agent Cus and one merchant agent Mer
interacting to ﬁnish an online shopping process. This protocol can also be applied to more
than one customer and one merchant. A customer Cus requests a quote from the merchant
Mer for an item to initialize the protocol. We assume that 5% of these requirements will
fail to be sent to the merchant due to internet connection issues. The merchant replies to the
successfully delivered request by presenting a quote for the requested item. Having received
the quote, we assume that 20% of customers reject the offer and end the protocol without
any purchase. The other 80% of customers accept the offer. Accepting the offer means that
the customer commits to send the payment to the merchant (CCus→MerPay). We assume that
only 90% of payment commitments will be fulﬁlled (Fu(CCus→MerPay)) and 10% will be
nulliﬁed. Both customer and merchant agents will be aware if the customer fulﬁlls its com-
mitments. When the merchant agent receives the payment, then it will commit to deliver
the items to the customer (CMer→CurDeliver). Suppose that 99% of deliveries are success-
ful, which means that the merchant fulﬁlls its commitments (Fu(CMer→CurDeliver)). If the
delivery fails, the merchant violates its commitment and in this case the merchant should
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refund the customer. Figure 4.4 depicts the model of the modiﬁed NetBill protocol.
Figure 4.4: The Modiﬁed NetBill protocol
With the PRISM modeling language, we translate every agent into a module and the
entire MAS is deﬁned as a system with agent modules which are all synchronized.
To formalize the protocol, the scenario is encoded using the probabilistic interpreted
systems M2 introduced earlier in Deﬁnition 4.1. Two basic modules, module Mer1 and
module Cur1 are deﬁned according to their probabilistic transitions. They represent the
customer agent Cus1 and the merchant agent Mer1 respectively. Other agents can just refer
to these two basic agents and use module renaming function to duplicate a module.
4.4.2 NetBill Protocol Properties
• Safety property: When designing a system, we may set a conﬁdence interval to
allow some mistakes for properties because it seems impossible for human beings
not to make any mistake in the real world. For example, “with 99% chance, the
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system will not fail" instead of “the system will never fail". In our protocol, one
bad situation is when the customer Cus1 sends the payment to the merchant Mer1
without the merchant being aware of that. The following property can avoid this bad
situation:
ϕ1 = P=1 [¬(Fu(CCus1→Mer1Pay)∧ (¬KMer1Pay))].
This event is critical without any uncertainty. Therefore, we set the probability to 1.
A similar formula is when the customer fulﬁlls its commitments, but it turns out that
it is not aware of:
ϕ2 = P=1 [¬(Fu(CCus1→Mer1Pay)∧ (¬KCus1Pay))].
With 1% tolerance for missing delivery, we can deﬁne the third safety property in our
logic as follows:
ϕ3 = P≥0.99 [¬(Fu(CCus1→Mer1Pay)∧¬(CMer1→Cur1Delivery))].
• Liveness property: Contrast to safety property, a liveness property means “a
good thing will eventually happen". For example, when the merchant commits to
deliver the goods to the customer, it will eventually deliver them. This property is
expressed as follows:
ϕ4 = P≥0.99(CMer1→Cus1Deliver ⇒ P≥0[F Fu(CMer1→Cus1Deliver)]).
• Reachability property: One good example for the reachability property for the
NetBill protocol is that the merchant will eventually commit towards the customer
to deliver the required goods, which should be reached from the initial state. This
property can be expressed as follows:
ϕ5 = P≥0 [F CMer1→Cus1Deliver]
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Table 4.1: Experimental results for NetBill protocol with PRISM
Number Model Construction
of Agents #States #Transitions Iterations Time (sec)
2 19 39 7 0.001
3 108 432 10 0.008
4 979 3.2∗103 13 0.011
5 6.1∗103 24∗103 16 0.024
6 38∗103 171∗103 19 0.028
7 230∗103 1.1∗106 22 0.035
8 1.4∗106 7.8∗106 25 0.049
9 8.4∗106 52∗106 28 0.071
10 50∗106 343∗106 31 0.097
15 392∗109 3.8∗1012 46 0.498
• Quantitative properties: One important usage for probabilistic model check-
ing is to compute the actual probability of some behaviors of the system. We can
calculate the probability for eventually the customer Cus1 commits to send the pay-
ment to the merchant Mer1 and eventually the customer fulﬁlls the commitment:
ϕ6 = P=? [F CCur1→Mer1Pay]
ϕ7 = P=? [F Fu(CCur1→Mer1Pay)]
4.4.3 Experimental Results
We veriﬁed several probabilistic epistemic and commitment properties as well as combi-
nations made up from both properties for the NetBill protocol. The presented experiments
were performed on a Toshiba Portégé computer with 2.00 GHz Intel Core2 Duo T6400
processor and 3GB memory under 64-bit Windows Vista Operating System.
We have conducted 10 experiments for the protocol using up to 15 agents. The results
are in Table 4.1. Model statistics data (number of states and number of transitions) and
model construction information (iteration and construction time) are reported. The model
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Figure 4.5: Model construction time for the NetBill protocol
Table 4.2: Verifying some PCTLkc properties for the NetBill protocol in case of two agents








for converting the PRISM model into a symbolic model and iterations required to ﬁnd
the reachable states. We have noticed that the state space increases exponentially as the
number of agents increases. However, the time needed for constructing the model increases
polynomially as more agents are added as shown in Figure 4.5.
We veriﬁed properties expressing some requirements of the NetBill protocol that in-
volve probabilistic knowledge and commitments. We checked Safety, liveness, and Reach-
ability properties as discussed above. Table 4.2 shows the results of model checking the
above desirable properties for the probabilistic NetBill protocol for a system that includes
one customer and one merchant.
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4.4.4 Discussion
As we have seen in this chapter, a probabilistic logic for addressing the interaction between
knowledge and social commitments in MASs was introduced. The described approach rep-
resents the ﬁrst attempt in the literature to reason about and verify the interaction between
the two concepts in the presence of uncertainty. However, from a consistency point of view,
the logic we proposed seems to be inconsistent and suffers from some paradoxes like those
identiﬁed in [1]. The problem is that, one of the underlying logics of PCTLkc, which is
PCTLC [107], is built using the social accessibility relation given in [9, 34] which, in fact,
over speciﬁes and over constrains the concept of illocutionary communication.
In the next chapter, we see how we will overcome the aforementioned problem by
extending a consisting logic of knowledge and commitment called CTLKC+ [1] by a prob-
abilistic operator so that capturing and reasoning about the interaction between the con-
cepts of knowledge and social commitments by means of a consistence probabilistic logic
becomes possible. Moreover, the logic we introduce in Chapter 5 incorporates the concepts
of group social commitments and group knowledge to the framework.
4.5 Related Work
The work presented in this chapter can be related to three perspectives in the literature:
probabilistic knowledge, probabilistic commitments, and the interaction between the two
aspects. In this section, we review the relevant work with respect to probabilistic knowl-
edge and the interaction between probabilistic knowledge and probabilistic commitments.
However, for the relevant work on probabilistic commitments, it has been discussed in
Chapter 3, Section 3.5.
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4.5.1 Probabilistic Knowledge in MASs
Delgado and Benevides in [26] deﬁned a probabilistic logic called K-PCTL which extends
PCTL with an epistemic operator for the knowledge. For modeling their target systems,
the authors proposed an approach that represents each agent in the system as a DTMC
with synchronization actions. In their DTMC model, each state either has a synchronized
action with probability 1 or regular probabilistic transitions. Having two different actions
in a single DTMC forced them to transform it into an MDP model. From the semantics
point of view, K-PCTL formulae are interpreted over MDP models which are augmented
with accessibility relations, so that probabilities over paths can be deﬁned. However, the
uncertainty of the knowledge cannot be measured as the accessibility relations are not prob-
abilistic. Our approach differs from this one in four main points. First, our logic adds two
modalities on top of PCTL; one for the knowledge, and one for the commitments and their
fulﬁlments. Therefore, dimension of system’s aspects that our logic can handle is larger
than that of K-PCTL making it more expressive. Second, our logic permits the probabilis-
tic operator to precede each of the knowledge modality and the social modality so that we
can quantitatively reason about the two aspects which again increases its expressive power.
Third, we model the target systems using probabilistic interpreted systems. Forth, we pro-
pose a concrete model checking technique in which we transform the problem of model
checking our logic to the problem of model checking an existing logic allowing us to re-use
the PRISM tool instead of just suggesting to extend it.
In [62], Huang and his colleagues extended the MCK model checker [48] with sub-
jective probability relative to agent knowledge using interpreted partially observed discrete-
time Markov chain (PO-DTMC). PO-DTMC is based on partial observations with assump-
tion on synchronous with perfect recall. To specify properties of probabilistic interpreted
systems, the authors use a logic that combines temporal and knowledge modalities with a
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probabilistic operator. In their approach, the set of accessible states is deﬁned as states of
a special agent, called the environment, while the remaining agents observe the environ-
ment and perform actions based on their observations. Then, probabilistic knowledge is
expressed by a rational linear combination of every agents’ probabilities in the system: ev-
ery agent has its own probability for each accessible state, which is supposed to be known.
Unlike this work, in our approach we do not assume that accessibility transitions are prob-
abilistic because this information is not always accessible to agents and sometimes hard to
quantify. Instead, we compute the probabilistic knowledge based on the number of acces-
sible states as they are equally accessible. Moreover, by re-using the exiting PRISM model
checker, we do not add a computational cost that is associated to extending the existing
version of it.
Wan et al. [116] has also addressed the veriﬁcation of epistemic properties in agent
environments against the background of participating parties. They propose PCTLK, a
probabilistic, epistemic, branching-time logic which extends CTL with probabilistic and
epistemic modalities. To verify the proposed logic, the authors introduced a reduction-based
model checking technique to translate the problem of model checking PCTLK into the
problem of model checking PCTL. Their reduction procedure involves two processes. First,
they transform the probabilistic interpreted systems into an MDP which is transformed
further to a DTMC. Second, they translate each PCTLK formula into a corresponding PCTL
formula. To model check a PCTLK forumla, they check its transformed PCTL formula
over the DTMC model. They demonstrated the applicability of their proposed veriﬁcation
technique by applying it on a well known case study and implementing it using the PRISM
model checker. Our work is similar to this work, except that we have a social modality in our
proposed logic for the commitments and their fulﬁlments which makes it more expressive
than PCTLK.
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4.5.2 The Interaction between Knowledge and Social Commitments
Little work has been done towards the problem of capturing and verifying the interactions
between knowledge and social commitments in MASs.
In [95], Schmidt and his colleagues investigated the problem of formalizing the inter-
action between knowledge and commitments within agent dynamic logic. Apparently, the
commitment adopted in this work is not a social commitment but rather an internal com-
mitment as the one presented by Castelfranchi in [18]. The term “internal commitment”
refers to a commitment of an agent to itself [99]. Using their proposed Agent Dynamic
Logic (ADL), the authors were able to express some combinations between knowledge and
commitments such as Commi (α) → Ki Commi (α) which expresses that agent i knows
(Ki) about his internal commitment (Commi) to perform the action α . However, from a
communication perspective, the internal commitment is neither communicative nor public
because it is not created as an agreement between two agents so that an agent can commit
towards the other to bring about a certain property. In contrast, our work focuses primary
on the notion of “social commitment" [98] which has been used as a means of communica-
tion between interacting agents in MASs. Unlike internal commitments, which are private
and concern a particular agent, social commitments are public and observable engagements
from one agent to another agent or a group of agents to bring about something. Further-
more, unlike [95], we study such an interaction —between the two concepts— in systems
exhibiting probabilistic behaviors.
Al-Saqqar et al. [1] have made the ﬁrst attempt towards studying the relationship
between knowledge and communicative social commitments from a logical perspective. In
particular, they combined a logic of knowledge (called CTLK [77]) and a logic of commit-
ments (called CTLC [9]) in a single tool called CTLKC. Having analyzed some postulates
with different combinations between the two concepts expressed in CTLKC, the authors
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identiﬁed a set of paradoxes that makes their combined logic inconsistent. To overcome
this problem, they mitigated the over-speciﬁcation problem that arises in the social acces-
sibility relation given in [9, 34]. Intuitively and broadly speaking, a social accessibility
relation for two agents i and j does exist between two global states s1 and s2 in the system,
if there is a communication channel between the local states of i and j in the global states s1
and s2 respectively. Based on a new social accessibility relation, they presented a new se-
mantics for the commitment (Ci→ jϕ) and fulﬁlment (Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) operators, where Ci→ jϕ
means that agent i commits towards agent j to bring about ϕ , and Fu(Ci→ jϕ) expresses the
fulﬁllment of such a commitment. These changes have been integrated into a new consistent
logic named CTLKC+. Having deﬁned the new logic, the authors have been successfully
able to reason about various combinations between knowledge Kiϕ , which means that agent
i knows ϕ , and social commitments as follows:
• Ci→ jϕ ⇒ Ki(Ci→ jϕ) where i = j.
• Fu(Ci→ jϕ)⇒ Kiϕ where i = j.
• Fu(Ci→ jϕ)⇒ Kjϕ where i = j.
Then, the authors introduced a reduction model checking technique in which they
transformed the problem of model checking their new logic (CTLKC+) into the problem
of model checking an existing logic called GCTL∗ [15], and computed the complexity of
the reduction technique. They used the automata-based model checker CWB-NC as the
veriﬁcation tool.
The veriﬁcation of CTLKC+ was further investigated in [2]. The authors used a
symbolic model checking technique based on reducing the problem of model checking
CTLKC+ into that of ARCTL. Then, they used the extended NuSMV to verify some given
properties written in CTLKC+. Their approach was carried out automatically using a JAVA
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transformation tool. This allowed them to overcome the scalability problem of automata-
based model modeling checking techniques, which is a highly considerable problem in
model checking real applications of multi-agent systems. The complexity analysis of the
proposed reduction-based technique was also provided.
Unlike this work that tends to assume ideal behavior for MASs so it limits its applica-
tion to reliable environments, ours considers the unreliable behavior of MASs. Therefore,
we add a probabilistic modality to the logic to be able to reason about some desirable prop-
erties in the presence of uncertainty. Our proposal subsumes the one in [1] because proba-
bility values range from 0 to 1 (when probability is equal to 1, the system becomes certain).
Therefore, our framework outperforms this proposal in the sense that not only qualitative
reasoning about the interaction between knowledge and commitments is achievable but also
quantitative reasoning becomes possible.
4.5.3 Comparison
We compare our framework to the existing proposals by taking into consideration ﬁve cri-
teria: Knowledge, Commitments, Uncertainty, Formalization, and Veriﬁcation. Knowledge
property shows whether the approach addresses epistemic properties of the systems or not.
Commitments property indicates whether it addresses the social commitments or not. Un-
certainty reﬂects target systems whose behavior is probabilistic. Formalization indicates the
use of formal logics, or formal methods in general. Finally, Veriﬁcation conﬁrms the presen-
tation of a formal veriﬁcation technique to verify the proposed approach. Table 4.3 shows a
summary about the comparison between our framework and the existing approaches based
on the criteria described above. We observe that our framework outperforms the related
approaches as it satisﬁes all the listed criteria.
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Table 4.3: Comparison between PCTLkc and the related work








√ √ √ √
[1]
√ √ √ √
Our approach
√ √ √ √ √
To summarize, the advancement of our work over existing work lies in the expressive-
ness power of the proposed logic which allows autonomous agents in MASs to represent
and verify the interaction between knowledge and social commitments in the face of un-
certainty. Moreover, the new probabilistic interpreted systems introduced in this chapter
helps MASs developers to have rich modeling with respect to knowledge and social com-
mitments. That is, not only modeling knowledge and social commitments independently in
the presence of uncertainty is possible, but also modeling the interaction between them has
become possible by making use of our proposed probabilistic model.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a novel technique for specifying and evaluating the interaction
between knowledge and social commitments in stochastic MASs. The proposed technique
allows us, for the ﬁrst time in the literature, to perform epistemic reasoning on social com-
mitments in probabilistic MASs. This helps ensure agents’ awareness about their commit-
ments and the fulﬁllments of these commitments. In particular, we ﬁrst developed a new
version of interpreted systems that captures the probabilistic behavior of knowledge and
commitments and accounts for the communication between interacting parties. Second, we
deﬁned a new logical framework that merges concepts of probabilistic knowledge and prob-
abilistic commitments in a single logic called PCTLkc, so that complex formulae including
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both modalities can be expressed. Third, we introduced a new model checking technique to
formally verify the compliance of MASs against some given properties expressed using the
new logic. The proposed model checking procedure is reduction-based, in which the prob-
lem of model checking PCTLkc is transformed (by the use of some rules) into the problem
of model checking an existing logic, namely PCTL. The key advantage of such a reduction
is gaining the privilege to re-use a well known model checker such as PRISM. The sound-
ness of the proposed reduction technique was provided. Moreover, we demonstrated the
effectiveness of the proposed framework by applying it to the NetBill protocol, a concrete
case study from e-business domain. The results have initially conﬁrmed the expressive
capabilities of PCTLkc in handling the interaction between knowledge and social commit-
ments in probabilistic settings. Moreover, the scalability of the proposed model checking
technique was evaluated and models having up to 4×1011 states can be effectively veriﬁed.
In the next chapter, we reﬁne and extend the approach presented for the interaction
between individual knowledge and commitments to accommodate group knowledge and
group commitments as well.
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Chapter 5
On Probabilistic Group Social
Commitments
In this chapter1, we improve and extend the work presented in Chapter 4 by reﬁning the
probabilistic logic of knowledge and commitment (PCTLkc) and then extending the reﬁned
logic further by operators for group knowledge and group commitment. In this respect,
we deﬁne a semantics for the group social commitment operator and integrate it into the
resulting logic. The developed logic is called the new probabilistic logic of knowledge and
commitment (PCTLkc+). Finally, we introduce a new formal veriﬁcation technique that
considers the new group modalities and implement it on top of the PRISM model checker.
5.1 Introduction
One of the major challenges in building complex software products such as Multi-Agent
Systems (MASs) is to advance error detection at early stages of their life-cycles. MASs
1Part of the results presented in this chapter, namely PCTLkc+ logic, has been published in SoMet_14
[104]. The results of model checking PCTLkc+ have been sumbitted to the Engineering Applications of
Artiﬁcial Intelligence journal [105]
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community has witnessed an important shift in deﬁning the semantics of ACLs from the
so-called mental approaches that is hard to verify [98] to social approaches which exploit
observable and veriﬁable social commitments. However, the increasing demand to use
social commitments as a means of communication among interacting parties [6, 20, 54]
requires reasoning about and verifying the relationship between social commitments and
some other systems’ aspects such as agents’ knowledge and uncertainty especially in the
case of having group-commitment scenarios. In addition to verifying the interactions be-
tween social commitments and knowledge in the presence of uncertainty, the ultimate ob-
jective of this chapter is to verify the interactions between the two elements when the scope
of interacting agents goes beyond the common agent-to-agent (i.e., one-to-one) scheme.
In order to effectively capture and express the interactions between individual and
group social commitments and knowledge in probabilistic MASs, we propose a new modal
logic called the new probabilistic logic of knowledge and commitments PCTLkc+ which is
built by combining a consistent logic of knowledge and commitment CTLKC+ [1] with a
well established probabilistic temporal logic PCTL [57]. The resulting logic is extended
further to accommodate operators for the group knowledge and group commitments.
At present, there is a relatively large gap in addressing the concepts of knowledge and
social commitments simultaneously in MASs, especially with the presence of uncertainty.
Existing approaches that address the interaction between knowledge and social commit-
ments either limit the scope of interacting agents to the widely used one-to-one commit-
ment scheme and ignore the uncertainty aspect of MASs [1], or adopt a different kind of
commitments called “internal commitment” rather than the “social commitments” that we
consider in this thesis [95]. Furthermore, although the notion of “group” is important in the
multi-agent community [94, 128], group social commitments has not been formalized and
veriﬁed yet. As knowledge and social commitments inﬂuence each other in many real world
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applications [1], their interactions need to be reasoned about and veriﬁed in a systematic
manner. As we said before, uncertainty in MASs may arise due to imperfect information
about the environment in which agents interact. Besides, in some situations, it happens that
even if there is some state of affairs (i.e., content of a commitment) that an agent wants
to bring about, its actions might not reliably drive the state of affairs into the desired state
[103]. Consequently, commitments themselves become stochastic and the degree to which
the commitment can be satisﬁed is not always guaranteed.
To motivate our study of representing and verifying the interaction between individ-
ual and group knowledge and social commitments in probabilistic MASs when taking into
account one-to-many commitments, let us consider the following simple example. A pro-
fessor teaching an engineering course with a capacity of 20 students. Various scenarios
could happen within this context.
• Scenario 1: while the professor was explaining some new concepts in the course,
one of the students asked the professor to provide him with more material regarding
these concepts. The professor then promised to email the student some references
the next day. This promise can be considered as a commitment from the professor
towards the student to provide him with extra material for the new concepts.
• Scenario 2: in the lecture before the mid-term exam, students requested the pro-
fessor to exclude some material and shorten the duration of the exam accordingly.
At the end of the lecture, the professor agreed to exclude some parts of the covered
material and to make the exam one hour long. This agreement can be considered as
a commitment from the professor to the group of students who are registered in this
course. Right after the class, the professor posted in the course web site an update
conﬁrming what they agreed on.
In the ﬁrst scenario, obviously both the professor and student are aware of the commitment
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(sending extra materiel). However, in the second scenario, every student registered in the
course, and not necessarily present during the lecture, has to know about this agreement
(commitment) to avoid wasting time studying excluded parts. In fact, because of some
unexpected factors like absence of the professor on the day of the exam, email delivery
failure, power outage, etc, there is no guarantee that these commitments are going to be
surely fulﬁlled. Therefore, it is important to have a logic system with the ability to not only
express the interaction between knowledge and social commitments, but also to handle the
concepts of knowledge and commitments within the scope of a group when uncertainty
matters. Once such a logic is deﬁned, it can be invested as the underlying logic for a veriﬁ-
cation technique to verify some desirable and useful properties expressing combinations of
knowledge and social commitments under uncertainty.
The work presented in this chapter can be seen as extension and continuation of the
work presented in Chapter 4 where reasoning about and verifying interactions between
individual knowledge and social commitments in probabilistic MASs were ﬁrst introduced.
In Chapter 4, we proposed a probabilistic logic called PCTLkc whose expressiveness power
allowed us to formulate combinations of the two concepts in the presence of uncertainty.
PCTLkc logic was built by fusing two logics, namely PCTLC [107] and PCTLK [116] using
the independent join technique [46]. However, as pointed out in [1], the social accessibility
relations given in [9, 34], have an over-speciﬁcation problem, and consequently the PCTLkc
logic suffers from some paradoxes as it adopts the aforementioned accessibility relations.
To elaborate, there exist some situations that are not desirable in real settings but with
the use of PCTLkc, they are valid. One major problem in PCTLkc is that agents commit
everything they know to others, which brings the lack of privacy into being. Formally, this
is represented by the following postulate:
• Kiϕ ⇒Ci→ jϕ , where i = j.
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The validity of this postulate is based on the fact that by establishing communication
channels through which commitments are supposed to be exchanged, the epistemic relation
needed to deﬁne the semantics of knowledge is also established. This is not reasonable in
open environments where agents are selﬁsh. Another problem is that agents commit every-
thing known by others. That is, when an agent knows that another agent knows something,
the ﬁrst agent commits to bring about what the other agent knows, formally:
• KiKjϕ ⇒Ci→ jϕ where i = j.
Such a postulate should be avoided in MASs because it is not realistic for an agent to
commit for something that is out of its capabilities. Moreover, this postulate can result in
serious circumstances if agent j is malicious, so it can express incorrect knowledge about
the other agent, obliging it to establish unwanted commitment.
On the other hand, we have some reasonable situations that should be always valid
but with the use of PCTLkc they can be unsatisﬁed. One example in this respect is when
agents should be always aware about the fulﬁllment of their own commitments.
• Fu(Ci→ jϕ)⇒ KiFu(Ci→ jϕ) where i = j
It is realistic for this postulate to be valid because any agent should be aware of
its fulﬁllment actions in order to prevent fulﬁlling the same commitment again and again.
However, this postulate is not valid in PCTLkc because of the same reasons mentioned
earlier. Consequently, PCTLkc fails to efﬁciently handle some practical situations in which
knowledge and social commitments need to interact.
The problem is that one of the underlying logics of PCTLkc, which is PCTLC [107], is
built using the social accessibility relations given in [9, 34], which in fact over speciﬁes and
over constrains the concept of illocutionary communication. In a recent work, Al-Saqqar et
al. [1] have ﬁgured out that although the social accessibilities presented in [9, 34] function
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perfectly when the concern is to model social commitments independently, they have some
limitations when combined with the epistemic accessibility relations in the same model.
The authors in [1] modiﬁed the social accessibility relations proposed in [9, 34] in order to
prevent the unintended emergence of the epistemic accessibility relations from the social
accessibility relations when the two accessibilities combined in the same model. Techni-
cally speaking, they relaxed the conditions upon which the social accessibility relations are
established in order to decouple the social accessibility relations from the epistemic acces-
sibility relations. The new deﬁnition of social accessibilities does no longer depend on the
unshared variables but rather depends merely on the shared variables between the inter-
acting agents as discussed in Chapter 2. The new condition upon which a communication
channel is established is stated below:
s≈i→ j s′ iffVari∩Var j = /0 such that ∀x∈Vari∩Var j we have lxi (s) = lxi (s′) = lxj(s′),
where ≈i→ j⊆ S×S is the social accessibility relation. It has been proven that with the new
social accessibilities, the resulting logic is consistent [1].
The work presented in this chapter differs from the one proposed in Chapter 4 in the
following points:
1. While the logic presented in Chapter 4 suffers from some paradoxes, the current work
builds upon a consistent logic of knowledge and commitment CTLKC+ [1] which
ensures having a paradox-free logic.
2. The new logic allows us to reason about commitments among multiple agents instead
of limiting the scope to merely two agents. The concept of group knowledge is also
integrated to the framework allowing us to reason about the knowledge in the case of
group of agents.
3. In the current work, we generalize the model checking technique that has been pro-
posed in Chapter 4 to ﬁt the new group commitment operators as well.
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The contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, we present a new probabilistic
logic called (PCTLkc+) with expressiveness abilities to capture and represent the interac-
tions between individual and group knowledge and social commitments. Second, we in-
troduce a formal veriﬁcation technique for the probabilistic logic PCTLkc+. The proposed
technique is based on reducing the problem of model checking PCTLkc+ to the problem of
model checking PCTL. This is achieved through 1) advocating a set of transformation rules
that transform the PCTLkc+ model into a Markov Decision Process (MDP), and then con-
verting the obtained MDP into a DTMC using the notion of “adversary” [43]; 2) reducing
PCTLkc+ formulae into PCTL formulae based on a set of formal reduction rules. Third,
we implement our reduction model checking technique on top of PRISM and apply it on
a concrete case study, namely the online shopping system [52]. We then check some sys-
tem’s properties written as PCTLkc+ formulae using the PRISM model checker by checking
their corresponding PCTL formulae. Figure 5.1 depicts a schematic view of our proposed
framework.
5.2 The New Probabilistic Logic of knowledge and Com-
mitment (PCTLkc+)
To overcome the inconsistency problem of PCTLkc, we develop a new logic called the new
probabilistic logic of knowledge and commitment (PCTLkc+). To build PCTLkc+, there are
two obvious resources available in the literature: 1) the traditional temporal logics that have
been developed for knowledge and social commitments independently or together such as
CTLC [9], CTLK [77], and CLTKC+ [1]; and 2) the existing probabilistic logics avail-
able in the literature such as PCTL [57], PCLTK [116], and PCTLC [103]. Unfortunately,


















































Figure 5.1: A schematic view of the probabilistic group social commitment approach
the uncertainty aspects in MASs, while the latter doesn’t capture the interaction between
knowledge and social commitments. Therefore, we propose a solution that draws upon both
resources. In particular, we combine an existing consistent logic of knowledge and commit-
ment CTLKC+ [1] with a well established probabilistic temporal logic PCTL [57]. Then,
we extend the resulting combined logic by adding new operators for the group knowledge
and group commitment.
Before going further, let us ﬁrst describe a new probabilistic model over which PCTLkc+
formulae can be interpreted. This model is an extension of the formalism of interpreted
systems [40] with the concepts of epistemic accessibility and social accessibility relations.
Concretely, the model of PCTLkc+ is generated from combining two extended versions of
the interpreted systems formalism. These extended formalisms are the extended version
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introduced in [55, 116] and a modiﬁed version of the extended version given in [9, 34] due
to Al-Saqqar et al. [1].
Deﬁnition 5.1 (PCTLkc+ Model).
Given a set of atomic propositions Φp = (p,q,r, . . .) and a set of agents Agt = {1, . . . ,n},
the model M3 = (S,P, I,∼1, . . . ,∼n,{≈i→ j}(i, j)∈Agt2 ,ν) is a tuple where:
• S ⊆ L1 × . . .× Ln is a countable set of all reachable global states of the system. A
state s is reachable iff there exists a sequence of transitions from an initial state to s
in which the probability of each transition is greater than 0.
• I ∈ S is an initial global state for the system.
• P : S×S→ [0,1] is a total transition probability function deﬁned as P(s,s′)= τ(s,as→s′ ,s′)
iff there exists a joint action a= (a1, . . . ,an) ∈ ACT such that
∑i∈Agt τi(li(s),ali(s)→li(s
′), li(s′))> 0 and ∑s′∈SP(s,s′) = 1 for all s ∈ S.
• ∼i⊆ S× S is the epistemic accessibility relation for the agent i, such that for two
global states s and s′, we have: s∼i s′ iff li(s) = li(s′).
• For each pair (i, j) ∈ Agt2, ≈i→ j⊆ S× S is the social accessibility relation which is
deﬁned as follows: s ≈i→ j s′ iff Vari∩Var j = /0 such that ∀x ∈ Vari∩Var j we have





• ν : S→ 2Φp is a valuation function.
The new model M3 differs from the model M2, presented in Chapter 4, in one partic-
ular point which is the social accessability relation. While M2 uses the social accessibility
relation ∼i→ j that has been introduced in [9, 34], the new model adopts the one ≈i→ j pro-
posed in [1] in order to overcome the over-speciﬁcation problem appeared in ∼i→ j.
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5.2.1 Syntax of PCTLkc+
Deﬁnition 5.2 (PCTLkc+ syntax). Let Φp = {p,q, . . .} be a set of atomic propositions,
and Agt = {1, . . . ,n} be a set of agents. The syntax of PCTLkc+, which is a combination
of PCTLK [116] and PCTLC [103, 107] augmented with further operators for the group
knowledge, is given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ |K | C | Pk(ψ) | Pk(K )| Pk(C )
ψ ::=©ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ U≤m ϕ
K ::= Ki ϕ | EG ϕ
C ::=Ci→ j ϕ |Ci→G ϕ | Fu(Ci→ j ϕ) | Fu(Ci→G ϕ)
where;
– p ∈Φp is an atomic proposition
– i, j ∈ Agt.
– G⊆ Agt.
– Pk is a probabilistic operator and ∈ {<,≤,>,≥}.
– k ∈ [0,1] is a probability bound or threshold.
m ∈ N+ is a positive integer number reﬂecting the maximum number of transitions needed
to reach a certain state.
– The Boolean connectives ¬ and ∨ are deﬁned in the usual way.
– ϕ and ψ are state and path formulae interpreted over the states and paths of M3 respec-
tively.
– The modal connectives K and C stand for “epistemic" and “social" operators, respec-
tively.
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In this logic, formulae K are state formulae and used to express the epistemic properties
through the operators; Ki which stands for agent i knows, EG which stands for everyone
knows. Modal connectives Ci→ j and Ci→G are called social formulae and stand for “com-
mitment” from a debtor towards a single creditor, and “commitment” from a debtor to a
group of creditors, respectively. Likewise, modal connectives Fu(Ci→ j) and Fu(Ci→G)
stand for “fulﬁllment” of the commitmentCi→ j and “fulﬁllment” of the commitmentCi→G,
respectively. ©,U and U≤m stand for “next time”, “until” and “bounded until” path modal
connectives respectively.
5.2.2 Social Commitments Classiﬁcation
Social commitments for agent communication have been always looked at within the scope
of one-to-one. However, back to our motivating example, we realize that in addition to the
usual agent-to-agent scheme, there are certain situations where group-agent commitments
are needed. In this chapter, we are interested to move beyond the scope of one-to-one
and investigate the case of committing to multiple agents. The idea of investigating other
schemes of social commitments rather than the one-to-one commitment scheme seems to
be both technically interesting and intuitively appealing. In what follows, we distinguish
between two different ﬂavors of social commitments, namely basic (or individual) social
commitment and group social commitment.
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Basic Social Commitment).
A basic social commitment is an agreement between two agents namely, debtor and
creditor such that the debtor engages towards the creditor to bring about a certain
property.
This is the simplest form of social commitments and has long been investigated in the
literature. The commitment in this case can be represented using the following operator:
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Ci→ j ϕ where i denotes the debtor, j denotes the creditor, and ϕ denotes the content of the
commitment. The fulﬁllment of such a commitment is written as follows: Fu(Ci→ j ϕ).
However, as the common form of social commitments is the basic social commitment, we
can simply use “social commitments" to refer to “basic (or individual) social commitments".
Deﬁnition 5.4 (Group Social Commitment).
A group social commitment is an agreement between a debtor and a group of cred-
itors to bring about a certain property.
This kind of commitments indicates the involvement of multiple agents in the same
commitment. The creditor is a group of independent agents that join together as a single
party due to their shared interests in the commitment at hand. A group social commitment is
represented using the following notation: Ci→G ϕ , where i denotes the debtor, G denotes a
group of creditors, and ϕ denotes the content of the commitment. The fulﬁllment of such a
commitment is given by the notation Fu(Ci→G ϕ). Technically, a group social commitment
can be seen as the conjunction of individual basic social commitments from the debtor i
to each agent in the group of creditors G. Formally, Ci→G ϕ ≡ ∧
j∈G
Ci→ j ϕ . An intuitive
explanation of the operator Ci→G ϕ is as follows: for a group social commitment to be
held at a certain state, the content of the commitment must be true at every accessible
state from the commitment state with respect to the group. This implies that none of the
group members could be excluded from having all accessible states satisfy the content of
the commitment. Consequently, it is obvious that for a state to be socially accessible from
the commitment state with respect to the group, it has to be socially accessible with respect
to at least one of the agents of the group. Therefore, we resolve the accessibility problem
resulted from having group commitments by taking the union of the social accessibility
relations of each single agent in the group. This in turn leads us to deﬁne the group social








Figure 5.2: Accessibility relations for group social commitment
Let G ⊆ Agt be a group of agents. We deﬁne the group social accessibility relation
from the social accessibility relation ≈i→ j as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.5 (Social Accessibility Relations for Group Social Commitment).
• ≈i→G is the union of the social accessibility relations between agent i and each agent
in the group G: ≈i→G= ⋃
j∈G
≈i→ j.
Notice that group social commitments have all the properties of basic social commit-
ments with an additional constraint that they can involve more than two agents. However, a
group social commitment involving only two agents is equivalent to the basic social com-
mitment. Figure 5.2 depicts the idea of group social accessibility (G= { j1, j2}).
5.2.3 Group Knowledge
In this work, we limit the scope of group knowledge to the concept of “Everyone Knows"
introduced in [40]. “Everyone Knows" is denoted by EG ϕ and means that everyone in the
group G knows ϕ . Technically, “Everyone knows" can be seen as the conjunction of the




Before we proceed to present the semantics of PCTLkc+, we need to deﬁne the epis-
temic accessibility relation for EG ϕ . Let G ⊆ Agt be a group of agents. We deﬁne the
epistemic accessibility relation for EG ϕ from the epistemic accessibility relation ∼i as fol-
lows [116]:
Deﬁnition 5.6 (Epistemic Accessibility Relation for Everyone Knows).




5.2.4 Semantics of PCTLkc+
Given a model M3 = (S,P, I,∼1, . . . ,∼n,{≈i→ j}(i, j)∈Agt2 ,ν), then (M3,s) |= ϕ states that
“a state s in the model M3 satisﬁes a state formula ϕ , (M3,π) |= ψ means that “a path
π in the model M3 satisﬁes a path formula ψ , and (M3,s) |= Pk(ψ) means that “a state
s in M3 satisﬁes Pk(ψ) if the probability of taking a path from s that satisﬁes ψ is in
the interval speciﬁed by  k”. When the model M3 is clear from the context, we simply
write the satisfaction relation |= as follows: s |= ϕ and π |= ψ . Furthermore, we denote the
number of socially accessible states s′ from a given state s such that s≈i→ j s′ by |s≈i→ j s′|,
and s≈i→G s′ by |s≈i→G s′|. We also denote the number of epistemically accessible states
s′ from a given state s such that s ∼i s′ by |s ∼i s′|. Similarly, we denote the number of
states s′ that are accessible from a given state s through ∼EG by |s∼EG s′|. Finally, we deﬁne




1, if s |= ϕ
0, otherwise.
Deﬁnition 5.7 (Satisfaction). Satisfaction of a PCTLkc+ formula in the model M3 is con-
ductively deﬁned as follows:
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s |= p iff p ∈ ν(s);
s |= ϕ1∨ϕ2 iff s |= ϕ1 or s |= ϕ2;
s |= ¬ϕ iff s  ϕ;
s |= Kiϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S s.t. s∼i s′, we have s′ |= ϕ;
s |= EG ϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S s.t. s∼EG s′, we have s′ |= ϕ;
s |=Ci→ jϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S s.t. s≈i→ j s′,we have s′ |= Kiϕ ∧Kjϕ;
s |=Ci→Gϕ iff ∀s′ ∈ S s.t. s≈i→G s′,we have s′ |= Kiϕ ∧EG ϕ;
s |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff there exists s′ ∈ S such that s′ ≈i→ j s and s′ |=Ci→ j ϕ or
there exists s′′ ∈ S and s′′ ∼i s such that s′′ |= Fu(Ci→ j ϕ) or
there exists s′′ ∈ S and s′′ ∼ j s such that s′′ |= Fu(Ci→ j ϕ);
s |= Fu(Ci→G ϕ) iff there exists s′ ∈ S such that s′ ≈i→G s and s′ |=Ci→G ϕ or
there exists s′′ ∈ S and s′′ ∼i s such that s′′ |= Fu(Ci→G ϕ) or
there exists s′′ ∈ S and s′′ ∼EG s such that s′′ |= Fu(Ci→G ϕ);
π |=©ϕ iff π(1) |= ϕ;
π |= ϕ1 U≤m ϕ2 iff ∃k ≤ m s.t. π(k) |= ϕ2 and ∀i< k,π(i) |= ϕ1;
π |= ϕ1 U ϕ2 iff ∃m≥ 0 s.t. π |= ϕ1 U≤m ϕ2;
s |= Pk(ψ) iff Probs(ψ)  k where: Probs(ψ) = Probs{π ∈Π(s) | π |= ψ};
• For a probabilistic operator working on an epistemic formula, where the set of all acces-
sible states from s is our sample space and the set of events F is the set of states accessible
from s and satisfy the formula:
s |= Pk(Ki ϕ) iff Prob(s |= Kiϕ)  k where: Prob(s |= Kiϕ) = ∑s∼is′
|s′|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| ;





• For a probabilistic operator working over a commitment formula,where the set of all ac-
cessible states from s is our sample space and the set of events F is the set of states accessible
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from s and satisfy the formula:




s |=Pk(Ci→Gϕ) iff Prob(s |=Ci→Gϕ) k where: Prob(s |=Ci→Gϕ)= ∑s≈i→Gs′
|s′|=Kiϕ∧EGϕ|
|s≈i→Gs′| ;
• For a probabilistic operator working over a fulﬁlment formula, assuming that accessible
states are also reachable:
s |= Pk(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff Prob(s |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ))  k; where:
Prob(s |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) = Probs{π ∈Π(s′) | s′ ≈i→ j s and π = s′ . . .s and s′ |=Ci→ jϕ};
s |= Pk(Fu(Ci→Gϕ)) iff Prob(s |= Fu(Ci→Gϕ))  k; where:
Prob(s |= Fu(Ci→Gϕ)) = Probs{π ∈Π(s′) | s′ ≈i→G s and π = s′ . . .s and s′ |=Ci→Gϕ}
Again as in Chapter 4, in the case of the knowledge, the uncertainty is computed in
such a way that it reﬂects the indistinguishability property of the epistemic accessibility
relations. Hence, the uncertainty is computed based on the probability of epistemic acces-
sibility relations which is calculated based on the number of accessible states satisfying the
content of the knowledge over the number of equivalent states, as all the states are equally
accessible. Likewise, probabilistic commitment is computed based on the number of ac-
cessible states that satisfy the content over the whole number of accessible states, which
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demonstrates the uncertainty of the agent over the accessible states, so that over the com-
mitment. Probabilistic fulﬁllment, however, is computed using the probabilistic transitions
of the path linking the commitment state to the fulﬁllment state.
The following proposition is straightforward from the semantics:
Proposition 5.1.
If (M3,s) |= P≤0(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) and (M3,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ), then s is not reachable from the
commitment state.
Theorem 5.1 (Epistemic Equivalences).
1. (M3,s) |= P≥1(Ki ϕ) iff (M3,s) |= Ki ϕ
2. (M3,s) |= P≤0(Ki ϕ) iff (M3,s) |= Ki ¬ϕ
3. (M3,s) |= P]0,1[(Ki ϕ) iff (M3,s) |= ¬Ki ¬ϕ ∧¬Ki φ
4. (M3,s) |= P≥1(EG ϕ) iff (M3,s) |= EG ϕ
5. (M3,s) |= P≤0(EG ϕ) iff (M3,s) |= EG ¬ϕ
6. (M3,s) |= P]0,1[(EG ϕ) iff (M3,s) |= ¬EG ¬ϕ ∧¬EG ϕ
Proof. We prove the ﬁrst three equivalences, the same method can be used to prove the
others.
• First equivalence.
“ ⇒ ”. Assume (M3,s) |= P≥1(Kiϕ). By the semantics of PCTLkc+, it follows that
Prob((M3,s) |= Ki ϕ)≥ 1. Therefore, ∑s∼is′
|(M3,s′)|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| ≥ 1. This means that ∀s′ ∈ S
such that s ∼i s′, we have (M3,s′) |= ϕ (as ∼i is reﬂexive, so s′ could be s itself).
Thus, (M3,s) |= Ki ϕ .
“ ⇐ ”. Assume (M3,s) |= Ki ϕ . By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that for all
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s′ ∈ S such that s∼i s′, we have (M3,s′) |= ϕ (i.e. all accessible states from s satisfy




and hence (M3,s) |= P≥1Kiϕ).
• Second equivalence.
“ ⇒ ”. Assume (M3,s) |= P≤0(Kiϕ). By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that
Prob((M3,s) |= Kiϕ) ≤ 0. Thus, ∑s∼is′
|(M3,s′)|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| ≤ 0. Since ∼i is reﬂexive, so the
set of the accessible states from s is not empty. Therefore, ∑s∼is′ |(M3,s′) |= ϕ|
must be 0 (i.e., ϕ is not true in any of the accessible states). Consequently, for all
s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i s′, we have (M3,s′)  ϕ , which means (M3,s′) |= ¬ϕ . Hence,
(M3,s) |= Ki¬ϕ .
“ ⇐ ”. Assume (M3,s) |= Ki¬ϕ . By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that ∀s′ ∈ S




|s∼is′| ≤ 0. Hence, (M3,s) |= P≤0(Kiϕ).
• Third equivalence.
“ ⇒ ”. Assume (M3,s) |= P]0,1[Kiϕ). By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that
0 < Prob(s |= Kiϕ) < 1. Thus, 0 < ∑s∼is′
|(M3,s′)|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| < 1. This means that it would
never be the case that ∑s∼is′ |(M3,s′) |= ϕ| = |s ∼i s′| nor ∑s∼is′ |(M3,s′) |= ϕ| = 0.
Consequently, there exist some s′,s′′ ∈ S such that s∼i s′ and s∼i s′′ and (M3,s′) |= ϕ
and (M3,s′′) |=¬ϕ . Hence, it is impossible to have (M3,s) |=¬ϕ or (M3,s) |= ϕ for
all s ∈ S such that s ∼i s. Consequently, (M3,s)  Ki¬ϕ and (M3,s)  Kiϕ . Hence
(M3,s) |= ¬Ki¬ϕ and (M3,s) |= ¬Kiϕ .
“ ⇐ ”. Assume (M3,s) |= ¬Kiϕ . By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that there
exists s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i s′ and (M3,s′) |= ¬ϕ . Consequently, it would never be
the case that for all s′ ∈ S such that s ∼i s′ we have (M3,s′) |= ϕ . Therefore, 1 >
∑s∼is′ |(M3,s
′)|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| . Now assume (M3,s) |= ¬Ki¬ϕ . Therefore, ∑s∼is′ |(M3,s′) |= ϕ|=
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0 would never be the case as some accessible states should satisfy ϕ . Consequently,
∑s∼is′ |(M3,s
′)|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| > 0. Thus, 0 <
∑s∼is′ |(M3,s
′)|=ϕ|
|s∼is′| < 1. Hence, (M3,s) |= P]0,1[(Kiϕ).
Theorem 5.2 (Commitment Equivalences).
1. (M3,s) |= P≥1(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M3,s) |=Ci→ jϕ
2. (M3,s) |= P≤0(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M3,s) |=Ci→ j¬ϕ
3. (M3,s) |= P]0,1[(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M3,s) |= ¬Ci→ j¬ϕ ∧¬Ci→ jϕ
4. (M3,s) |= P≥1(Ci→Gϕ) iff (M3,s) |=Ci→Gϕ
5. (M3,s) |= P≤0(Ci→Gϕ) iff (M3,s) |=Ci→G¬ϕ
6. (M3,s) |= P]0,1[(Ci→Gϕ) iff (M3,s) |= ¬Ci→G¬ϕ ∧¬Ci→Gϕ
Proof. We prove the ﬁrst three equivalences, the same method can be used to prove the
others.
• First equivalence.
“ ⇒ ”. Assume (M3,s) |= P≥1(Ci→ jϕ). By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that
Prob((M3,s) |= Ci→ jϕ) ≥ 1. Thus,
∑s≈i→ js′ |(M3,s
′)|=ϕ|
|s≈i→ js′| ≥ 1. This means that for all
s′ ∈ S such that s≈i→ j s′, we have (M3,s′) |= ϕ , and hence (M3,s) |=Ci→ jϕ .
“ ⇐ ”. Assume (M3,s) |=Ci→ jϕ . By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that for all
s′ ∈ S such that s≈i→ j s′, we have (M3,s′) |=ϕ (i.e. all accessible states from s satisfy




1 and hence, (M3,s) |= P≥1(Ci→ jϕ).
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• Second equivalence.
“ ⇒ ”. Assume (M3,s) |= P≤0(Ci→ jϕ). By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that
Prob((M3,s) |=Ci→ jϕ)≤ 0. Thus,
∑s≈i→ js′ |(M3,s
′)|=ϕ|
|s≈i→ js′| ≤ 0. Since the set of the acces-
sible states from s is not empty, then ∑s≈i→ js′ |(M3,s′) |= ϕ| must be 0 (i.e. ϕ is not
true in any of the accessible states). Consequently, for all s′ ∈ S such that s ≈i→ j s′,
we have (M3,s′)  ϕ , which means (M3,s′)  ¬ϕ . Hence, (M3,s) |=Ci→ j¬ϕ .
“⇐ ”. Assume (M3,s) |=Ci→ j¬ϕ . By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that for all
s′ ∈ S such that s≈i→ j s′, we have (M3,s′)  ϕ . Since the set of the accessible states
from s is not empty, then
∑s≈i→ js′ |(M3,s
′)|=ϕ|
|s≈i→ js′| ≤ 0. Hence, (M3,s′) |= P≤0(Ci→ jϕ).
• Third equivalence.
“ ⇒ ”. Assume (M3,s) |= P]0,1[(Ci→ jϕ). By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that
0<Prob((M3,s) |=Ci→ jϕ)< 1. Thus, 0<
∑s≈i→ js′ |(M3,s
′)|=ϕ|
|s≈i→ js′| < 1. This means that it
would never be the case that∑s≈i→ js′ |(M3,s′) |=ϕ|= |s≈i→ j s′| nor∑s≈i→ js′ |(M3,s′) |=
ϕ| = 0. Consequently, there exist some s′,s′′ ∈ S such that s ≈i→ j s′ and s ≈i→ j s′′
and (M3,s′) |= ϕ and (M3,s′′) |= ¬ϕ . Hence, it is impossible to have (M3,s) |= ¬ϕ
or (M3,s) |= ϕ for all s ∈ S such that s ≈i→ j s. Consequently, s  Ci→ j¬ϕ and
(M3,s) Ci→ jϕ . Hence (M3,s) |= ¬Ci→ j¬ϕ and (M3,s) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ .
“ ⇐ ”. Assume (M3,s) |= ¬Ci→ jϕ . By the PCTLkc+ semantics, it follows that there
exists s′ ∈ S such that s ≈i→ j s′ and (M3,s′) |= ¬ϕ . Consequently, it would never
be the case that (M3,s′) |= ϕ for all s′ ∈ S such that s ≈i→ j s′. Therefore, 1 >
∑s≈i→ js′ |(M3,s
′)|=ϕ|
|s≈i→ js′| . Now assume (M3,s) |=¬Ci→ j¬ϕ . Therefore,∑s≈i→ js′ |(M3,s′) |=




|s≈i→ js′| > 0. Thus, 0 <
∑s≈i→ js′ |(M3,s
′)|=ϕ|
|s≈i→ js′| < 1. Thus, (M3,s) |=
P]0,1[(Ci→ jϕ).
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Theorem 5.3 (Fulﬁllment Equivalences).
1. (M3,s) |= P>0(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff (M3,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) and s is reachable from the
commitment state.
2. (M3,s) |= P≤0(Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff (M3,s) |=¬Fu(Ci→ jϕ) or s is not reachable from the
commitment state.
3. (M3,s) |= P>0(Fu(Ci→Gϕ)) iff (M3,s) |= Fu(Ci→Gϕ) and s is reachable from the
commitment state.
4. (M3,s) |= P≤0(Fu(Ci→Gϕ)) iff (M3,s) |= ¬Fu(Ci→Gϕ) or s is not reachable from
the commitment state.
Proof. The proofs of these equivalences are direct from Proposition 5.1 and the above se-
mantics.
5.3 Model Checking PCTLkc+ using Reduction
In this section, we generalize the model checking technique for the logic of knowledge and
social commitments proposed in Chapter 4 to cover more complex cases, such as group
knowledge and group commitment. As we have seen in the previous section, the semantics
of our new logic PCTLkc+ is deﬁned over an extended version of interpreted systems M3.
The idea of our proposed veriﬁcation technique is based mainly on reducing the problem of
model checking PCTLkc+ to the problem of model checking PCTL. This however involves
two processes. First, we deﬁne transformation rules to transform PCTLkc+ model (M3)
to an MDP model to be suitable for PRISM, the probabilistic model checker of PCTL.
The solution of an MDP comes in the form of an “adversary” [43] which is described as a
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mapping of states to probability distributions over actions. Second, we construct a set of
rules to reduce PCTLkc+ formulae to PCTL formulae.
In a nutshell, our proposed model checking procedure is as follows. Given M3 =
(S,P, I,∼1, . . . ,∼n,{≈i→ j}(i, j)∈Agt2 ,ν), and PCTLkc+ formula ϕ , we have to deﬁne an
MDP model M′3 = F (M3) and PCTL formula F (ϕ) using the transformation function
F such that M3 |= ϕ iff F (M3) |=F (ϕ).
S S' S S' S S'
S S' S S' S S'
a)  translating transition relation b)  translating epistemic 
acceesibility relation
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Figure 5.3: Examples of translating relations in M3 into labeled transitions
5.3.1 Transforming the Model M3
As done in Chapter 4, given an MDP model M′3 = (S,Act,Pt , Ii,L), a major step in trans-
forming M3 into M′3 is to deﬁne the set of actions Act. The idea is to map each relation in
M3 into a corresponding action in Act; more speciﬁcally, to translate each relation in M3
into a labeled transition in M′3. Then, these labels (also called actions) are used to form the
set Act in M′3. Consequently, the different relations in M3 namely, probabilistic transition
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relations, epistemic accessibility relations, and social accessibility relations, are translated
into labeled transitions in M′3. Moreover, to interpret the fulﬁllment of a commitment, we
need to add the symmetric closure of the transition resulted from translating the social ac-
cessibility relation. Figure 5.3 (where n is the number of agents, 1 ≤ i≤ n, and 1 ≤ j ≤ n)
explains the process of translating the probabilistic transition relation P, epistemic acces-
sibility relations ∼i, and social accessibility relations ≈i→ j into labeled transitions. More
precisely, the action ε denotes a transition deﬁned from the probabilistic transition rela-
tion P, action α i denotes a transition deﬁned from the epistemic accessibility relation ∼i,
action β i j denotes a transition deﬁned from the social accessibility relation ≈i→ j, and ac-
tion γ i j denotes a transition added to capture the semantics of the fulﬁllment of a basic
commitment. Likewise, the epistemic accessibility relation ∼EG, and the social accessibil-
ity relation ≈i→G are translated in the same way where the action αEG denotes a transition
deﬁned from the epistemic accessibility relation ∼EG, action βG denotes a transition deﬁned
from the social accessibility relation ≈i→G, and the action γG denotes a transition added to
capture the semantics of the fulﬁllment of a group commitment. Consequently, the model
M′3 = (S,Act,Pt , Ii,L) can now be deﬁned as follows:
• S=S; Ii=I; L=ν .
• Act = {ε} ∪ {α1,α2, . . . ,αn,αEG} ∪ {β 11,β 12, . . . ,β nn,βG} ∪ {γ11,γ12, . . . ,γnn,γG}
where n is the number of agents.
• Pt can be deﬁned as the union of the transitions labeled with ε , transitions labeled
with α i, transitions labeled with αEG , transitions labeled with β
i j, transitions labeled
with βG, transitions labeled with γ i j, and transitions labeled with γG. The probabil-
ities of transitions labeled with ε are not manipulated but rather inherited from the
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probabilistic transition function P. However, transitions labeled with α i and emanat-
ing from the same state are given equal probabilities which reﬂect the indistinguish-
ably property of epistemic relations over equivalent states. Thus, the probability of
each transition annotated by α i is equal to the probability of each other transition
labeled with α i emanating from the same state which is calculated by dividing one
over the number of transitions labeled with α i. The probabilities of transitions la-
beled with αEG , β
i j, βG, γ i j, and γG are calculated in the same way. For states s,s′ ∈ S




P(s,s′), if θ = ε
1




, if θ = αEG
1
|s≈i→ js′| , if θ = β
i j
1
|s≈i→Gs′| , if θ = β
G
1
|s′≈i→ js| , if θ = γ
i j
1
|s′≈i→Gs| , if θ = γ
G
As mentioned earlier, the non-deterministic choices in MDP are resolved using the
adversary by picking one enabled transition at each state, which induces a DTMC model.
Technically speaking, the adversary is a function from the state set S to the action set Act
such that it chooses in any state s one of the enabled actions. In particular, we deﬁne seven
adversaries (σε , σe, σEG , σc, σ
G
c , σ f , σGf ) that are used to deﬁne DTMCs from the obtained
MDP model as follows: σε captures only the semantics of regular temporal formulae, σe
captures the semantics of the knowledge formulae, σEG captures the semantics of the op-
erator everyone in the group knows, σc captures he semantics of the basic commitment,
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σGc captures the semantics of group social commitment, σ f captures the semantics of the
fulﬁllment of the basic commitment, and σGf captures the semantics of the fulﬁllment of
group commitment. Concretely, we set the adversary σε in such a way that always selects
the transitions labeled by ε at each state in the model. This results in a DTMC model that
captures only probabilistic temporal transitions inherited from P and ignores all transitions
obtained by translating the various accessibility relations. The adversary σe always picks
the action α i at the state s and then selects the action ε at all following states (i.e., ﬁrst the
transitions resulted from the accessibility relations ∼i are considered, and then the normal
transitions), and so on for the other adversaries.
To this end, we introduce our reduction rules that translate each PCTLkc+ formula to
PCTL formula w.r.t a given adversary.
5.3.2 Reducing PCTLkc+ Formulae into PCTL Formulae
The PCTLkc+ formulae are reduced inductively into PCTL as follows:
F (p) = p, if p is an atomic proposition,
F (¬ϕ) = ¬F (ϕ),
F (ϕ ∨ψ) =F (ϕ)∨F (ψ),
F (Pk©ϕ) = Pk©F (ϕ),
F (Pk(ϕ U ψ)) = Pk(F (ϕ)UF (ψ)),
F (Pk(ϕ U≤m ψ)) = Pk(F (ϕ)U≤mF (ψ)).
F (Ki ϕ) = P≥1(©F (ϕ))
F (PkKi ϕ) = Pk(©F (ϕ)).
F (EG ϕ) = P≥1(©F (ϕ))
F (PkEG ϕ) = Pk(©F (ϕ)).
F (Ci→ j ϕ) = P≥1(©F (ϕ))
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F (PkCi→ j ϕ) = Pk(©F (ϕ)).
F (Ci→G ϕ) = P≥1(©F (ϕ))
F (PkCi→G ϕ) = Pk(©F (ϕ)).
F (Fu(Ci→ j ϕ)) = P≥1(©F (Ci→ j ϕ)) = P≥1(©P≥1(©F (ϕ)))
F (PkFu(Ci→ j ϕ)) = Pk(©F (Ci→ j ϕ)) = Pk(©P≥1(©F (ϕ))).
F (Fu(Ci→G ϕ)) = P≥1(©F (Ci→G ϕ)) = P≥1(©P≥1(©F (ϕ)))
F (PkFu(Ci→G ϕ)) = Pk(©F (Ci→G ϕ)) = Pk(©P≥1(©F (ϕ))).
To complete the reduction process, each PCTL formula has to be interpreted over a
DTMC model D = (S,s,P,L). This is achieved by indicating which adversary is associated
with which formula. In the following, (M′3,s) |=σε ϕ means that the PCTL formula ϕ holds
in the model D obtained by applying the adversary σε at state s. The following theorem is
a direct consequence of the deﬁnition of F and can be easily proved by induction on the
structure of the formula.
Theorem 5.4 (Transformation Satisfaction).
Considering the following adversaries: σε , σc, σGc , σ f , σGf , σe, and σ
E
G (which are
DTMCs capturing temporal, commitment, and epistemic formulae in the model M3), the
following equivalences hold:
(M3,s) |= p iff (M′3,s) |=σε p
(M3,s) |= ¬ϕ iff (M′3,s) |=σε ¬F (ϕ)
(M3,s) |= Pk(ϕ ∨ψ) iff (M′3,s) |=σε PkF (ϕ)∨PkF (ψ)
(M3,s) |= Pk©ϕ iff (M′3,s) |=σε Pk©F (ϕ)
(M3,s) |= Pk(ϕ U ψ) iff (M′3,s) |=σε Pk(F (ϕ)U F (ψ))
(M3,s) |= Pk(ϕ U≤m ψ) iff (M′3,s) |=σε Pk(F (ϕ)U≤m F (ψ))
(M3,s) |= Kiϕ iff (M′3,s) |=σe P≥1(©F (ϕ))
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(M3,s) |= PkKiϕ iff (M′3,s) |=σe Pk(P≥1(©F (ϕ)))
(M3,s) |= EGϕ iff (M′3,s) |=σEG P≥1(©F (ϕ))
(M3,s) |= PkEGϕ iff (M′3,s) |=σEG Pk(P≥1(©F (ϕ)))
(M3,s) |=Ci→ jϕ iff (M′3,s) |=σc P≥1(©F (ϕ))
(M3,s) |= PkCi→ jϕ iff (M′3,s) |=σc Pk(P≥1(©F (ϕ)))
(M3,s) |=Ci→Gϕ iff (M′3,s) |=σGc P≥1(©F (ϕ))
(M3,s) |= PkCi→ jϕ iff (M′3,s) |=σGc Pk(P≥1(©F (ϕ)))
(M3,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M′3,s) |=σ f P≥1(©P≥1(©F (ϕ)))
(M3,s) |= PkFu(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M′3,s) |=σ f Pk(P≥1(©P≥1(©F (ϕ))))
(M3,s) |= Fu(Ci→Gϕ) iff (M′3,s) |=σGf P≥1(©P≥1(©F (ϕ)))
(M3,s) |= PkFu(Ci→ jϕ) iff (M′3,s) |=σGf Pk(P≥1(©P≥1(©F (ϕ))))
This theorem emphasizes that each translated PCTLkc+ formula must be interpreted
over an appropriate DTMC. That is, if the PCTLkc+ formula includes only temporal op-
erators, then the corresponding PCTL formula is interpreted over the DTMC obtained by
only considering the normal transitions (i.e., σε ). Moreover, if the formula has the form
of Ki ϕ , then the corresponding PCTL formula is interpreted over the DTMC obtained by
considering ﬁrst the transitions resulted from translating epistemic accessibility relations
∼i and then the normal transitions, which shows why the K operator is translated into the
next operator ©. The same intuition holds for the other epistemic and social formulae.
Theorem 5.5 (Soundness and Completeness of F ).
Let M3 and Φ be respectively PCTLkc+ model and formula and let F (M3) and F (Φ) be
the corresponding model and formula in PCTL. We have M3 |=Φ iffF (M3) |=F (Φ).
Proof. To prove the soundness (i.e., the necessary condition) and completeness (i.e., the
sufﬁcient condition) of the proposed reduction technique, we prove that the following three
cases are sound and complete: Φ = Kiϕ , Φ =Ci→ jϕ and Φ = Fu(Ci→ jϕ). We prove this
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by induction on the structure of the formula Φ. The cases when Φ = EGϕ , Φ = Ci→Gϕ ,
and Φ = Fu(Ci→Gϕ) can be proved in a similar way. The cases of PCTLkc+ formulae that
are also PCTL formulae are straightforward.
• Φ= Ki ϕ . We have (M3,s) |= Ki ϕ iff (M3,s′) |= ϕ for every s′ ∈ S such that s∼i s′.
Therefore, (M3,s) |= Ki ϕ iff (F (M3),s) |= F (Ki ϕ). We know that F (M3) =
M′3. Now, (M′3,s) |=F (Ki ϕ) iff for every s′ ∈ S such that (s,α i,s′) ∈ Pt , we have
(M′3,s′) |=F (ϕ). However, w.r.t the semantics of σe which is a DTMC deﬁned to
interpret commitment formulae overM′3, it follows that every inﬁnite path π ∈Πσe(s)
satisﬁes that π(1) = s′ and (σe,π(1)) |= F (ϕ). Thus, (σe,s) |= ©F (ϕ) for all
π ∈Πσe(s). As the path quantiﬁer A is not deﬁned in PCTL, and we have P≥1 instead,
so we obtain (σe,s) |= P≥1(©F (ϕ)).
• Φ=Ci→ jϕ . We have (M3,s) |=Ci→ jϕ iff (M3,s′) |=ϕ for every s′ ∈ S such that s≈i→ j
s′. Consequently, (M3,s) |=Ci→ jϕ iff (M′3,s) |=F (Ci→ jϕ). It follows that, (M3,s) |=
F (Ci→ jϕ) iff for every s′ ∈ S such that (s,β i j,s′) ∈ Pt , we have (M′3,s′) |=F (ϕ).
Now, based on the adversary σc which is a DTMC deﬁned to interpret commit-
ment formulae over M3, every inﬁnite path π ∈ Πσc(s) satisﬁes that π(1) = s′ and
(σc,π(1)) |=F (ϕ). Thus, (σc,s) |=©F (ϕ) for all π ∈ Πσc(s). As the path quan-
tiﬁer A is not deﬁned in PCTL, and we have P≥1 instead, so we obtain (σc,s) |=
P≥1(©F (ϕ)).
• Φ = Fu(Ci→ jϕ). We have (M3,s) |= Fu(Ci→ jϕ) iff there exists s′ ∈ S such that
s′ ≈i→ j s and (M3,s′) |=Ci→ jϕ . Consequently, (M3,s) |=F (Fu(Ci→ jϕ)) iff there
exists s′ ∈ S such that (s,γ i j,s′) ∈ Pt and (M′3,s′) |=F (Ci→ jϕ). Now, w.r.t the ad-
versary σ f which is a DTMC deﬁned to interpret fulﬁllment formulae over M3, we
obtain at least one inﬁnite path π ∈ Πσ f (s) that satisﬁes π(1) = s′ and (σ f ,π(1)) |=
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F (Ci→ jϕ). Since E is equivalent to P>0 andF (Ci→ jϕ) is equivalent to P≥1(©F (ϕ)),
so we obtain (σ f ,s) |= P>0(©P≥1(©F (ϕ))).
5.4 Implementation
We consider the web-based online shopping system [52] as a case study to evaluate the
effectiveness of our proposed veriﬁcation technique.
5.4.1 Online Shopping System
The online shopping system aims at providing an online shopping environment for cus-
tomers. Customers can request to purchase one or more items from the supplier. By re-
questing an item, the customer commits towards the supplier to pay in order for the request
to take place. Once the order is paid, the supplier conﬁrms the order, and commits to deliver
the requested item and enters a planned shipping date. Finally, when the order is shipped,
the customer is notiﬁed. Requested item is either successfully delivered or refund is issued
otherwise.
Because of the uncertainty associated to the underlying infrastructures of both com-
mitments (i.e., the internet through which the payment is made and the transport system
through which the delivery of purchased goods is done), there is no guarantee that these
commitments are going to be fulﬁlled. Reasoning about and verifying the commitment to
pay and the commitment to deliver have to be tackled with uncertainty in mind so that the
degree of fulﬁlling each commitment can be measured, and so on.
We verify the online shopping system by means of the reduction-based model check
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Figure 5.4: A model for the case of one supplier and one customer
between one supplier and one customer. In every experiment, we enlarge the system by
increasing the number of customers only. For simplicity, we assume that all customers per-
form the same commitment, which is the commitment to pay for the requested item, respec-
tively. We also assume that the supplier commits to all customers (i.e. a group commitment)
to deliver the requested items. This allows us to verify both classes of commitment; basic
social commitments and group social commitments.
5.4.2 System Properties
Properties that capture the probabilistic behavior of the online shopping system have been
veriﬁed using PRISM in various proposals, for instance [85]. In this section, special em-
phasis is given to properties related to the concepts of knowledge and social commitments.
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Concretely, we verify some system’s properties such as Safety, Liveness, and Reachabil-
ity that involve probabilistic knowledge, probabilistic commitments, and combinations of
both. For the case of social commitments, our veriﬁcation covers both basic and group
social commitments. All deﬁned properties are expressed in PCTLkc+.
• Safety Property: Verifying formulae expressing this property in the system mod-
els ensures avoiding the appearance of bad situations in the real systems. One bad
situation that need to be veriﬁed is when the (Cus) fulﬁlls his commitment to pay for
the requested order but the (Sup) does not commit to deliver the requested item. This
situation can be expressed in PCTLkc+ as follows:
ϕ2 = P≥1¬[P>0♦Fu(Ccus→sup(Pay))∧P≥1¬(Csup→cus(Deliver))]
• Liveness Property: In all computation paths it is always the case that if the cus-
tomer commits to pay for the requested item, then in the future the customer will
eventually make the payment. This can be expressed in PCLTkc+ as follows:
ϕ3 = P≥1[(Ccus→sup(Pay))⊃ P≥1♦Fu(Ccus→sup(Pay))]
• Reachability Property: One possible example with regard to the online shop-
ping system is that if the customer (Cus) commits towards the supplier (Sup) to pay
for the requested item, the state at which the customer can fulﬁll his commitment
should be reached from the initial state. That is, there should be a possibility from
the initial state for the customer to reach the fulﬁlment state. This can be formally
expressed in PCLTkc+ as follows:
ϕ1 = P>0♦Fu(Ccus→sup(Pay)).
Furthermore, thanks to the probabilistic model clacking technique, we can also get the
satisﬁability of given formulae in terms of quantitative results. That is, checking whether a
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given formula holds in the model with a threshold (at least 0.95% for example) is achiev-
able. Let us consider the following examples:
• Once the customer fulﬁlls his commitment to pay, he will be aware about the payment
with at least 0.95%.
ϕ4 = P>0.95 Fu(Ccus→sup(Pay))⊃ KcusPay
• Once the customer fulﬁlls his commitment to pay, the supplier will be aware about
the payment with at least 0.98%.
ϕ5 = P>0.98 Fu(Ccus→sup(Pay))⊃ KsupPay
5.4.3 Experimental Results
The online shopping system is encoded into the PRISM input language as follows. Supplier
agent (Sup) and Customer agent (Cus) are mapped into modules in the PRISM language.
Each agent’s actions are used to determine the behavior of the agent (i.e., his local states).
For example, Supplier’s actions (variables) are: Accept: Accept the request, Reject: Reject
the request, Deliver: Deliver the requested item, Receipt: Send receipt, Refund: Refund
in case of not delivery. The global model is obtained by the synchronization between all
modules (agents).
Our implementation was performed on a TOSHIBA laptop equipped with 32-bit Win-
dows XP with 1 GB of RAM and Genuine Intel(R) CPU at 1.6 GHz. Table 5.1 reports
the results of 15 experiments wherein (Exp.#) denotes the experiment number, (#Agent)
denotes the number of agents, (#States) denotes the number of reachable states, (#Transi-
tions) denotes the number of transitions, and (Construction Time) denotes the time needed
for building the simulated model in seconds.
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Table 5.1: Veriﬁcation results of the online shopping system
Exp.# #Agents #States #Transitions Const. Time (s)
Exp.1 2 30 74 0.031
Exp.2 3 210 700 0.039
Exp.3 4 1470 6102 0.047
Exp.4 5 1.02∗104 5.10∗104 0.063
Exp.5 6 7.20∗104 4.15∗105 0.078
Exp.6 7 5.04∗105 3.31∗106 0.109
Exp.7 8 3.52∗106 2.60∗107 0.189
Exp.8 9 2.47∗107 2.03∗108 0.328
Exp.9 10 1.73∗108 1.56∗109 0.516
Exp.10 11 1.21∗109 1.19∗1010 0.765
Exp.11 12 8.47∗109 9.01∗1010 1.406
Exp.12 13 5.93∗1010 6.79∗1011 2.219
Exp.13 14 4.15∗1011 5.09∗1012 6.094
Exp.14 15 2.91∗1012 3.8∗1013 8.046
Exp.15 16 2.03∗1013 2.82∗1014 13.406
First experiment started with only two agents; One supplier (Sup) and one Customer
(Cus). In the rest of experiments, we add one more customer (Cus) each time and report
the changes occurring in the size of the model and the time needed for building the model.
These results show that (#States) and (#Transitions) grow up exponentially as the system
is augmented with more agents. However, the (Construction Time) increases polynomially
till we reach a point close to the state explosion, then it grows up dramatically. Figure 5.5
shows the increase in the construction time as more agents join the system. This dramatic
change in the time needed to build the model reﬂects the fact that the model size becomes
massive.
Table 5.2 reports the model checking results for the deﬁned formulae (ϕ1 to ϕ5) for
the case of two agents (one customer and one supplier). All formulae hold in the model as
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Figure 5.5: Model construction time for the online shopping system
the system properties expressed using the probabilistic logic PCTLkc+. Moreover, as shown
in Table 5.2, although the model checking time varies from one formula to another, it is still
short compared to the time needed for building the model.
For scalability purposes, starting from experiment #2, we re-write the above-deﬁned
formulae in a parameterized form as follows:




















where n is the number of agents in the experiment.
To be able to verify group social commitments, which is one of the main motivations
of this chapter, we need models of one supplier agent interacting with two or more customer
agents by means of social commitments. Table 5.3 reports the results of verifying group
social commitments for experiment #2 and experiment #3 using the proposed reduction
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Table 5.2: Results of model checking some properties for the online shopping system






technique. In experiment #2, we have one supplier (Sup) committing to two customers
(Cus1) and (Cus2) to deliver the goods. The commitment should be fulﬁlled in the future
to meet the liveness property. Likewise, in experiment #3, we have one supplier (Sup)
committing to three customers (Cus1), (Cus2), and (Cus3) to deliver the requested items.
ϕ6 = P≥1[(Csup→{cus1,cus2}(Deliver))⊃ P≥1♦Fu(Csup→{cus1,cus2}(Deliver))]
ϕ7 = P≥1[(Csup→{cus1,cus2,cus3}(Deliver))⊃ P≥1♦Fu(Csup→{cus1,cus2,cus3}(Deliver))]
We were also successful in verifying formulae expressing the interaction between knowl-
edge and group social commitments for experiment #2 and experiment #3 as shown below.
ϕ8 = P≥1[Fu(Csup→{cus1,cus2}(Deliver))⊃ Kcus1(Deliver)∧Kcus2(Deliver)]
ϕ9 =P≥1[Fu(Csup→{cus1,cus2,cus3}(Deliver))⊃Kcus1(Deliver)∧Kcus2(Deliver)∧Kcus3(Deliver)]
Where, ϕ8 states that the fulﬁlment of a group commitment (the commitment from
sup to cus1 and cus2 to deliver) implies that every creditor in the group will know about the
content of the commitment (i.e., cus1 and cus2 will know about the delivery). Similarly, ϕ9
states the same meaning in the case when sup fulﬁlls its commitment to three customers.
Table 5.3: Model checking group commitment formulae
Exp.# #Agents Formulae Results
Exp.2 1 Sup, 2 Cus ϕ6 true
Exp.3 1 Sup, 3 Cus ϕ7 true
Exp.2 1 Sup, 2 Cus ϕ8 true
Exp.3 1 Sup, 3 Cus ϕ9 true
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a formal approach for specifying and verifying the interac-
tions between basic (individual) and group social commitments and knowledge in proba-
bilistic MASs. The proposed approach encompasses three main parts. In the ﬁrst part, we
presented a new probabilistic logic of knowledge and commitments (PCLTkc+). The expres-
sive power of PCLTkc+ outperforms those of existing logics because of its ability to express
and specify not only the concepts of knowledge and social commitments independently, but
also their interactions in the presence of uncertainty. Also, being enriched by operators for
the group knowledge and group commitments, PCLTkc+ allows handling more complicated
commitment scenarios with respect to the number of participating agents. We categorized
social commitments into two classes based on the number of participating agents; basic
social commitment (the common one-to-one scheme) and group social commitment (one-
to-many scheme). We then presented a formal semantics for the group social commitment.
With such a classiﬁcation of social commitments, we gain an insight into different ways to
utilize commitments among communicating parties. In contrast, exiting solutions for social
commitments restrict themselves to the common one-to-one commitment scheme.
In the second part, we proposed a sound and complete reduction-based model check-
ing technique for the new logic. The proposed technique consists of reducing the problem
of model checking PCLTkc+ to the problem of model checking PCTL. The soundness and
completeness of the reduction technique were proven. Finally, in the third part, we used the
PRISM tool to implement our reduction technique and check PCLTkc+ formulae by check-
ing their corresponding PCTL formulae without adding new computation cost. In terms of
scalability, we showed that our reduction technique is scalable as we were successfully able
to apply it on models of size up to 1013 states and 1014 transitions. To conclude, the two
main ﬁndings of this chapter are:
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1. Simply combining a probabilistic logic of knowledge and a probabilistic logic of
commitments to capture the interactions between the concept of knowledge and social
commitments in probabilistic MASs is not quite working as excepted.
2. Representing group social commitments and the interactions between group social
commitments and knowledge in the presence of uncertainty become attainable by the
use of our proposed framework.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have put forward a formal framework for agent communication using a
commitment-based approach in order to enable effective agent interactions in open, het-
erogeneous, and dynamic systems when uncertainty matters. The main purpose of this
framework is to essentially specify and reason about social commitments in probabilistic
settings, so they can be formally veriﬁed. As an improvement over the existing solutions,
our proposed framework targets systems exhibiting probabilistic behavior and considers
commitments among a group of agents. The framework is composed of three main compo-
nents. First, we presented a new probabilistic approach for tackling social commitments in
the presence of uncertainty. To specify probabilistic social commitments, we deﬁned a new
logic called the probabilistic logic of commitments (PCTLC). Our new logic is interpreted
over a new extended version of probabilistic interpreted systems. Furthermore, we intro-
duced a new reduction-based model checking technique for the new logic and implemented
it on top of the PRISM model checker. Then, by using the proposed reduction technique,
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we showed how to evaluate some systems’ properties representing probabilistic social com-
mitments – expressed in terms of the new logic – against system design models obtained
using our extended version of probabilistic interpreted systems.
The second component of our framework focused on the interaction between knowl-
edge and social commitments in probabilistic MASs. We introduced a new logic called
the probabilistic logic of knowledge and commitment (PCTLkc) to represent and reason
about such interactions. PCTLkc logic is interpreted over a new version of probabilistic
interpreted systems that has epistemic accessibility relations and social accessability rela-
tions at its core. To verify the new logic, we developed a veriﬁcation technique based on
model checking and implemented it using the PRISM tool. Our interest in the ﬁrst and
second contributions was focused on the common two-agent commitment scenarios (i.e.
agent-to-agent scheme).
In the third part of the framework, we improved and extended our work in the second
part as follows:
1. We reﬁned and improved PCTLkc to overcome the inconsistency problem appeared
when taking the recent work of Al-Saqqar et al. [1] into consideration. Therefore, in
this part, we adopted CTLKC+ [1] as a basis for our new logic and combined it with
PCTL.
2. We extended the scope of interacting agents from agent-to-agent to agent-to-many.
This allowed us to investigate different commitment schemes such as the case of
committing to multiple agents. In this respect, we deﬁned an adequate semantics for
group social commitments for the ﬁrst time in the literature.
Based on the new semantics of group social commitments and the consistent logic of knowl-
edge and commitment presented in [1], we presented a new probabilistic logic of knowl-
edge and commitment called (PCTLkc+). The new logic accommodates new operators for
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group social commitments and group knowledge in addition to the modalities already found
in PCTLkc. The expressiveness power of PCTLkc+ outperforms those of existing logics be-
cause of its ability not only to capture and express the combinations of knowledge and social
commitments in the presence of uncertainty, but also to express formulae involving group
social commitments. Formulae of PCTLkc+ are interpreted over a new extended version of
probabilistic interpreted systems. Our new version of interpreted systems integrates a mod-
iﬁed version of social accessabilities that accounts for basic social commitments, group
social commitments, and knowledge. To evaluate the new logic (PCTLkc+), we proposed a
reduction-based model checking technique and implemented it on top of PRISM.
Furthermore, we proved the soundness of all proposed veriﬁcation techniques. Also,
using different case studies we were successfully able to demonstrate the effectiveness and
usefulness of our proposed work and evaluate the scalability of the introduced veriﬁcation
techniques.
Finally, as the proposed framework permits addressing probabilistic social commit-
ments as well as their interaction with knowledge when the scope of interacting parties
moves beyond the common one-to-one scheme, we believe that it will advance the litera-
ture of agent communication and help MASs designers build more effective and efﬁcient
systems.
6.2 Future Work
There is still a long way to go in order to develop a comprehensive framework for proba-
bilistic social commitments in MASs. In the future, we plan to extend our work by investi-
gating several directions.
First, time complexity and space complexity of our proposed veriﬁcation techniques
are not analysed yet. Therefore, we intend to compute the complexity of the proposed
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reduction techniques of the three components.
Second, we are planning to extend our framework to support more commitment
schemes such as many-to-one and many-to-many commitments. This is extremely im-
portant because in real settings there exist situations where performing such commitment
scenarios contributes towards improving the efﬁciency of MASs.
Third, integrating more commitment actions (such as assign, delegate, ..etc) [98] are
of a great interest to investigate. This helps ensure that all possible commitment operations
employed in probabilistic environments are adequately dealt with.
Forth, we intend to explore the interaction between social commitments and norms in
probabilistic systems.
Fifth, another direction that we intend to explore is the probabilistic conditional social
commitments. Conditional social commitment is still in its infancy [68] and investigating
it in systems exhibiting stochastic behavior is an open point for research.
Finally, we plan to extend the PRISM model checker to accommodate our new op-
erators (i.e. commitment and group commitment) and then develop dedicated veriﬁcation
algorithms for the proposed logics and implement them directly into PRISM. So doing will
allow us to compare the results obtained from the indirect method (reduction-based tech-
niques) with the results of the direct method (dedicated algorithms).
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